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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
While scientific, engineering and social advancements have significantly raised 
the standard of living for much of the world’s population, these advances have also 
produced certain by-products, such as hazardous and radioactive waste. These materials 
are the unwanted result of energy production, mineral extraction and national defense 
programs, as well as industrial and manufacturing operations. In many circumstances, 
treatment processes do not exist that can destroy these materials. Because of these 
limitations, such materials are routinely disposed of in shallow burial grounds throughout 
the world. These disposal practices have restricted and limited the use of private and 
public property, have increased the risk to human health and the environment and have 
resulted in damage to the ecosystem by contaminating considerable volumes of soil and 
groundwater.  
 
Current Strategies for Contaminant Isolation 
Society is realizing that it cannot restore many of these environmentally 
contaminated sites to pristine conditions (NRC, 2000). Additionally, many of today’s 
waste management techniques do not eliminate the waste contaminants, but rather only 
concentrate or attempt to contain the contaminants of concern (Suter et al., 1993; Rumer 
and Mitchell, 1995; NRC, 1997; Applegate and Dycus, 1998; USEPA, 1998; Russell, 
2000). As such, risks to human health and the environment often remain at many sites 
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even after regulatory-approved environmental remediation operations are complete. 
These risks are associated with the residual wastes left in-place or disposed of on-site, as 
well as residual contamination of soils, facilities, surface water and groundwater.  
The primary strategy for managing these risks involves the emplacement of 
contaminated materials into near-surface contaminant isolation facilities and subsequent 
long-term monitoring of the facility and surrounding groundwater. The best available 
technology is most often used in the design, construction and monitoring of isolation 
facilities. The intent of these facilities is to maintain the long-term isolation of the 
identified contaminants (radioactive, organic, inorganic, etc.) as well as to mitigate their 
associated hazards (gamma radiation, radon emanation, contaminant migration, fire and 
explosion potential, etc.). 
 
Applicable Regulations 
The United States is addressing waste-related problems by enforcing a variety of 
environmental regulations. Two primary regulations applicable to the remediation of 
abandoned radioactive and hazardous waste sites are the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 and the Uranium Mill 
Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) of 1978. CERCLA, commonly known as 
Superfund, establishes the framework for the federal response to the release of hazardous 
substances that endanger public health or the environment (CERCLA 1994). UMTRCA 
defines the remediation requirements for abandoned sites that processed uranium and 
related ores for the federal government (UMTRCA 1978). 
Additional related regulations include the Resources Conservation and Recovery 
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Act (RCRA) of 1976 (RCRA 1976), the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act (Brownfields) of 2002 (USEPA, 2002d) and the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s (USNRC) Consolidated Nuclear Material Safety and 
Safeguards Guidance of 2002 (USNRC, 2002). RCRA establishes requirements for 
managing hazardous, industrial and household wastes from generation through disposal 
to minimize future pollution that could result from solid waste landfills. The Brownfields 
Program focuses on abandoned, idle or under-utilized industrial and commercial facilities 
where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental 
contamination. The USNRC program provides decommissioning guidance to nuclear 
facility licensees. Of particular interest is the USNRC’s requirements for License 
Termination (USNRC, 2003b) as well as the USNRC Long Term Control Possession 
Only License (USNRC, 2004).  
Despite such regulatory constructs, waste isolation strategies often fail and 
environmental problems persist. This is partly the result of the long-lived nature of some 
contaminants, as well as technical, economic, social and political limitations.  
 
Problem Statement 
Society’s experience with modern waste isolation techniques is beginning to show 
that contaminant isolation facilities and associated management techniques do not always 
perform as expected (USGAO, 1990). The reality is that actual performance can deviate 
from planned performance. If not rectified by the site stewards, these performance 
deviations can negatively affect facility performance to the point that the system fails, 
resulting in negative consequences such as exposure of human receptors to the residual 
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contaminants. 
Figure 1 illustrates the prevailing concept used for the management of residual 
contaminants. Remedial operations often consolidate contaminated materials on-site and 
contain these residual contaminants in an isolation facility. The management objective of 
such a facility is to maintain isolation of the contaminants for hundreds of years, although 
in most situations it will be required for perpetuity. In a few limited situations, assuming 
the contaminants decay, the associated site risk could reduce to acceptable levels and the 
site could potentially be released for unrestricted use. 
Remedial
Operations
Residual
Waste
Contaminant
Isolation Facility
Management
Unrestricted 
Use
Failure & 
ConsequencesPotential Re-exposure
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model for residual contaminant isolation management. 
 
The management of the contaminant isolation facility can be seen as the critical 
step within this process. This management step generally includes two key components – 
maintaining engineered barriers and maintaining institutional controls. Engineered 
barriers are physical modifications to the natural setting, including the site, facility and/or 
the residual materials themselves. They are used to reduce or eliminate the potential for 
exposure to contaminants of concern (COCs). Conversely, institutional controls are 
processes, instruments and mechanisms designed to influence human behavior and 
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activity. They are used to limit the activities performed on one’s land. 
The relevant science, state-of-the-art practice and regulatory structure of the time 
govern the implementation details of the management process. As society gains 
additional knowledge, regulations are subsequently modified and operational 
requirements to reduce long-term risks are enhanced. Enhancements tend to focus on 
either improving the reliability of engineered components or clarifying the administration 
of the institutional controls.  
Engineered structures are designed to perform within expected ranges. Simulation 
models are often used to predict potential long-term material performance and possible 
contaminant migration. Engineering advancements have led to improved construction 
materials, advanced facility designs and new performance models, which improve the 
system reliability by reducing the performance uncertainties.   
Advancements in the area of institutional controls appear to be less developed. 
Growing attention in the social sciences literature, with regard to the institutional 
management of residual waste, acknowledges the need to further explore the types of 
institutional controls that can and are being used as well as identifying their potential 
effectiveness (Pendergrass, 1996; English et al., 1997; Breggin et al., 1998; Edwards, 
2003a; USGAO, 2005).  
As noted by the National Academy of Science, society should plan for fallibility 
with regard to long-term contaminant isolation (NRC, 2000). The research presented in 
this dissertation builds on this recommendation.  
Specifically, the central focus of this research is the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of institutional controls and the associated functions required to 
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complement the engineered barriers. Although these isolation facilities are intended to 
successfully perform in perpetuity, this research is focused on evaluating their 
effectiveness during the first 100 years.  
It is important to note that the described research focuses on near-surface residual 
contaminant isolation facilities only. Other types of contaminant isolation facilities 
(geologic repositories, aquitards, etc.) are not addressed. 
 
Research Hypothesis 
Current near-surface (i.e., within the top 10 meters of the earth’s surface) 
contaminant isolation approaches will ultimately fail without continued human 
intervention, given the longevity of the contaminants (i.e., half-lives rates greater than 
100 years). System failure could be the result of engineered barrier errors, institutional 
control errors or a combination of both.  
Given that the objective of a contaminant isolation facility is to maintain isolation 
of the known contaminants until such time that they are no longer a risk to humans or the 
environment, failure, in the context of this research, refers to a contaminant isolation 
facility’s inability to achieve its objective of maintaining contaminant isolation. In other 
words, failure corresponds to an inability to provide contaminant isolation. The 
consequences associated with such failures will be site-specific, because they depend on 
the contaminants present, exposure routes and rates, and the receptors involved. 
Two simplified scenarios (ingress and egress) illustrate this definition of failure. 
In one scenario, the potential human receptors, animals or vegetation breach the isolation 
controls of the contaminant isolation facility and ingress into the contaminated material. 
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In the second scenario, the contaminated material escapes (egresses) from the 
contaminant isolation facility and is available for potential exposure. Both of these 
scenarios could represent acute or chronic occurrences and can result in a range of 
consequences (i.e., irrelevant through severe) depending on site-specific conditions.  
Preventing both of these scenarios from occurring is the primary objective of the 
contaminant isolation facility management component depicted in Figure 1. This 
component involves maintaining and monitoring the isolation controls employed at the 
contaminant isolation facility. Reliability engineering, however, has shown that a variety 
of errors can occur, which can affect a system’s performance (Reason, 1990). In terms of 
contaminant isolation facility management, errors are events in which a planned 
sequence of activities does not achieve its intended outcome. Errors are potential 
precursors to contaminant isolation facility failure. They indicate that actions did not go 
according to the plan or that the plan itself was inadequate to achieve the objective 
(Reason, 1997). 
 
Research Goal 
The goal of this research is to define the institutional responsibilities of a 
sustainable environmental protection system for the improved management of residual 
contaminants. Sustainable systems include not only engineered barriers and institutional 
controls but they may also need to include an expanded set of institutional responsibilities 
to minimize error precursors. Institutional responsibilities involve a set of management 
functions that are necessary to maintain the engineered barriers and institutional controls. 
To achieve this goal, this research: 
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• Evaluates existing contaminant isolation facilities, strategies, controls and systems 
in the form of case studies,  
• Determines if and how errors and failures occurred, 
• Identifies interactions between the engineered barriers and institutional controls, 
and  
• Develops a framework for evaluating institutional responsibilities to improve the 
long-term (100-years) management of residual contaminants. 
The results of this research can be used to support the planning and 
implementation of improved and more sustainable long-term management strategies at 
relevant residual contaminant sites. Furthermore, this research could support the 
development of new isolation facilities. 
 
Project Relevance 
Results of this research are applicable to a variety of organizations that are 
responsible for the long-term management of residual waste sites. Sites of interest include 
both federal facilities and non-federal facilities. 
 
Federal Facilities 
Federal facilities are those facilities or lands that are owned or leased by the 
federal government. The management responsibilities for these properties reside in a 
specific office within the executive branch of the federal government. 
The U.S. Government Accounting Office (USGAO) reports that as of fiscal year 
2001 the U.S. federal government's environmental liabilities total $307 billion (USGAO, 
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2003). This is a conservative estimate because it includes only currently known liabilities. 
Liabilities include excess military bases, closed energy production facilities and legacy 
waste sites.  
Two federal agencies, the U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE) and the U.S. 
Department of Defense (USDOD), account for 98% of the known environmental 
liabilities. The USDOE accounts for 78% or $238 billion and the USDOD accounts for 
20% or $63 billion (USGAO, 2003). The remaining environmental liabilities are the 
responsibility of other federal agencies such as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(USNRC) and the U.S. Department of Interior (USDOI). 
 
U.S. Department of Energy 
The USDOE manages one of the largest environmental remediation efforts in the 
world. This effort involves the remediation of sites negatively affected by 50 years of 
nuclear energy research and weapons production. The USDOE has identified 113 known 
geographic sites located in 30 states and one territory (USDOE, 1997c; USDOE, 1999a). 
USDOE’s cleanup challenges include the remediation of 40 million cubic meters of 
contaminated soil and buried waste, 1.7 trillion gallons of contaminated groundwater and 
the deactivation and decommissioning of more than 4000 excess facilities, as well as the 
long-term care of uranium mine and mill tailings (USDOE, 2001d; USDOE, 2001e). 
In 2001, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) 
completed a baseline assessment of the USDOE cleanup program (INEEL, 2001). This 
assessment shows that the USDOE cleanup program is planning to “close” sites and shift 
its resources from active remediation (i.e., facility demolition, waste processing, waste 
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containment) to post-closure management (i.e., long-term stewardship). Long-term 
stewardship, as defined by the USDOE, includes those activities necessary to protect 
human health and the environment from hazards and wastes remaining at sites (or 
portions of sites) once active remediation is complete (USDOE, 2001d).  
 
U.S. Department of Defense 
 
The USDOD has responsibility for all active defense sites, major and minor 
installations slated for realignment (i.e., sites to be reused for other USDOD missions) or 
closure sites via the Base Realignment and Closure program (BRAC). In addition, 
USDOD is accountable for more than 9000 Formally Used Defense Sites (FUDS) that 
had a historic USDOD role. Similar to the USDOE, a significant percentage of these sites 
have some form of environmental contamination and many are expected to require post-
remediation controls. 
Questions continue to arise concerning USDOD environmental management 
practices. For example, the USGAO has questioned whether the USDOD had adequate 
justification in determining that more than 4000 FUDS have no remaining hazards and, 
therefore, required no further cleanup study or cleanup action (USGAO, 2002b). 
 
Other Federal Agencies 
Other federal agencies face similar challenges with regard to the long-term 
isolation of residual hazards. Although these agencies were not the focus of this research, 
they likely would have similar problems and therefore benefit from these results. 
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Non-Federal Facilities 
State and local governments and private industry are also concerned with residual 
contaminants, Brownfields sites, contaminated landfills, abandoned mine sites and 
abandoned hazardous waste sites. These sites include publicly held properties of a state or 
municipality and privately owned sites, as well as abandoned properties. 
The environmental remediation of these non-federal sites is accomplished through 
collaborative efforts of both the federal (i.e., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) and 
the individual state regulators. These efforts are conducted consistent with federal 
regulations established primarily by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
CERCLA Sites 
CERCLA is of primary importance when considering environmental remediation 
and waste isolation. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) has managed 
the Superfund Program for the past 24 years since CERCLA was enacted in 1980. This 
program has two primary areas of focus: the long-term cleanup of contaminated sites and 
an emergency response program (USEPA, 2004g).  
Superfund is a large, complex program, with approximately $18 billion being 
expended to date (USEPA, 2004g). The USEPA established the National Priority List 
(NPL) in 1980 as a way of prioritizing the program’s work. The USEPA has placed 
approximately 1518 sites on the NPL (although 274 have since been deleted) and 
approximately 30 new sites are added each year. These sites include both federal facilities 
and non-federal facilities. 
Approximately 900 NPL sites have completed remedial construction. Nearly 70% 
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of these sites have some form of post-closure institutional controls as part of their 
environmental remedy (Bellot, 2003a). Following the completion of remedial 
construction, the USEPA initiates a five-year review process to verify that the remedies 
are performing as anticipated. The USEPA completed 134 five-year reviews annually 
from 1999 to 2003 (USEPA, 2004g). The number of reviews completed by the USEPA 
annually is increasing, as an increased number of sites are being completed. 
The emergency response program within Superfund was originally established to 
enable rapid response and clean up of sites that presented immediate threats to human 
health and the environment. This program has expanded in recent years to include other 
emergencies such as train derailments, biological contamination, etc. Approximately 
7000 emergency actions have been conducted as part of this program. 
 
Brownfields Sites 
 
The USEPA also manages the Brownfields Program (USEPA, 2004b). 
Brownfields sites are defined as real property, the expansion, redevelopment or reuse of 
which could be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant or contaminant (USEPA, 2004b). Brownfields sites include sites that 
a.) meet the definition, b.) are contaminated by a controlled substance, c.) are 
contaminated by petroleum products, d.) are relatively low risk (i.e., not qualified for 
inclusion on the NPL) and have no viable responsible party, and/or e.) are mine-scarred 
lands (USEPA, 2002a; Bromm et al., 2003). More than 400,000 Brownfields sites are 
believed to be present throughout the United States (USEPA, 2002a; USEPA, 2004b). 
Following active remediation, however, many of these sites will require continued long-
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term management because residual contaminants (volatile organic compounds, heavy 
metals, etc.) will remain on-site at elevated levels that restrict site use. The management 
of these residual waste sites could benefit from the findings of this research. 
 
Dissertation Structure 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter I introduces the problem of 
residual contaminant isolation and presents the objectives of the research project.  
Chapter II provides a description of current management systems, including both 
engineered barriers and institutional controls. Chapter III reviews the relevant 
institutional control literature with a focus on the process of managing residual 
contaminants. Chapter IV presents the research methodology, including descriptions of 
the case study approach and fault tree analysis. Chapter V contains individual reports for 
each of the selected case studies as well as a summary of all cases. The individual reports 
include the findings and observations obtained from each of the studies. Chapter VI 
presents a cross-case analysis. This analysis includes the development of fault trees 
useful in identifying potential error pathways that could lead to system failure. Research 
conclusions and recommendations are presented in Chapter VII. The dissertation also 
contains a Glossary of Terms section and individual data collection checklists as 
appendices and a Bibliography. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CONTAMINANT ISOLATION FACILITY 
 
Introduction 
A contaminant isolation facility maintains separation of hazardous contaminants 
(radioactive, organic and inorganic by-products) from potential human receptors. This 
protection includes the mitigation of associated hazards such as contaminated leachate 
migration, gamma radiation and radon emanation. 
While various contaminant isolation facility design configurations are being used 
throughout the world (IAEA, 2001), these are most often viewed as “closed systems” 
having no interaction with the surrounding environment (Jones et al.). As such, to 
maintain long-term isolation, the contaminant isolation facility must successfully prevent 
the release of contaminants via the following five mechanisms: 
• Infiltration of water (precipitation and surface runoff) into the waste,  
• Groundwater intrusion (lateral and vertical flow) into the waste,  
• Leachate migration from the waste,  
• Human and other biological intrusion into the waste, and  
• Release of gases (e.g., radon) from the contaminant isolation facility. 
This chapter draws primarily on the experience generated from near-surface 
(within 10 meters of the earth’s surface) contaminant isolation facilities designed for 
chemical and radioactive waste (e.g., low-level waste and uranium mill tailings).  
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Subsystems of a Contaminant Isolation Facility 
A contaminant isolation facility generally involves the integration of three 
subsystems that collectively attempt to prevent the unwanted release of contaminants via 
the aforementioned five mechanisms. The three subsystems of the contaminant isolation 
facility include (1) the natural environmental setting (geology, climate, etc.) in which the 
contaminant isolation facility is located, (2) the engineered subsystem (i.e., active 
processes and passive engineered barriers), and (3) the institutional controls subsystem 
(i.e., administrative land use controls). Figure 2 is an illustration of a typical contaminant 
isolation facility. 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of a typical contaminant isolation facility. The insert highlights the 
engineered subsystem (Kostelnik et al., 2004). 
 
 
Natural Subsystem 
The natural subsystem (i.e., environmental setting) in which a contaminant 
isolation facility is located is of critical importance during the siting process for a new 
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disposal facility. During the siting process, a site’s environmental characteristics are 
evaluated to identify areas most suitable for locating such a facility. For other 
circumstances in which waste materials were generated at a site and are likely to remain 
on-site, the natural subsystem is obviously not a factor in the siting process although it 
remains a critical subsystem. In either scenario, the important environmental 
characteristics of a site are: 
• Geology (geomorphology, geomechanics, seismicity, etc.) 
• Hydrogeology (permeability, hydraulic conductivity, etc.) 
• Climate (precipitation, temperature, vegetation, etc.) 
• Topography (slope, landscape, etc.). 
 
Engineered Subsystem 
The engineered subsystem of a contaminant isolation facility serves to augment 
the natural subsystem. The engineered subsystem could involve active processes as well 
as passive engineered barriers. Active processes involve ongoing remedial operations at a 
site. These could include groundwater pump and treat operations, vapor vacuum 
extraction operations and bio-remediation operations. Passive engineered barriers found 
at a typical near-surface contaminant isolation facility consist of a surface cover, the 
stabilized hazardous material and subsurface barriers (bottom liners and side walls). More 
recent designs also include a leachate recovery system (IAEA, 2001). The insert in Figure 
2 illustrates the typical configuration of these various engineered layers. 
The engineered cover or top liner of a near-surface contaminant isolation facility 
performs two critical functions. First, it prevents and minimizes the infiltration of 
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precipitation and surface water run-off into the contaminated material. Second, it 
prevents or minimizes the potential for direct contact with the contaminants. The 
engineered cover uses several specific barrier layers, consistent with site-specific 
requirements, to achieve these two functions. 
An engineered cover typically includes an optional soil layer, an erosion 
protection barrier, a surface-water drainage layer and a low hydraulic conductivity 
primary protection layer (refer to the Figure 2 insert). Additional radiation/radon barriers 
and structural stability layers could be required depending on site-specific requirements.  
Current designs make use of both natural and synthetic materials. Although the 
typical cover design using this multiple-layer approach evolved over time, it is important 
to note that regulatory requirements typically prescribe the minimum performance 
standards as well as the cover design itself. Alternative design approaches, often 
considered to be more appropriate given site-specific environmental conditions, must 
demonstrate equivalency to the prescribed design (Benson et al., 2002; Clarke et al., 
2004).  
The contaminated material (e.g., tailings, waste, debris) placed in the contaminant 
isolation facility is generally compacted or otherwise stabilized to reduce the potential for 
post-closure subsidence and settlement. Stabilization also minimizes porosity and 
controls the permeability within the contaminant isolation facility. The incorporation of a 
leachate recovery system and subsurface barriers (e.g., bottom liners), if used, are 
predicated on site hydrology, ecology, climate, local groundwater characteristics and use 
patterns and regulatory requirements (USEPA, 2004h). 
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Institutional Controls Subsystem 
Institutional controls are “non-engineered” mechanisms that influence human 
behavior and land use activity (USEPA, 2002c). According to the USEPA, institutional 
controls should be used to supplement engineered barriers at residual waste sites 
(USEPA, 2002c). Institutional controls most often used in the United States include 
government controls, such as local zoning and groundwater use restrictions and property-
based controls, such as deed restrictions and covenants (Borinsky, 1995; Gaspar and 
Burik, 1998). Chapter III provides further details regarding the types of institutional 
controls implemented at a contaminant isolation facility. 
There are two predominant strategies associated with controlling land use at 
residual waste sites. One land use strategy attempts to maintain the complete separation 
of human receptors from the potentially contaminated property. Within this strategy, 
residual waste areas are isolated and eliminated from further use by society. Because 
these sites have not been returned to productive use following remediation these sites are 
often referred to as “sacrifice zones.” 
A second or alternative land use strategy used at residual waste sites involves 
actively reusing a portion of the property. At these sites, current and future human 
activity (residential, industrial, agricultural, etc.) considered appropriate for the area, is 
evaluated during the remedial planning process (ASTM, 2000a). Land use activity is then 
limited based on the potential risks associated with the remediated site. This risk-based 
approach is becoming more acceptable to regulators and stakeholders. Such an approach 
is also being incorporated into a number of key remediation programs such as the USEPA 
Brownfields Program and the USDOE Environmental Management Program (USDOE, 
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2003; USEPA, 2004b) as well as the USNRC nuclear facility license program (USNRC, 
2003b). 
 
Management of a Contaminant Isolation Facility 
Studies have shown that contaminant isolation facilities are not “closed systems” 
operating independent of their surroundings (NRC, 1997; USEPA, 1998; Clarke et al., 
2004). Instead, there is considerable interaction between the contaminant isolation facility 
and its surroundings. These interactions include hydrologic, climatic, biologic, geologic 
and chemical influences at the surface as well as within the vadose and saturated zones.  
In fact, studies have shown that chemical, physical and biological processes begin 
to influence the performance of a contaminant isolation facility soon after its construction 
(Suter et al., 1993; USDOE, 1997b; USDOE, 1999b). Figure 3 illustrates a number of the 
key interactions that influence contaminant isolation facility performance.  
 
 
Figure 3. Numerous factors influence contaminant isolation facility performance. 
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To ensure continued system performance, site stewards must be actively involved 
in the management of the contaminant isolation facility. This management involves two 
primary activities (monitor and maintain) related to two of the three subsystems (the 
engineered subsystem and the institutional control subsystem). 
 
Monitoring 
A systematic monitoring program is critical for evaluating the long-term 
performance of a contaminant isolation facility (USEPA, 1998). Monitoring involves the 
active investigation and observation of processes, operations, structures and controls 
applied at a specific site.  
Visual inspection of the contaminant isolation facility and all of its physical 
features continues to be the primary qualitative monitoring technique. These inspections 
are useful in identifying deficiencies in both the engineered and institutional control 
subsystems. Natural events, which can affect the engineered structures and could include 
erosion, bio-intrusion, subsidence, material degradation, infiltration and seepage, can be 
observed through visual inspections. Likewise, anthropogenic events, such as deliberate 
human intrusion, vandalism and property restriction violations inconsistent with the land 
use restrictions, can also be detected through visual inspections. 
The second form of monitoring applied at a contaminant isolation facility is 
quantitative. This method consists of analyzing samples from the area surrounding the 
contaminant isolation facility, including the vadose zone, the saturated zone and the 
leachate recovery system. These quantitative methods serve to indirectly detect evidence 
of performance deficiencies such as increased saturated conductivity or material 
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performance deficiencies. Although the intent of this approach is to provide an early 
warning of future problems, this approach, in many instances, serves as confirmation of a 
system failure. 
Monitoring measures need to be performed in accordance with a schedule best 
defined after considering site-specific conditions. Sampling strategies generally are 
conducted on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis. Site-wide visual inspections are often 
performed annually or every five years (e.g., CERCLA five-year reviews). 
 
Maintenance 
Maintenance activities are required to ensure that the contaminant isolation 
facility subsystems continue to perform as designed. These activities are needed for 
active processes, passive engineered barriers and the associated institutional controls. 
Maintenance efforts for active remedial processes, which are commonly 
associated with the ongoing treatment of contaminated groundwater or a treatable source-
term in the vadose zone, could include continued power supply, equipment repair and 
sample management. Maintenance efforts for engineered surface covers could include 
repairs to damaged layers resulting from surface erosion or bio-intrusion, re-contouring 
surface features and vegetative controls (cutting, spraying herbicide, etc.). Maintenance 
of the subsurface barrier components is generally minimal if these components are 
designed and installed properly. Failure of these components, however, could require 
repair, replacement or re-remediation of the site. 
Maintaining institutional controls differs somewhat from the maintenance of 
engineered barriers. Maintaining institutional controls requires administrative actions as 
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well as legal enforcement of the controls. Reviewing regional land use change requests, 
zoning change requests and land transfer records could be maintenance functions that are 
required to ensure land use restrictions are not inappropriately modified. Information 
collection, integration and reporting including periodic public notice will also be 
required. 
 
Institutional Responsibilities 
Additional maintenance responsibilities exist beyond the conventional 
institutional controls. Included within these responsibilities is the need to: 
• Maintain the security of the site from inadvertent or intentional intrusion,  
• Maintain financial security of the site and associated functions,  
• Maintain a multi-generational awareness within the local community,  
• Maintain emergency/contingency plans and perform emergency actions when 
applicable,  
• Maintain information/records,  
• Evaluate the surrounding environment/ecosystem, and  
• Continually assess the performance of the system and identify areas for 
improvement. 
 
Logic Diagram for Contaminant Isolation Facility Management 
The management of a contaminant isolation facility is a complex dynamic process 
in that individual activities could change over time. Site stewards must be able to 
recognize such temporal changes and adjust their management approach accordingly. 
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Figure 4 illustrates a logic diagram applicable to site stewards for assessing the 
management function of a contaminant isolation facility. The diagram highlights three 
operational questions related to the presence of existing subsystem components (Active 
Operations, Engineered Barriers and Land use Restrictions). A positive response to any 
of these three questions triggers site-specific requirements. Such requirements could 
include the monitoring and maintenance of remedial processes, engineered barriers or 
institutional controls. The site-specific monitoring and maintenance requirements can be 
viewed as the institutional responsibilities of the site stewards. 
 
 
 
Active 
Operations?
CONTAMINANT 
ISOLATION FACILITY
MANAGEMENT
Engineered 
Barriers?
Land-use
Restrictions?
UNRESTRICTED USE
Monitor/Maintain 
Remedial Processes
Monitor/Maintain 
Engineered Barriers
Monitor/Maintain  
Institutional 
Controls
No No No
Yes Yes Yes
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
 
 
Figure 4. A logic diagram applicable to site stewards for assessing the management 
functions of a Contaminant Isolation Facility. 
 
 
An important aspect of institutional responsibilities, as shown in Figure 4, is that 
some form of institutional control should be present for all sites having a restricted-use 
classification. Because of this broad applicability, the long-term effectiveness of 
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institutional controls appears to be significant.  
The following chapter contains a review of the pertinent literature for institutional 
controls. This discussion includes an overview of the controls currently in practice. It 
then focuses on the specific application of institutional controls for the management of 
residual waste sites. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS  
 
Introduction 
Institutional controls are processes, instruments and mechanisms designed to 
influence human behavior and activity. These controls generally take the form of legal or 
administrative restrictions. Such controls are also commonly referred to as land use 
controls (LUCs) (ICMA, 2000) or activity and use limitations (AULs) (Edwards, 2000a). 
Collectively, institutional controls are most often described in terms of their method of 
control, the manner in which they are established or the application for which they are 
intended. 
This review begins with an overall introduction to institutional controls and then 
focuses on the application of these controls with respect to the management of residual 
contaminants. Included in this review are a summary of institutional control applications, 
various methods of direct or indirect control and a discussion of the methods for 
establishing and funding institutional controls. The review also includes an introduction 
to the legal aspects involved with institutional controls. Various federal, state and local 
implementation guidance is presented as well as a summary of various evaluations and 
studies that have investigated the performance of institutional controls. 
 
Institutional Control Applications 
There are two primary applications associated with the implementation of 
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institutional controls (Clancy-Hepburn et al., 1995; Pendergrass, 1996). Institutional 
controls are routinely used as a means of preserving and protecting valuable assets 
(preservation of land, water, cultural resources, etc.) and as a method of influencing and 
restricting current and future behavior (e.g., use-restrictions) due to potential 
incompatibility. 
 
Preservation and Protection 
The federal government has routinely used institutional controls to protect 
specific assets either for preservation or use-restriction purposes. Pendergrass (1996) 
provides an introduction to a number of federal programs that use institutional controls 
for preservation purposes. Examples of these types of programs and applications include 
Historic Preservation, Buried Utility Protection, Ecosystem Preservation, Floodplain 
Management, Wellhead/Aquifer Protection and Waste Management.  
The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966, as amended through 
1992, established the federal policy whereby the use of institutional controls, including 
financial and technical assistance, was encouraged to preserve historic and cultural 
aspects of the nation. The Act states that the preservation of the irreplaceable heritage is 
in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, 
inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future 
generations of Americans (NHPA 1966). NHPA directs that actions be taken to ensure 
that significant prehistoric and historic artifacts, and associated records, be managed by 
an institution with adequate long-term curatorial capabilities (NHPA 1966). Such an 
institution could be the appropriate State Historic Preservation Program working in 
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cooperation with other nations and states, local governments, Native American tribes, 
private organizations and individuals. 
The U.S. Department of Interior (USDOI) represents the largest federal 
preservation and protection program. Consisting of eight Bureaus, the USDOI is 
responsible for managing approximately 20% of the entire U.S. landmass. USDOI’s goals 
include protecting the environment and preserving our nation’s natural and cultural 
resources, managing these natural resources for a healthy environment and a strong 
economy and providing recreation for America (USDOI, 2003). USDOI’s preservation 
responsibilities include natural resource preservation, wildlife refuges, national parks, 
cultural resources and national heritage, cooperative conservation, water resource 
management, mineral resources, Native American affairs, etc. 
States and local municipalities have also used various forms of institutional 
controls to protect their assets. Surprisingly, however, many of these organizations do not 
always recognize these mechanisms as institutional controls (ASTSWMO, 1997). For 
example, the protection of buried utilities is a preservation control frequently not 
recognized as an institutional control. Various states have established procedures for 
planning and conducting excavations near underground utility facilities (FLDEP, 2002; 
Illinois 2002; Ohio 1990). The purpose of these laws is to reduce damage to gas, water, 
oil, steam, telephone, cable television and sewer lines. These laws establish state-level 
requirements for maintaining location records, which are important for locating all 
utilities, providing advance notice prior to any excavation, the establishment of one-call 
statewide information management systems and emergency excavation procedures. 
In addition to various government-led preservation controls, numerous private 
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organizations have been established with the primary goal to preserve various ecological 
assets, such as scenic rivers and natural resources. Major environmental groups, such as 
the Nature Conservancy and the Sierra Club Foundation, have formed to consolidate 
membership and promote preservation positions (Nature, 2003; Sierra, 2003). These 
types of conservation groups achieve their preservation goals through the use of a variety 
of institutional mechanisms. The Nature Conservancy, for example, often buys then 
manages areas they deem ecologically important. The Conservancy also negotiates 
partnerships or conservation easements whereby the Conservancy agrees to manage areas 
without actually holding title to the property. In addition to these direct methods, 
conservation organizations are often involved in training and educational programs and 
they also work with resource-based industries to influence their business practices 
(Nature, 2003). 
 
Use Restrictions 
The second application of institutional controls involves restrictions applied to the 
use of land. This application limits either current or future behavior because certain land-
uses are deemed incompatible with the land’s condition or location (Clancy-Hepburn et 
al., 1995; Hersh et al., 2002). 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), is an example of a federal institutional control 
program designed to reduce construction in flood-prone areas. Although participation in 
this program is voluntary, NFIP offers incentives as a means of attracting community 
participation (FEMA, 2000). These incentives include the ability to obtain federal flood 
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insurance and low-interest loans. Participating communities that satisfy the federal rules 
are encouraged to establish then enforce the provisions of the program through state and 
local zoning laws, ordinances and building codes (FEMA, 2002b). 
A second example of a land use restriction program involves the protection of 
public groundwater supplies. Groundwater is of critical importance to federal, state and 
local authorities. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) enacted in 1974 and amended in 
1986, established a new program for the protection of public groundwater supplies. The 
Wellhead Protection (WHP) Program, administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEPA), was the first resource-based approach at the federal level for ensuring 
that public groundwater supplies were protected from a wide range of potential 
contaminating sources (USEPA, 1999c; FLDEP, 2003a). With the programmatic goal of 
protection, the institutional controls established limitations on uses that were deemed 
inappropriate for groundwater recharge areas. 
 
Institutional Control of Residual Contaminants 
Use-restrictions associated with environmentally contaminated sites are one area 
that is receiving increased attention. Hazardous, radioactive and other toxic substances 
(i.e., contaminants of concern) have routinely been generated and subsequently disposed 
of in the shallow subsurface throughout the world (NRC, 2000; Tucker, 2001; USDOE, 
2001d; Long, 2002). Hazardous and/or contaminated material that remains on-site 
following active operations or the completion of remedial actions continues to pose risk 
to humans and the environment. These risks represent a significant and chronic problem 
(Edwards, 1997). 
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Edwards and North (1997) have found that institutional controls were historically 
used as an interim measure before and during an active remediation program. Under 
current regulations, institutional controls are not to be used as a substitute for active 
response actions. CERCLA and RCRA remedies, for sites having residual contamination, 
often use institutional controls to protect the integrity of engineered barriers as well as to 
minimize the potential of human exposure to the contaminants (Bellot, 2003b; Miller, 
2003). 
Institutional controls, however, have become a more integral part of long-term 
corrective actions (USEPA, 2000). This is primarily because the remediation and 
subsequent management of contaminated sites is increasing linked to current and future 
land use projections (CERCLA 1994).  
Several studies have shown that land use considerations are complex issues 
(Mazurek and Hersh, 1997; Wernstedt and Hersh, 1997; Wernstedt and Probst, 1997; 
Wernstedt et al., 1998). As discussed by White et al. (1993), land use concerns directly 
affect baseline risk assessments. Areas with land use restrictions are often categorized in 
ways that define acceptable activities, such as agricultural, industrial, recreational and 
commercial uses. These projected uses are linked to remediation decisions and, therefore, 
the classifications serve as a measure of acceptable future risk (Applegate and Dycus, 
1998; Hersh et al., 2002). 
The USDOE, which is responsible for one of the largest environmental 
management efforts in the world (USDOE, 1997c), has recently provided a revised post-
remediation policy. DOE Policy 455.1, a Policy Statement on the Use of Risk-Based End 
States, provides direction to USDOE management and attempts to establish a common 
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understanding of how the USDOE will consider post-remediation conditions/risk in 
remediation strategies (USDOE, 2003). 
 
Methods of Control 
According to Clancy-Heburn et al. institutional controls can be viewed as direct 
or indirect controls (Clancy-Hepburn et al., 1995). Direct mechanisms involve the forced 
control of another’s actions. This is often achieved through legal instruments such as 
property ownership or regulatory requirements. Indirect mechanisms attempt to influence 
another’s actions but lack the legal authority to enforce these actions. Indirect control 
mechanisms include such actions as information management, education and effective 
notices. 
 
Mechanisms for Establishing Institutional Controls 
A number of legal mechanisms exist for establishing institutional controls. The 
literature attempts to differentiate these mechanisms in a variety of ways. A National 
Research Council (NRC) Committee on the Remediation of Buried and Tank Wastes 
suggested that typical institutional controls include easements, deed notifications, zoning, 
permit programs, access controls, government ownership and lease restrictions (NRC, 
2000). Edwards (1997) presents a legal interpretation and subsequently divides the most 
commonly used controls into eight categories. The eight categories are deed restrictions, 
use restrictions, access controls, compliance monitoring, notice, registry requirements, 
transfer requirements and zoning. The USEPA recognizes four categories of institutional 
controls. These are governmental controls, proprietary controls, enforcement and permit 
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controls and informational devices (Bellot, 2003b; Edwards, 2003a). The interpretation 
presented by Breggin et al. (1998) categorizes institutional controls into three categories: 
regulatory controls, property-based controls and notice provisions.  
For the purposes of this review, the mechanisms for establishing institutional 
controls will be classified into three primary mechanisms: government controls, property-
based controls and public notice (DERTF, 1996; Pendergrass, 1999).   
 
Government Controls 
Local, state and federal authorities can establish a variety of controls, which are 
regulatory in nature. Clancy-Hepburn et al. (1995), Edwards and North (1997), Breggin 
et al. (1998), English and Inerfeld (1999), Pendergrass (1999), Edwards (2000) and 
Edwards (2003) provide detailed descriptions of various types of government controls. Of 
particular interest are zoning, ordinances, orders and decrees and permit systems. 
Zoning is the most common mechanism for controlling land use (Borinsky, 1995; 
Gaspar and Burik, 1998). Although this mechanism is governed by state law, 
implementation is performed at the local government level by counties or municipalities 
(Pendergrass, 1999). This mechanism involves the creation of “use” districts (i.e., zones). 
Appropriate and inappropriate uses are then tied to the land in accordance with these 
districts/zones. The implementation of zoning laws varies considerably across the 
country. Exclusionary, cumulative and contract zoning are but a few of the different types 
of zoning mechanisms being practiced (Clancy-Hepburn et al., 1995). It is important to 
recognize that zoning laws, however, are not static. Zoning boards, influenced by local 
and regional pressures, have the authority to change zoning districts and requirements as 
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well as issue variances and exceptions.  
Ordinances are legislative acts (laws) generally passed at the local and state levels 
of government (county, city or state). These governmental bodies use ordinances to 
establish minimum management requirements and controls that are deemed necessary to 
protect and safeguard the general health, safety and welfare of the public.  
An ordinance of particular interest to residual waste management is state land 
protection controls. These types of controls refer to state legislation that is enacted to 
control land use activity. State land protection controls are a means of shifting the 
enforceability of land use controls from property law to common law, which some 
believe to be more consistent with long-term land use restrictions (Edwards, 2003a; 
NCCUSL, 2003; Strasser and Breetz, 2003). 
The term “Orders and Decrees” is used in this research to encompass the legally 
binding agreements (e.g., USEPA Administrative Orders) issued by regulators and other 
governmental requirements (e.g., Federal Departmental Orders) as well as judicial 
decrees (e.g., court decisions). These agreements describe actions that must be taken. 
With regard to residual contaminants, these orders and decrees define the requirements 
for continued environmental protection. 
Permits are another institutional mechanism employed at local and state 
government levels to control land use activity. Permit requests trigger the review and 
approval of the governmental permitting authority (Edwards, 2003c). This type of control 
is routinely used to manage site development and often involves excavation permits, 
building permits and groundwater-use permits (USDOE, 2000a).  
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Property-based Controls 
Common-law property-based controls, also referred to as proprietary controls, 
serve as a second mechanism for limiting land use. Such methods often involve 
restrictions or limitations on a property created in the conveyance of the property from 
one party to another (DERTF, 1996; Edwards and North, 1997; Breggin et al., 1998; 
Pendergrass, 1999). Property-based controls can be described in terms of deed 
restrictions, contractual mechanisms and continued government ownership. 
Although not a true legal term, deed restrictions generally refers to covenants, 
servitudes and easements that are placed in a deed to control future land use at that 
property (Clancy-Hepburn et al., 1995). Covenants are promises made by one landowner 
to a subsequent landowner in connection with the conveyance of property (USEPA, 
2004c). Servitudes are burdens placed on a property for the benefit of another. Easements 
are rights conveyed by one property owner to another party with regard to the first party’s 
land (USEPA, 2004i).  
Deed restrictions serve as the most common property-based control for sites with 
residual contaminants. This is in part due to the provisions of CERCLA, Section 
120(h)(3)(C), which deals with the transfer of real property. It requires that a federal 
agency transferring real property to a non-federal entity include a covenant in the deed of 
transfer warranting that all remedial action necessary to protect human health and the 
environment has been taken prior to the date of the transfer with respect to any hazardous 
substance remaining on the property. This provision also requires that the remedy, 
including institutional controls, is operating properly and successfully (CERCLA 1994). 
Private parties can also make contractual arrangements to restrict land use. This 
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form of institutional control is enforceable by and restrictive of only the parties involved 
in the contract. Third parties, including state, federal and local governments, if not party 
to the contract, cannot intervene (Edwards, 2003c).  
In addition to the aforementioned property-based controls, several authors have 
suggested that continued government ownership of sites with residual hazards be 
included as a viable property-based institutional control (Applegate and Dycus, 1998; 
English and Inerfeld, 1999; NRC, 2000). Presumably this mechanism would minimize 
the likelihood of property transfer and thereby reduce the probability of inappropriate 
future uses. 
 
Public Notice 
The dissemination of information (e.g., public notice) is a third category of 
institutional controls. This mechanism is useful for maintaining a viable knowledge basis 
(e.g., information management) and for informing the general public and interested 
stakeholders with regard to the condition of a site containing residual contamination. 
Public notice fosters continued diligence, which will be necessary for sites with long-
term use and activity restrictions.   
A primary objective of using notices as an institutional control is to inform people 
of the potential hazards so that their behavior is positively influenced. Notices can be 
provided in a variety of manners to satisfy site-specific requirements. For example, a 
notice could involve disclosure via deed notices, deed restrictions or covenants within 
land records during the time of property transfer, broad public publication (e.g., Federal 
Register), listing of contaminated sites within a state registry and on-site signage 
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(Breggin et al., 1998; Pendergrass, 1999; ASTM, 2000b). 
 
Funding Mechanisms 
A variety of funding mechanisms may be used to cover the costs associated with 
the implementation of institutional controls. Uncertainty remains, however, concerning 
the timing and magnitude of implementation costs (USGAO, 1990; ASTSWMO, 1997). 
Potential funding mechanisms include governmental appropriations, government 
corporations, special-purpose public authorities, public-private partnerships, insurance 
instruments and trust funds (Maurer, 2003). Government appropriations, insurance 
instruments and trust funds appear to be the most widely used funding mechanisms. 
Government appropriations serve as the predominant funding mechanism for the 
federal implementation of institution controls. U.S. Congressional action is required for 
the expenditure of all federal funding. These actions include congressional approval in 
terms of federal authorizations as well as federal appropriations and are required 
annually. Similar actions are conducted for state-level appropriations. 
The private sector is investigating alternative funding mechanisms for non-federal 
facilities. For example, the environmental insurance industry is responding to the risk of 
institutional control failure by offering pollution legal liability (PLL) insurance (Maurer, 
2003). These insurance policies cover client costs associated with environmental damage 
resulting from the emission, discharge, release or escape of contaminants.   
Trust funds are being investigated for both federal and non-federal facilities. 
Bauer and Probst (2000) have provided a review of trust funds for financing the oversight 
and management of contaminated sites. Trust funds offer several advantages. One 
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advantage that trust funds offer is that they separate the benefits of owning property from 
the burdens of maintaining it (e.g., beneficiaries and trustees). A second advantage is that 
the legal framework is well defined for trust funds. This framework includes procedures 
for allocating economic assets as well as enforceable rules for how, and by whom, the 
assets will be managed (Bauer and Probst, 2000). A disadvantage of federal trust funds is 
that the federal government can unilaterally change the terms of administration for the 
trust.   
Several variations of trust funds have been reported through the literature. These 
examples include the Industri-Plex Custodial Trust (Wernstedt and Probst, 1997), the 
Pennsylvania Guardian Trust (PaDEP, 2002; Alper and Reshen, 2003) and the Tennessee 
Perpetual Care Trust (Brown, 1999).  
Trust funds vary considerably because the mission, objectives and scope of 
individual Trusts are routinely established to satisfy site-specific requirements. For 
example, the Industri-Plex Custodial Trust had a focus towards site re-use (Wernstedt and 
Probst, 1997). The Pennsylvania Guardian Trust was established to investigate the use of 
a not-for-profit, public/private entity for managing of post-remediation obligations (Alper 
and Reshen, 2003). The Tennessee Perpetual Care Trust focused on the long-term 
maintenance and monitoring costs associated with the Oak Ridge Reservation's 
Environmental Management Waste Management Facility only and does not have 
provisions if the facility has a release (Brown, 1999). Due to the limited experience 
represented by these trusts, their long-term viability is inconclusive at this time. 
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Legal Considerations for the Institutional Control of Residual Hazards 
The federal government, states, municipalities and private entities face significant 
environmental challenges associated with the remediation and post-remediation 
management of residual waste sites. These challenges represent long-term institutional 
management obligations. The fulfillment of these obligations involves the coupling of 
acceptable remedies, long-term controls consistent with desired land use and performance 
monitoring (Finger, 1997).  
In recognition of such obligations, the U.S. federal government has enacted key 
environmental legislation to specifically “protect human health and safeguard the natural 
environment — air, water and land — upon which life depends” (CERCLA 1994). 
 
CERCLA 
CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, was enacted on December 11, 1980 
(GI, 2001; CERCLA 1994). CERCLA establishes the framework for the federal response 
to the release of hazardous substances that endanger public health or the environment. An 
amendment to CERCLA, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 
was approved on October 17, 1986. SARA incorporated experience obtained in the 
administration of the Superfund program during its first six years. In addition, the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) was also passed on 
October 17, 1986. The purpose of EPCRA was to encourage emergency planning as well 
as provide the public and local governments with information concerning potential 
chemical hazards present in their communities. 
CERCLA established a process for determining how best to remediate abandoned, 
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hazardous waste sites (USEPA, 1989). The first step of the process involves a 
preliminary site screening (i.e., scoring of potential hazards). If a site scores sufficiently 
high, it is listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). NPL sites then proceed through a 
process known as the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) process. Each 
step of the RI/FS process improves the definition of the contaminants of concern and 
identifies the best remediation alternatives. The Remedial Investigation stage defines the 
extent of the contamination and develops preliminary baseline risk assessments. The 
Feasibility Study stage focuses on alternative treatments based on the contaminants of 
concern. The Record of Decision (ROD) formally documents the selected remedy and 
estimates the magnitude of residual risk remaining (CERCLA 1994). 
Although CERCLA baseline risk assessments consider risk in the absence of any 
institutional controls, it is important to consider the estimated risks associated with 
residual waste sites with institutional controls in accordance with projected land uses as 
well as the risk when institutional controls are removed (White et al., 1993). 
The USEPA defines institutional controls as non-engineered instruments such as 
administrative and/or legal controls that minimize the potential for human exposure to 
contamination by limiting land or resource use (USEPA, 2000). The USEPA specifically 
excludes access controls, fences and physical barriers in its definition of institutional 
controls.  
CERCLA establishes several key requirements with regard to the implementation 
of institutional controls for managing residual contaminants. First, CERCLA stresses the 
importance of permanent remedies and treatment technologies in cleaning up hazardous 
waste sites rather than the containment or removal of contaminants.  
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While institutional controls alone are not to be selected simply as a substitute for a 
more permanent engineered control (CERCLA 1994), institutional controls can and are 
continuing to play a substantial role in many final remedies. For example, an informal 
survey of USEPA Record of Decisions (RODs) (USEPA, 2003d) found that institutional 
controls were part of approximately 68% of all final remedies. Similarly, the Association 
of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO) found that 
approximately 70% of remedies employed at non-NPL sites from 1993 to 1997 included 
some form of institutional control (ASTSWMO, 1998). 
CERCLA also provides requirements with regard to state responsibilities. In 
accordance with CERCLA section 104(c)(3)(A), the state must provide its assurance to 
assume responsibility for operation and maintenance of implemented remedial actions for 
the expected life of such actions. This includes the state’s assurance that any institutional 
controls implemented as part of the remedial action at a site are in-place, are reliable and 
will remain in-place after the initiation of the operating and maintenance phase 
(CERCLA 1994). To ensure that the final remedy remains effective, the USEPA also 
requires that a review be conducted every five years for those sites where 
contamination/waste has been left on site at levels that require limited use and restricted 
exposure (USEPA, 2001b). 
One potential deficiency in the CERCLA process could arise when institutional 
controls are not explicitly defined in the ROD. As discussed by Breggin et al. (1999), the 
USEPA does not have legal authority to require public participation post-ROD. 
Therefore, if the selection of specific institutional controls is deferred until that time, 
community involvement could be limited for a major portion of the remedy selection. 
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RCRA 
The U.S. Congress enacted the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) in 1976 (RCRA 1976). RCRA facilities are typically industrial properties and 
this law focuses on wastes that are actively managed, while CERCLA focuses on 
properties that were commonly abandoned contaminated sites. RCRA, similar to 
CERCLA, has the primary objective of maintaining human health and safety. RCRA, 
however, differs from CERCLA in several ways.  
RCRA was primarily established to minimize future pollution that could result 
from solid waste landfills and to take a more prescriptive approach in its legislation. By 
specifically defining “hazardous” waste and associated contaminants of concern, RCRA’s 
approach serves as an incentive for manufacturers, transporters and users of these 
products and materials to self regulate themselves and thereby reduce the quantity of 
these materials. Second, RCRA is technology-specific and defines acceptable treatment 
technology for various waste stream applications such as RCRA-specific designs for 
landfill covers.  
Despite this more prescriptive approach, RCRA language is more vague with 
regard to institutional controls (USDOE, 2000a). Although RCRA is not specific in 
defining the use of institutional controls, the USEPA interpretation of the regulations are 
intended to be consistent with CERCLA (Bellot, 2003b). As such, institutional controls 
are not intended to be the sole remedy but rather they should complement engineered 
barriers (USEPA, 2000). Their implementation, however, can vary substantially from 
state to state as RCRA is a state-delegated program (USEPA, 2002c).   
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Brownfields 
The "Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act" was 
signed into law January 11, 2002 (USEPA, 2002d). This legislation defines Brownfields 
as abandoned, idle or under-utilized industrial and commercial facilities where expansion 
or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination 
(USEPA, 2002a). 
Brownfields sites continue to gain increased attention within the USEPA and the 
states. At many of these sites, contaminants and associated hazards remain after 
environmental remediation is completed because cleanup levels are related to projected 
future land use. For example, if sites are projected for industrial use the cleanup levels 
could be less stringent than for unrestricted-use sites, e.g., cleanup to an industrial-use 
standard rather than a residential-use standard. 
Residual contaminants are wastes left in-place or disposed of on-site as well as 
residual contamination of soils, facilities, surface water and groundwater. Brownfields 
sites could therefore require monitoring, inspections and other institutional controls. Two 
critical issues have been identified with regard to the use of institutional controls at 
Brownfields sites. These concerns include public awareness and acceptance of the 
institutional controls as well as the long-term effectiveness of selected institutional 
controls (McTiernan, 2000) 
 
Guidance for Institutional Control Implementation 
To improve the effectiveness and implementation of institutional controls, various 
guidance documents have been developed. These guides have been produced for various 
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applications and by various organizations including federal and state governments. 
 
Federal Guidance 
Institutional controls for managing residual contaminants are allowable tools 
under a variety of federal statutes including 10-CFR-61, CERCLA, RCRA and the 
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). As such, the 
responsible federal organization has issued guidance for their implementation.  
The USEPA has issued guidance, directed toward site managers, for the 
implementation of CERCLA and RCRA Corrective Actions (USEPA, 2000). This 
guidance is also applicable to interested stakeholders and the regulated community. The 
USEPA recognizes institutional controls as a vital part of the decision process for the 
management of residual contaminants. Appropriate institutional controls are believed to 
improve the protectiveness of the final remedy, although the enforceability of 
institutional controls remains a question (Edwards, 2000b). 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) is responsible for regulating 
nuclear materials and facilities. USNRC responsibilities include establishing standards 
for protection against radiation (10-CFR-20, 1991) as well as licensing land disposal 
facilities for low-level radioactive waste (10-CFR-61, 1982). Regulations require the 
landowner or custodial agent to implement an institutional control program to restrict 
physical access to a disposal site. Such a program should include environmental 
monitoring, periodic surveillance, custodial care and administration of appropriate 
funding to carry out these institutional controls (10-CFR-61, 1982). The USNRC requires 
that licensees demonstrate the adequacy of institutional controls with regard to site 
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decommissioning leading to USNRC license termination (USNRC, 2002). As part of the 
license termination process, USNRC staff review and verify detailed information 
concerning the proposed institutional controls (USNRC, 2002; USNRC, 2003b; USNRC, 
2004).  
Similarly, the USDOD has issued a guide for the establishment of institutional 
controls at military installations being closed (USDOD, 1998). This guide is relevant to 
various types of military facilities including Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
sites, Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action 
Program (FUSRAP) sites (USDOD, 2000a). This guidance, consistent with and reliant on 
CERCLA, suggests two common situations in which institutional controls can play an 
important role. Institutional controls may be appropriate to protect the integrity of 
engineered controls. Second, institutional controls may be necessary to limit the exposure 
of individuals to residual contamination by limiting reuse activities. In addition, this 
guide suggests that if institutional controls are to be used as part of the final remedy 
action, early stakeholder involvement and concurrence could improve the effectiveness of 
the controls (USDOD, 1998). 
Security has always been one of the concerns associated with the management of 
residual contaminants. The use of institutional controls has received increased attention in 
the past several years. FEMA has recently developed additional guidance for integrating 
human-caused hazards into mitigation planning (FEMA, 2002b; FEMA, 2002a). These 
new security threats add an additional challenge with regard to maintaining the long-term 
effectiveness of institutional controls at sites with residual hazards.  
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State Guidance 
In addition to the federal guidance, states are also developing guidance for the 
implementation of institutional controls. The Environmental Law Institute (ELI) has 
conducted several studies regarding the use of institutional controls by state regulatory 
agencies. ELI reported that as of 2002, 43 states rely on some form of institutional 
controls to manage sites with residual contaminants (Pendergrass, 2003). However, only 
26 states have specific state statutory authority involving various aspects of institutional 
controls.  
An example is the State of Oregon whose Department of Environmental Quality, 
Waste Management and Cleanup Division has produced guidance for its organization’s 
implementation of institutional controls (Christensen et al., 1998). This guide provides 
useful descriptions of the types of institutional controls that the State of Oregon utilizes 
as well as discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of each. In addition, this guide 
suggests that institutional controls not only restrict uses but could also at times require an 
affirmative action such as monitoring and remedy review (Christensen et al., 1998).  
The State of Colorado passed Senate Bill 145 in 2001. This legislation provides 
the Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment with the legal authority 
to establish and enforce environmental covenants (Miller, 2003). Through the passage of 
this legislation, the state overcame the uncertainties associated with enforcing common 
property law covenants and ensured that the state regulators have the enforcement 
mechanism required to compel compliance (Miller, 2003).   
The State of Florida has also taken an aggressive role in formulating state 
statutory guidance for institutional controls (FLDEP, 2002). This guidance recommends 
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enforcement actions if the following occur:  a.) the restrictive covenant or conservation 
easement has been violated; b.) the restrictive covenant or conservation easement has 
been improperly removed; c.) local government repeals an institutional control ordinance; 
d.) ownership of the property has changed; and e.) any time that the restrictions are not 
protecting human health or the environment. In addition, the state maintains a registry of 
sites with institutional controls (FLDEP, 2003b).    
 
Uniform Environmental Covenant Act 
A number of deficiencies have been reported with regard to the implementation of 
institutional controls at hazardous waste sites (Edwards, 2000a; Edwards, 2003b). These 
deficiencies include lack of notice, implementation, monitoring and enforcement (Gaspar 
and Burik, 1998; Hocking and Martino, 2003; Hocking and Martino, 2004). The question 
of enforcement of institutional controls appears centered on two important themes. One 
concern is grounded in the legal review of common property law and the second concern 
deals with the reliability of government administration with regard to environmental 
protection (NRC, 2000; Edwards, 2003a; Miller, 2003). 
Several national efforts are attempting to standardize the implementation of 
institutional controls to overcome these deficiencies. The American Society for Testing 
and Materials (ASTM) has established a Standard Guide for the use of institutional 
controls (Edwards, 1997). This Guide was developed in part because of these varying 
views of institutional controls as well as due to concerns raised about the long-term 
effectiveness of institutional controls. Within this Guide the ASTM describes institutional 
controls as legal or administrative restrictions on the use of, or access to a site or facility 
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(ASTM, 2000b).    
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has approved 
the Uniform Environmental Covenant Act (UECA) in an attempt to eliminate many of 
the common law impediments associated with the implementation of institutional 
controls (NCCUSL, 2003). The language of this act attempts to improve the 
implementation of environmental servitudes among the various state jurisdictions by 
reducing uncertainty and transaction costs (Strasser, ; Strasser and Breetz, 2003). 
 
Performance Evaluation of Institutional Controls 
As discussed previously, various types of institutional controls have been 
implemented for a variety of purposes. The use of institutional controls for the 
management of residual contaminants is one such application. The effectiveness of 
institutional controls for this specific application is of particular concern due to the nature 
of the contaminants and the duration of the hazards. Several studies have attempted to 
evaluate the effectiveness of institutional controls with regard to the management of 
residual hazards.  
 
Surveys 
The ASTSWMO surveyed states in 1997 to determine to what extent institutional 
controls have been used nationally (ASTSWMO, 1997). Forty-two states responded to 
the survey, which showed that the use of institutional controls was a required part of the 
remedy in 31 states when the final remedy resulted in a restricted use classification. The 
factors influencing the selection and implementation of institutional controls were found 
to be: cost, proximity of human and environmental targets, technical impracticality and 
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anticipated future land use. 
Although the majority of responding states implement institutional controls under 
their own statutes, rules, and health codes, local public officials are the primary agents 
monitoring and maintaining the institutional controls through land use zoning and local 
ordinances. As a result, the vast majority of institutional control-related information is 
managed, maintained and controlled via local property records in the form of deed 
restrictions or deed notices. Local ordinances, zoning and building permit records as well 
as local health department records and well permit records are also areas where 
institutional control information is managed and maintained. With regard to the 
effectiveness of the selected institutional controls, most states indicated that they have not 
been used long enough to determine whether these controls will be effective over the long 
term (ASTSWMO, 1997). 
The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) also conducted a 
targeted survey in 1997 in part to determine what types of institutional controls local and 
state governments were employing at former hazardous waste sites (Gaspar and Burik, 
1998). Results of the survey included responses received from 27 local governments from 
16 different states. The study highlighted several areas of concern. For example, the study 
indicated that there was confusion among the respondents with regard to what level of 
government (i.e., local versus state) is responsible for implementation of the institutional 
controls. In addition, the findings indicated that 74% of local respondents did not have 
adequate experience implementing institutional controls despite the fact that the most 
common institutional controls were traditional zoning (56%), groundwater regulation 
(26%) and deed restrictions (19%). Finally, the enforcement of institutional controls was 
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found to be minimal and primarily relied on institutional memory, citizen complaints and 
informal inspections.   
The Northeast-Midwest Institute has also issued the results of their state-wide 
survey (Bartsch and Deane, 2002). Forty-one states provided responses to this survey that 
focused on state voluntary compliance and Brownfields programs. The results suggest 
that individual states view the use of institutional controls quite differently. Some states 
discourage the use of such controls within these programs while others have moved 
forward to strengthen their effectiveness by establishing statutory provisions for 
institutional controls (Edwards, 2003a).   
 
Case Studies 
A number of case studies have been documented in which the performance of 
institutional controls have been investigated (Lowrie and Greenberg, ; Mazurek and 
Hersh, 1997; Wernstedt and Hersh, 1997; Wernstedt and Probst, 1997; James M. 
McElfish et al., 1998; Lowrie and Greenberg, 1998). Resources for the Future (RFF) has 
completed several case studies that have specifically investigated the role that land use 
plays (Mazurek and Hersh, 1997; Wernstedt and Hersh, 1997; Wernstedt and Probst, 
1997; Hersh et al., 2002). The ELI has also developed a number of case studies that have 
focused on the use of institutional controls (James M. McElfish et al., 1998; Pendergrass 
et al., 1999).  
One of the ELI studies involved an analysis of the use of institutional controls at 
the Grand Junction Uranium Mill Tailings Remedial Action (UMTRA) project site 
(Pendergrass et al., 1999). This project involved the remediation of approximately 5000 
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properties in the Grand Junction, CO area. This case highlighted several issues that could 
influence the long-term effectiveness of institutional controls. Multiple federal and state 
programs were involved in this project and each of these programs had separate 
requirements and funding mechanisms. This lack of coordination was evident by a 
difference of opinions regarding near-term land use as well as unresolved regulatory 
issues (i.e., groundwater treatment at the Climax Site). This case also pointed out the 
importance of public perception. For example, participation in this program was 
voluntary and because the public viewed the process as wasteful and driven by the federal 
government, not all owners of contaminated properties participated in the remedial action 
project.    
 
Assessments/Studies 
English et al. (1997) provides a preliminary assessment of the public’s 
acceptability of institutional controls. Although not definitive, this report suggests that 
characteristics of the site, contamination, technical remedy, surrounding area and 
social/political setting as well as the institutional control itself influence the public’s 
acceptance of institutional controls (English et al., 1997). Institutional controls must be 
carefully designed and tailored to site-specific conditions if they are to produce the 
desired effects. Institutional controls must be appropriate, verifiable, enforceable, durable 
and flexible (i.e., adaptable to a variety of sites and surroundings) (English and Inerfeld, 
1999).  
The National Research Council (NRC) reported on the broader but related issue of 
long-term institutional management (LTIM) (NRC, 2000). The NRC defines LTIM as the 
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ability, over long periods of time, to ensure that the public, worker health and safety and 
the environment are protected when potentially hazardous contaminants are left on sites. 
To achieve this protection, the NRC identified three basic measures: contaminant 
reduction, contaminant isolation and stewardship activities. For LTIM to remain 
effective, there should be the means to detect impending or actual failure and also the 
authority and will to require those responsible to correct the problem (NRC, 2000). The 
NRC suggests that LTIM programs contain the following characteristics: defense in 
depth, complementarity and consistency, foresight, accountability, transparency/ 
visibility, feasibility, stability through time, iteration and follow-through/flexibility. 
The longevity and durability of institutional controls continues to be of significant 
concern (USGAO, 2005). An analysis of successes and deficiencies of CERCLA five-
year reviews provides some insight into the role institutional controls could play in 
ensuring remedy protectiveness (Hocking and Martino, 2003; Hocking and Martino, 
2004). This study noted that remedy deficiencies, as identified by CERCLA five-year 
reviews, fall into several categories: remedy technology, public acceptability and 
institutional controls. The institutional control deficiencies included examples of 
improper monitoring, improper information management, lack of notice, potential 
violations of use restrictions and lack of implementation (Hocking and Martino, 2003; 
Hocking and Martino, 2004). 
The National Environmental Policy Institute (NEPI) has provided an analysis of 
the related concept of stewardship (NEPI, 1999). NEPI defines stewardship as a 
systematic means of ensuring that future decision-makers concerned with the safety and 
protection, conditions of use, and potential further cleanup of sites with residual or long-
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term contamination have the proper knowledge, awareness and tools passed on from 
previous generations of site decision-makers to make informed decisions about site 
management. As such, the long-term effectiveness of institutional controls is a critical 
component of stewardship.  
Lowrie et al. (2003) suggests that for stewardship efforts to be effective it should: 
1) be incorporated into the mission of the responsible organization, 2) involve local 
communities and stakeholders, 3) involve redundant safety systems and techniques,       
4) remain flexible and innovative, and 5) identify and obtain stable financial resources to 
fulfill its obligations (Lowrie et al., 2003). 
Because of uncertainties associated with the long-term viability of institutional 
controls the concept of “Rolling Stewardship” has been suggested (NEPI, 1999; Russell, 
2000). Rolling stewardship builds on the concept of stewardship by focusing on the links 
needed between generations. For example, although current generations cannot determine 
the actions future generations will take, current generations could ensure that the future 
generations are aware of residual contamination and are provided the proper tools to 
make sound management decisions. 
The concept of rolling stewardship appears to be a viable management approach 
that shows promise with regard to strengthening the long-term performance of 
institutional controls. This approach focuses on ensuring that the knowledge, tools and 
infrastructure are in place to empower the future decision-makers. Rather than assuming 
perpetual guarantees, usually associated with the concept of CERCLA, rolling 
stewardship asks “will the solution remain viable for a generation?” rather than “will the 
solution remain viable for the next millennium and beyond?” (NEPI, 1999). 
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The issue of stewardship is central to many of the USDOE sites currently 
undergoing remediation and “closure.” As such, local citizens groups at these sites are 
working to influence the conditions the sites will be left in and identify the post-
remediation obligations. The Rocky Flats Stewardship Working Group has developed a 
“Toolbox” that aids in the planning of long-term stewardship. This toolbox provides a 
process for identifying the requirements for site stewardship and provides a framework 
for considering detailed issues (RFSWG, 2002). 
 
Findings and Summary 
The described literature review has shown that institutional controls are 
commonly used practices for preservation purposes, use restriction and information 
dissemination. Institutional controls are routine elements of federal, state and local 
operations. Various types of operations make use of institutional controls including 
historical and cultural preservation, utility protection, ecological preservation, floodplain 
management, groundwater protection and waste management.   
The management of residual contaminants requires multiple controls. Engineered 
controls are practices that modify the physical environment and the residual hazards. 
Institutional controls are practices designed to modify human behavior. A combination of 
both types of controls improves the likelihood that residual contaminants will remain 
isolated from potential receptors. This concept, referred to as layering and defense-in-
depth, is advocated by numerous studies (USDOD, 1998; NRC, 2000; USEPA, 2000). 
As noted, numerous studies have shown that the use of institutional controls for 
residual waste management applications is becoming an increasingly significant element 
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in selected remedies (ASTSWMO, 1997; ASTSWMO, 1998; Gaspar and Burik, 1998). 
Final remedies that include institutional controls establish obligations for and 
responsibilities of future generations (English and Inerfeld, 1999). As such, current 
generations need to act appropriately as trustees and stewards with regard to present 
resources on behalf of future generations (Finger, 1997; STGWG, 1999). 
The long-term performance of institutional controls, however, remains an open 
question. Studies have highlighted deficiencies and failures of institutional controls 
(English et al., 1997; Hocking and Martino, 2004). Monitoring and enforcement 
measures are critical if institutional controls are to remain effective and durable over the 
long-term (DERTF, 1996). Affirmative action, including broad and periodic notice, will 
be needed to ensure that information regarding residual contaminants is readily available 
to multi-generational stakeholders. Coordination of institutional controls is complicated 
because of multi-organizational involvement. If responsibilities and authority are not 
clearly defined then management conditions will likely worsen over time and will impact 
maintenance and enforcement efforts. 
The legal authority required to maintain and enforce institutional controls is not 
always clearly defined (Borinsky, 1995; Edwards, 2000b; Edwards, 2000a; PaDEP, 
2002). The government’s enforcement ability depends on various statutory and regulatory 
requirements. For institutional controls, such as deed restrictions, to remain effective and 
enforceable, they need to be incorporated into state statutory law (English and Inerfeld, 
1999; Miller, 2003). 
The results of this literature review begin to illustrate the deficiencies associated 
with the implementation of institutional controls. Deficiencies, expressed in terms of their 
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potential effectiveness and enforceability, have been noted. This research will add to this 
body of literature by investigating how and why institutional controls could fail. This 
research will use a series of case studies to further investigate how institutional controls 
are currently being implemented. Then a failure analysis will be conducted of these sites 
to better understand how and why failures occur. The final stage of this analysis will 
investigate if monitoring and mitigation methods can make the systems more robust and 
thus less prone to failure.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
The selected research methodology uses a multiple case study design to 
investigate the complex dynamics of long-term contaminant isolation. Case studies when 
selected, as a research approach, have been shown by Yin and others to be a valuable 
research methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1991; Yin, 1994; Audet and 
d'Ambiose, 2001). The case study approach offers several advantages over other research 
techniques. Specific to this research, the key advantages are that case studies: 
• Provide insight into the dynamics of a complex situation,  
• Successfully tackle questions of “why” and “how,”   
• Provide the investigator the ability to retain a holistic view of individual cases yet 
the flexibility to explore embedded units of analysis across cases, and   
• Provides an all-inclusive approach including both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence. 
The case study approach represents a form of empirical inquiry. While case 
studies do not represent a sample of a population, they are useful in expanding and 
generalizing a theory (Yin, 1994). As such, selected case studies are used to extract 
valuable insights into why some residual contaminant isolation practices have succeeded 
and why others have failed.  
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Case Study Approach 
Figure 5 illustrates the case study development process used throughout this 
research. As illustrated, this research approach involves six distinct steps. The details 
associated with the research hypothesis (Step 1) were presented in Chapter I. The details 
associated with the remaining five research steps are discussed further in this chapter. 
1. 
Research 
Hypothesis
2. Case 
Study
Protocol
3. Select 
Case 
Studies
4. 
Construct 
1st Case 
Study
5. Construct 
Remaining 
Cases
6. Case 
Study  
Analysis & 
Conclusions
 
Figure 5. Diagram showing the case study development process used for this research. 
 
 
 
Case Study Protocol 
The case study research approach is an iterative process. The second step of this 
process involves the development of a case study protocol. The protocol serves as a guide 
throughout this research by identifying and refining key research questions as well as 
describing the data collection, management and evaluation tasks.  
The following key questions were considered throughout this research effort and 
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associated theories were continually refined. Considerations included:   
Why does system failure occur?   
• What aspect or aspects of the system actually fail?   
• Are there precursors to failure?   
• Is system failure imminent? If so, is it detectible?   
• What are the consequences resulting from system failure? 
How do institutional controls influence system performance? 
• Is the loss of one control key to system failure or is there an accumulation of minor 
failures that form a critical mass?   
• Does “decision irreversibility” occur?   
• Is there adequate recovery time after making “wrong” decisions?   
How do long-term planning assumptions subsequently influence system performance?  
• What were the long-term planning assumptions?  
• Are they valid and similar for all cases?  
How do institutions (i.e., organizations) implement contaminant isolation systems? 
• What is the role and durability of the institution? 
• How does institutional mission influence institutional performance? 
• Are there distinguishing factors between different types of institutions (i.e., federal, 
state, local, private)?  
How have current practices captured lessons learned from historic practices? 
• How do current decision networks compare to historic decision networks? 
• Are there specific decision pathways that lead to failure? 
• Are there redundancies built into the system?  
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Data Collection 
A considerable amount of information was required to understand the 
circumstances of each selected case and to adequately represent these conditions in the 
case study reports. To aid in this effort, the protocol included a data collection checklist. 
The checklist consisted of two parts. Part A, shown in Table 1, includes a discussion of 
the characteristics of each site. Important site characteristics include environmental, 
waste, societal, regulatory and contaminant isolation facility characteristics. Part B, 
shown in Table 2, includes a discussion of how important management functions and 
activities were employed at each selected site.  
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Table 1. Case Study Checklist Part A, Site Characteristics. 
 
Site Characteristics Comments 
Background  
Environmental Characteristics  
 Annual Precipitation  
 Surface Waters  
 Aquifer/Groundwater  
 Biological Indicators  
 Annual Freeze/Thaw Cycles  
 Ecosystem “Value”  
 Size  
 Site Geology  
Waste Characteristics  
 Primary Contaminants of Concern  
 Primary Exposure Routes  
 Primary Risk  
Societal Characteristics  
 Population Density within 1 mi. and 10 mi.  
 Demographic Pattern  
 Current Regional Land Use  
 Historic Regional Land Use  
 Current Site Land Use  
 Potential Alternative Land Use(s)  
Regulatory Characteristics  
 Principle Regulation  
 Current Land Owner  
 Land Transfers  
 Former Land Owner(s)  
 Potentially Responsible Parties  
System Characteristics  
 Engineered Barriers Description  
 Institutional Controls Description  
 Date of Site Closure  
 State of Practice at that time  
 Repair Actions to Date  
Graphics  
 Photographs  
 Maps  
 Timeline  
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Table 2. Case Study Checklist Part B, Functions and Activities. 
Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System  
 Verify Engineered System Construction (i.e., QA/QC)  
 Establish System Monitoring Plan    
 Perform System Monitoring (i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
 
 Analyze and Report Data (i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually)  
 Maintain Active Processes (pump & treat, biorem, etc.)  
 Conduct Active Repairs   
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem  
 Define Environmental, Ecological & Bioindicators   
 Establish Monitoring Plan   
 Perform Active Monitoring   
 Analyze and Report Data   
Maintain Site Security  
 Establish Security Plan   
 Maintain Security Mechanisms (i.e., Access Controls)    
 Detect Security Violations   
 Deter Security Violations   
Enforce Legal Controls  
 Define Legal Responsibility (i.e., local, state, fed, multiple)  
 Establish Property-based Controls (i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
 
 Maintain Reporting Requirements   
Maintain Financial Security  
 Establish Financial Requirements (for monitoring, repair, 
replace, emergency actions, etc.) 
 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms (insurance, tax, trust, etc.)   
 Maintain Funding (i.e., long-term financial security)  
Maintain Community Awareness  
 Identify Site Stakeholders  
 Establish Community Awareness Program   
 Define Community Awareness procedures and schedule  
 Maintain Community Awareness Program  
Perform Information Management  
 Define Information Users  
 Define Information Requirements  
 Establish Information Management System  
 Integrate All Monitoring and Other Relevant Data  
 Maintain Information Management System  
 Maintain Data Current with Information Technology Platforms  
Perform Emergency Actions  
 Establish Emergency Preparedness Plans  
 Obtain Emergency Response Equipment  
 Train Emergency Response Teams  
 Maintain Emergency Response Equipment & Team  
Continuous Improvement of System Operations   
 Integrate All Residual Hazards Management System Functions  
 Define Best Available Technology  
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of Repair versus Replace versus 
Re-remediate 
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This research uses various sources of information to obtain the details necessary 
to populate the developed tables, including published documentation, archival records, 
personal interviews and direct field observations. The data collection process was 
performed in three phases: Phase 1 – Historical Data, Phase 2 – Site Visits, and Phase 3 – 
Data Checklist Completion. This process was completed for each individual case selected 
for this research.  
The initial phase of data collection included obtaining electronic sources of 
information to establish a general understanding of the critical factors involved at the 
selected site. Obtained sources included site-specific as well as government internet sites, 
journal publications and electronic news media sources. This information served to 
establish the initial foundation for each of the cases. 
The second phase of data collection involved a more thorough investigation to 
provide greater understanding of the site and its surrounding environment. Site visits 
were scheduled and conducted for all selected case studies. Site visits provided a unique 
perspective and added substantially to the case study development. Site photographs 
taken during site visits documented the current condition of each site. Copies of original 
“source” records obtained helped establish key facts associated with each case. Personal 
interviews and discussions with site representatives provided important insights that were 
not always evident in other sources. 
The third phase of the data collection process involved data checklist completion 
and data verification. The primary focus of this phase was ensuring data completeness 
and accuracy of the datasets. Follow-up discussions with site representatives were 
important in clarifying key issues and obtaining additional documentation.  
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Data Management 
Information obtained during the data collection process was organized and 
maintained to ensure accuracy and consistency throughout the project. To aid in the data 
collection process, as well as to support review of the evidence, the bibliographic 
database software Endnote was used. EndNote is a reference and image database 
(ResearchSoft, 2002). Endnote, Version 6, has expanded features, including graphics-
management capabilities. It specializes in storing, managing and searching reference 
libraries. 
 
Data Evaluation 
The data and information collected from multiple sources were correlated to help 
establish the facts associated with each case. Source documents offered the strongest 
evidence of how past events actually occurred. When source documents were 
unavailable, multiple sources of corroborative information were obtained to validate site 
events.  
 
Individual Case Study Reports 
Case study reports present the facts associated with each selected case and are 
presented in Chapter V. These reports identify the key factors influencing the success and 
failures of the individual contaminant isolation systems. A chronological timeline of the 
major events associated with each of the sites is included. Each case study report presents 
the observations and findings of each case as well as historic and current photographs. 
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Cross-Case Conclusions 
A cross-case evaluation of all selected case studies is presented at the end of 
Chapter V. This analysis highlights the similarities and differences between the 
individual cases. Through this cross-case comparison (i.e., similar cases or similar units 
of analysis), key patterns are identified.  
 
Fault Tree Analysis 
Chapter VI expands on the cross-case conclusions with a discussion of the 
potential error pathways that could lead to system failure. Several different analytical 
techniques were evaluated for conducting this analysis. Influence diagrams were 
evaluated but the technique was found to be too general for this analysis. Event trees and 
decision trees were also considered but these techniques were found to be too site-
specific. Fault tree analysis (FTA) is an analytical technique that describes the collection 
of events that must occur to explain a described state of a system. FTA was selected for 
this analysis because it could best utilize the information from the individual cases as 
well as from the cross-case observations.  
The FTA process is initiated by first defining an undesired state of the system. An 
analysis of the details of the system is then performed to determine logical ways in which 
the undesired event could occur (Vesely et al., 1981). In this manner, FTA is a useful tool 
in clarifying how undesired events can occur and, likewise, how mitigation efforts can 
reduce system failure.  
For the purposes of this research, FTA provides a graphical means of displaying 
the qualitative information included in the case studies. Chapter VI presents this FTA for 
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the selected case studies associated with this research.  
 
Case Study Selection 
Selection Criteria 
Case studies applicable to this research involve sites containing a variety of on-
site residual contaminants, such as radioactive waste, hazardous materials, chemical 
munitions, etc. The case study selection criteria for this research consisted of the 
following: 
• Operations/Remedial Action phase completed, 
• Known, persistent (i.e., half-lives greater than 100 years) contaminated materials 
remain on-site in the  shallow subsurface (i.e., in the top 10 meters), 
• Engineered and Institutional Controls are part of the remedial action,  
• System performance information is available, and 
• Regulatory structure is defined (e.g., CERCLA, UMTRCA). 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CASE STUDY REPORTS 
 
Selected Case Studies 
The remediation of contaminated sites involves federal and non-federal properties 
as well as various regulatory drivers. A primary regulation governing the management of 
residual contaminants is CERCLA, as defined in Chapter III. This regulation addresses 
the remediation and subsequent management of both federal and non-federal properties. 
CERCLA-applicable sites were therefore a major source of potential case studies. 
Additional case studies were selected from the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation 
Control Act (UMTRCA) program. This program involved the containment of residual 
contaminants generated from the mining and milling of uranium ore. Sites associated 
with this program represent some of the earliest modern containment operations and thus 
provide insight into system performance within the current regulatory framework. 
Seven sites were selected and investigated as case studies. These sites include: 
• Anaconda/Old Works Superfund Site, Anaconda, MT 
• Love Canal Chemical Waste Disposal Cell, Niagara Falls, NY 
• Maxey Flats Low-level Waste (LLW) Disposal Cell, Hillsboro, KY 
• Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Commerce City, CO 
• Spring Valley Site, Spring Valley, Washington, D.C. 
• Burrell UMTRCA Disposal Cell, Burrell, PA 
• Canonsburg UMTRCA Disposal Cell, Canonsburg, PA. 
66  
Table 3 summarizes applicable regulations at each site. Included in Table 3 are 
the regulatory drivers for each case, the lead federal regulatory agency, the primary 
responsible party and the major regulatory actions that occurred for each site. 
 
Table 3. Regulatory introduction for selected case studies. 
 
Case Regulatory 
Driver 
Federal 
Regulatory 
Agency 
Primary 
Responsible 
Party 
Regulatory 
Actions 
Anaconda CERCLA USEPA ARCO 1987, 1991, & 
1994 RODs 
Love Canal CERCLA USEPA Occidental 1985, 1988 & 
1991 RODs 
Maxey Flats CERCLA USEPA USDOE 1991 ROD 
 
Rocky 
Mountain 
Arsenal 
CERCLA, 
RMANWRA 
USEPA USDOD 1995 & 1996 
RODs 
Spring Valley CERCLA USEPA USDOD Non-time Critical 
Removal Actions 
Burrell 
 
UMTRCA USNRC USDOE 1987 Cell 
completed 
Canonsburg 
 
UMTRCA USNRC USDOE 1985 Cell 
completed 
 
 
The following sections of this chapter contain the individual reports for the 
selected case studies. Each report includes a summary of the historic events of each case, 
a chronological timeline of the major events, a summary of the contaminant isolation 
facility controls employed at each site and personal observations of the case, based on 
personal interviews with site representatives and visual inspections. 
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Anaconda/Old Works Case Study 
Historical Events 
The Anaconda Mineral Company (AMC) established the Anaconda/Old Works 
Smelter site in 1883. The site was established to process copper ore that was being mined 
in Butte, MT some 30 miles away (see Figure 6). The location of this site was selected 
because of the dependable water supply provided by Warm Springs Creek (USEPA, 
1994c). 
 
 
Figure 6. Map showing location of Anaconda site (USEPA, 2004a). 
 
The site involves several specific operational areas. Construction of the Upper 
Works area took place from 1883 to 1884. In 1888, the Lower Works was constructed to 
expand the facility’s processing capacity. The two Works operated in concert with two 
copper smelters. The smelters were connected to brick stacks atop adjacent hills by 
masonry flues (ARCO, 1993).  
The Old Works and the two associated smelters operated from 1884 to 1901. 
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Operations focused on the processing of copper ore. The initial processing step involved 
separating out ore containing a copper concentration that was greater than 6%. Ore of this 
concentration was sent directly to the smelters and processed. Slag and flue ash were the 
residual wastes produced from this process. Ore containing a copper concentration less 
than 6% required additional pre-processing. This material was first crushed, segregated, 
concentrated and then processed in the smelters. These additional processing steps 
subsequently resulted in additional waste streams such as jig tailings, which were 
discharged onto the floodplain (ARCO, 1993). 
Operations at the Old Works ended in 1901. The Old Works operations were 
replaced with a newer smelting operation, known as the Washoe Works (later known as 
the Anaconda Reduction Works). This facility was located across the valley from the Old 
Works and operated from 1902 through 1980 (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Historic photograph of the Anaconda smelter operations (Troon, 2004). 
 
 
During the 1930s and 1940s, portions of the residual waste were reworked. 
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Portions of the waste piles were retrieved and reprocessed with advanced techniques. 
From 1940 to 1943, approximately 26 million pounds of copper and more than 1 million 
pounds of silver were retrieved from the reworking of a portion of the site known as the 
Red Sands area. 
The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) acquired the AMC in 1977. ARCO 
continued mineral processing operations at Anaconda until 1980. 
In 1983, the USEPA placed the Anaconda site on the NPL, which initiated a 
series of site investigations. These investigations defined the Anaconda NPL site as an 
area encompassing approximately 300 square miles. The waste volumes associated with 
this site have been estimated to be approximately 230 million cubic yards of concentrated 
mine tailings, 30 million cubic yards of furnace slag, 500,000 cubic yards of flue dust, 
20,000 acres of contaminated soil and millions of gallons of contaminated groundwater. 
Because of its size and complexity, the Anaconda site was subdivided into 
15 smaller, manageable Operable Units (OUs). One of the OUs, the Old Works/East 
Anaconda Development Area (OW/EADA), is the primary focus of this case study. 
While additional OUs have been and are currently being investigated and remediated, the 
final OU to be resolved will be the Anaconda Soils, Community Soils, and Regional 
Water and Wastes OU. 
In October 1984, ARCO entered into an Administrative Order Consent and began 
to conduct a remedial investigation of the site. An expedited RI/FS was entered into in 
July 1986 for the Mill Creek portion of the site. Families with young children were 
temporarily relocated due to the elevated arsenic levels in soil. A 1987-ROD determined 
that permanent relocation was warranted. A second Administrative Order Consent was 
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established in September 1988 for the Flue Dust and Smelter Hill OUs. A 1991-ROD was 
finalized for these sites. An Action Memorandum was signed in July 1991 for the Old 
Works area. This Action included stabilization of the Red Sands, repairs to Warm 
Springs Creek levees and access control fencing. The March 1994 ROD defined the 
remedial actions for the OW/EADA OU (USEPA, 1994c).   
The OW/EADA OU encompasses approximately 1,300 acres. Approximately 
1.4 million cubic yards of waste material (jig tailings, “heap roast” slag, Red Sands and 
other wastes) is associated with this OU. To support the remedial planning process, the 
OW/EADA OU was further divided into six subareas: the Old Works Structural area, the 
Heap Roast Slag and Waste Piles, the Warm Springs Creek floodplain, Red Sands, East 
Anaconda yard and the Drag Strip (ARCO, 1993).  
Human health risks resulting from the site are associated with five chemicals: 
arsenic, cadmium, lead, zinc and copper (USEPA, 1994c). The historical release and 
transport mechanisms for these contaminants include discarded waste materials, aerial 
deposition from stack emissions, in situ leaching from waste material, fluvial erosion and 
redeposition of wastes and demolition of contaminated structures (ARCO, 1993; USEPA, 
1994c). Since no humans live within the OU, and current and future land use was 
assumed to remain recreational and commercial, the potential receptor population was 
assumed to be recreational visitors and on-site workers (USEPA, 1994c). Given this 
scenario, the 1994-ROD determined that the most plausible routes of human exposure for 
this OU were direct ingestion of dust, soil or surface wastes, inhalation exposure to 
respirable particulate matter and ingestion of contaminants via groundwater. As such, the 
theoretical Reasonable Maximum Exposure cancer risk for on-site workers was 
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determined to be greater than 1 x 10-4, with the range being 2 x 10-5 to 4 x 10-4 (USEPA, 
1994c). 
The selected remedy for the OW/EADA OU requires both engineered and 
institutional controls. The engineered controls include: 
• Construction of engineered covers over waste materials exceeding arsenic levels of 
1000 parts per million (ppm) for areas designated as recreational and potentially 
commercial,  
• Treatment of soils exceeding arsenic levels of 1000 ppm for areas designated as 
recreational and potentially commercial,  
• Engineered covers or treatment of soils exceeding arsenic levels of 500 ppm in 
current commercial areas,  
• Construction of surface controls to manage surface water runoff, and  
• Repair and upgrades to the Warm Springs Creek levees. 
Institutional controls selected for the OW/EADA OU are intended to assure that 
future land and water use is consistent with residual risks, preserve and maintain the 
remedial structures, assure that future construction be performed consistent with the 
remedial actions and ensure that future remediation be conducted as future development 
occurs (USEPA, 2001c). 
To achieve these objectives four layers of institutional controls are planned for 
this OU (USEPA, 2001c). The first institutional control layer is the Community 
Protective Measures Program (CPMP). CPMP is primarily an informational process 
including public notices, warning signs, maps, remedial status reports and public health 
advisories. The second layer of institutional controls is the Anaconda Deer Lodge County 
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Master Plan (ADL, 1992a) and Anaconda-Deer Lodge County Development Permit 
System (ADL, 1992b). All proposed new development within the impacted area is 
required to obtain a county permit. This permit system provides a means of identifying 
potential future remediation that would be required in association with the proposed 
residential or commercial development. This remediation would then have to be 
performed at the time of development to ensure that the appropriate arsenic levels are 
maintained consistent with the land use.  
The final two layers are not in existence at the time of this writing. It is 
anticipated that the final set of institutional controls will be defined in the last Regional 
OU. The third protective layer is control of groundwater. It is envisioned that the State of 
Montana or the local water district will establish procedures for managing groundwater 
use. The fourth envisioned layer of control is specific to the area of the site where waste 
has been left in-place. Restrictive covenants, conservation easements and dedicated 
development areas are anticipated to form the foundation for these controls.  
A significant feature of the remedial plan for the OW/EADA OU involved the 
development of a “Jack Nicklaus Signature Golf Course” on a portion of the site. This 
golf course, which incorporated innovative “irrigated mining caps” into its design, 
supported an economic re-use of the property for recreational purposes (ADL, 1992a; 
Manning, 2003). The USEPA, the State of Montana and the Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County classified the golf course and the associated Old Works Historic Trail System as 
new, dedicated developments. 
In April 1994, the USEPA issued a Unilateral Administrative Order to ARCO to 
implement the preferred alternative remedy (USEPA, 1994c; USEPA, 1994a; USEPA, 
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1994d). On May 5, 1994 the property for the golf course and the Old Works Historic 
Trail System was transferred from ARCO to the Anaconda-Deer Lodge County to be 
operated by the Old Works Golf Course, Inc. a Montana nonprofit corporation (Montana, 
1994a; Montana, 1994b). Included in the land transfer were specific restrictive covenants 
designed to ensure that the site’s operations remain consistent with the selected remedy 
(Burnham, 1994; Montana, 1994b). In addition, the operation and maintenance (O&M) 
responsibilities, management insurance and contingency funding requirements and the 
subsequent land conversion requirements are defined in the property conveyance 
agreement (Burnham, 1994; Montana, 1994b).  
Construction of the Jack Nicklaus Signature Golf Course began in June 1994 (see 
Figure 8) and was completed in 1996 (see Figure 9). The course was opened for business 
in May 1997. Construction in the last sub-area of this OU was completed in 2001. The 
OU is considered to be in an interim status because the remediation of groundwater in 
this area has been deferred to the Anaconda Regional Water, Waste, & Soils OU 
(USEPA, 1999b; USEPA, 2001a; USEPA, 2003a). 
Two CERLCA five-year reviews have been completed at the Anaconda site to 
date. These reviews are a means of validating that the selected remedies are being 
maintained and implemented as expected. The first five-year review was released by the 
USEPA in November 1994 (USEPA, 1994b). The second five-year review was released 
by the USEPA in December 1999 (USEPA, 1999b). Both reviews found that the remedy 
at the OW/EADA were protective of human health and the environment consistent with 
the ROD (USEPA, 1994c). 
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Figure 8. Construction of the Old Works Golf Course (Troon, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Photograph of Old Works Golf Course with the remnants of the Lower 
Works in the background. 
 
Observations 
The Anaconda site was visited October 3, 2003. Included as part of this visit were 
discussions with Mr. Milo Manning of the Anaconda Environmental Education Institute. 
Mr. Manning coordinates the USEPA Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) and maintains a 
copy of the site’s Administrative Record and a local information repository. Mr. Manning 
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provided access to this information as well as his personal insight concerning this case. 
Discussions were also held with Mr. Brian Bartkowiac of the Montana Department of 
Environmental Quality. Mr. Bartkowiac provided copies of additional site information 
such as the Institutional Controls Design Package (USEPA, 2001c). An informal tour of 
the Anaconda area was also conducted during this visit.  
The management system installed at the Anaconda Smelter Site serves as a good 
example with respect to all functions and activities discussed in Table 2. The only 
possible weakness evident at this site is in the area of environmental and ecological 
monitoring. This environmental monitoring was not obvious on the Old Works OU 
although there are two related management activities. One, there is a nature trail integral 
to the OU, which indirectly supports this objective through public awareness and 
education. Second, there is a stronger ecological component at the Spring Creek OU that 
could be incorporated into the final OU.  
The Anaconda site exhibited strong local involvement in the site design and with 
community awareness. There was a local information repository present in Anaconda. 
The USEPA, via a TAG, supported this local involvement. The Old Works Golf Course 
also promotes its unique background (see Figure 10). 
The remedial design selected for the Anaconda site involved an innovative “re-
use” of a portion of the impacted area. This “re-use” alternative design was even less 
expensive than the more conventional capping design (Manning, 2003).   
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Figure 10. Photograph of an educational poster displayed at the Old Works Golf 
Course. 
 
Portions of the remediated properties were transferred to a non-profit organization 
for operation and maintenance. The responsibilities associated with this transfer include 
maintaining the engineered controls and the institutional controls consistent with the 
ROD. Restrictive covenants and revisionary provisions were placed in the Deed transfer 
to ensure consistent operations long-term. 
Multi-agency involvement and cooperation was evident at the Anaconda Site. 
This involvement included federal, state and local government participation. This 
involvement also appeared evident during the remedial design phase as well as during the 
post-ROD operations. 
Strong local government involvement was evident at this site, particularly with 
regard to future land transfers and land development. For example, the county established 
a Development Permit System for the area. This system requires all proposed 
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development within the impacted area obtain a county permit to ensure that the proposed 
development is consistent with existing land use classifications. During the review 
process for these development permits, any additional future remediation would need to 
be identified. Thus this permitting process ensures that future land use remains consistent 
with current conditions or requires that additional remediation be performed. 
Table 4 is a chronological timeline for the Anaconda Case Study. This timeline 
highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 5 is a summary of the 
contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls present at the Anaconda site.  
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Table 4. Chronological timeline of key events for the Anaconda Case Study. 
 
1883 Construction of the Upper Works in Anaconda, MT. 
1884 Copper smelting operations begin at the Upper Works.  
1888 Construction of the Lower Works expands processing capacity. 
1901 Operations end at the Upper and Lower Works. 
1902-
1980 
Copper smelting operations performed at the Anaconda Reduction 
Works. 
1977 Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) acquires Anaconda Mineral 
Company. 
1980 Operations end at the Anaconda site. 
1980 CERCLA enacted by Congress. 
1983 Anaconda site placed on the National Priority List.  
1984 ARCO and the USEPA enter into Administrative Order Consent and 
begin to conduct a Remedial Investigation of the site. 
1986 Expedited Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) entered 
into for the Mill Creek operable unit. 
1987 ROD signed for Mill Creek OU determines that permanent relocation 
is warranted. 
1988 A second Administrative Order Consent established for the Flue Dust 
and Smelter Hill OUs. 
1991 ROD signed for the Flue Dust and Smelter Hill OUs. 
1991 Action Memorandum was signed for the Old Works area. 
1994 ROD signed for the Old Works/East Anaconda Development Area 
OU.   
1994 Portions of Old Works OU transferred from ARCO to Anaconda-Deer 
Lodge County. 
1994-
1996 
Construction of the Old Works Golf Course on portions of OU with 
residual waste. 
1994 First 5-year review of CERCLA remedial actions conducted. 
1997 Old Works Golf Course opens to the public. 
1999 Second 5-year review of CERCLA remedial actions conducted. 
Present On-going remedial operations in remaining OUs.  
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Table 5. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
Anaconda Site. 
 Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site Security 1. Private property signs around perimeter 
of site  
2. Golf course office and maintenance 
staff  
Active Processes 3. Surface and groundwater monitoring 
system 
Surface Covers 4. Multi-layer cap 
Engineered 
Subsurface Barriers 5. Groundwater drainage system 
stabilized waste 
Information 
Management 
6. OU monitoring data collected 
7. CERCLA Five-year Reviews 
8. Administrative records 
9. Local information repository 
Stakeholder Awareness 10. Local and national recognition 
Orders & Decrees 11. Several Orders used during remediation 
process  
Permits 12. Anaconda-Deer Lodge County 
Development Permit System 
Deed Restriction 13. Property conveyance requires O&M, 
management insurance and 
contingency funding  
Contract 14. Property management via the Old 
Works Golf Course, Inc. 
Institutional 
Ordinance/Statutes 15. CERCLA 
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Love Canal Case Study 
Historical Events 
The origins of Love Canal date back more than 100 years. In the 1890s, an 
entrepreneur named William T. Love had a vision to create a “model city” in the Niagara 
Falls region of New York State. Love was attracted to the region because of the Niagara 
Falls. Love’s plan was to construct a canal between the upper and lower reaches of the 
Niagara River. This canal was to be used for two primary purposes. First, the canal would 
serve as an important transportation route around the Falls for commerce between Lake 
Erie and Lake Ontario. Second, it would serve as a source of hydroelectric power, which 
Love needed for his model industrial city.   
Love acquired property rights in the La Salle region of the City of Niagara Falls. 
The area’s clay soils were a positive attribute for construction of the canal. In 1894, 
construction of the canal began with both state and private finances. A portion of the 
canal, measuring between ½ to 1 mile, was constructed. The canal, however, was never 
finished, as the result of financial constraints. The idle site subsequently served as a 
swimming hole for local residents for some 40 years.   
In 1941, Elon H. Hooker became interested in the former Love Canal as a 
potential disposal site for by-products resulting from the Hooker Electrochemical 
Company (Hooker). The 16-acre site was close to the Hooker operations; therefore, 
transportation costs would be low. Hooker investigated the site and determined that the 
low hydraulic conductivity clay soils made the site suitable for containing residue 
hazardous waste from its operations. In 1942, Hooker acquired the property and began 
disposing chemical waste into the former canal.    
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Hooker disposed of waste in the former canal from 1942 through 1953 (Mazur, 
1998). The dimensions of the canal at this time measured 3000 feet long and varied from 
60 to 80 feet wide. The depth varied from 8 to 16 feet. Hooker conducted disposal 
operations in the northern section of the canal from 1943 through 1946. The southern 
portion of the canal served the period from 1946 through 1953. In addition, Hooker dug a 
number of disposal pits outside of the canal. These pits measured approximately 40 feet 
by 40 feet and were 25 feet in depth. After reaching capacity in 1953, Hooker filled the 
site with layers of dirt.   
The waste disposed of by Hooker consisted of liquid and solid chemical residues 
and by-products from Hooker’s chemical manufacturing processes. The solid waste was 
disposed of in 55-gallon metal and fiberboard drums while liquid waste was sometimes 
disposed of directly into the canal from tank trucks. The USEPA estimates that 
approximately 21,000 tons of chemicals were disposed of in the canal (USEPA, 1988). 
The primary contaminants of concern according to the 1988 ROD include chlorides, 
chlorobenzene, chlorophenols, dioxin, mercaptans, metals, pesticides, phenols and 
toluenes (USEPA, 1988; USEPA, 1991b). 
In addition to Hooker, the City of Niagara Falls used Love Canal for the disposal 
of municipal waste (Zuesse, 1981). There are also claims that the U.S. Army used the 
canal for the disposal of chemical waste during World War II (WWII).   
Following WWII, a population growth spurred the housing market in the Niagara 
Falls area. New housing projects began to expand the city eastward in the direction of 
Love Canal. Beginning in 1942, the LaSalle Housing Development was established one 
block from Love Canal. By the early 1950s, small single-family homes began to surround 
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the rectangular canal site.   
As the city’s population increased its infrastructure continued to expand to 
accommodate the demand. In the early 1950s the Niagara Falls Board of Education 
(Board) approached Hooker with regard to its interest in acquiring a portion of the canal 
property. The Board was interested in acquiring a suitable property for a new school. It 
has been reported that Hooker informed the Board of the type of waste disposed of in the 
canal and suggested that this site was not suitable for excavation or construction. On at 
least two occasions, Hooker appeared at Board meetings to again present their warnings 
(Zuesse, 1981). In 1953, the entire Love Canal property was transferred to the Board for 
$1. Language in the Deed acknowledged that chemical waste was buried on the site and 
that Hooker was released of all liability and risk associated with the site (NYS, 1953; 
1979; Zuesse, 1981; Whelan, 1985).  
In 1954, the Board built the 99th Street School on the acquired Love Canal 
property. During the initial excavation for the school, waste was encountered. 
Construction continued and the 99th Street School opened in 1955. In addition to this 
construction project, the Board sold portions of the former Love Canal property for 
residential development (see Figure 11). From 1955 through 1962, additional portions of 
the property were used for the construction of streets, sidewalks and residential 
development. Storm sewers were installed at a 10-foot depth under sections of 
Wheatfield and Read Avenue. These construction activities involved disturbances to the 
clay soils, which served as the containment system for the Love Canal disposal cell. 
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 Figure 11. Historical aerial photograph of 99th Street School, surrounding 
neighborhood and original Love Canal disposal cell. (ETF 1998) 
  
 
 
 
Public health concerns and questions began to surface in 1976. During this time, 
annual precipitation was significantly higher than the 30-year average of 36 inches 
(Mazur, 1998). For example, annual precipitation for the years 1976 and 1977 were 
47 and 50 inches respectively.  
In 1978, Michael Brown ran a series of articles in the Niagara Gazette (1980). 
These articles suggested health problems such as miscarriages, birth defects and cancer 
were being observed that were resulting from contaminants leaking from the disposal 
site. National attention began to focus on the neighborhood of Love Canal.     
On April 25, 1978, the New York Department of Health ordered the installation 
of a protective fence around the canal. In addition, a series of public meetings were held 
in May 1978. Residents complained of a lack of information as well as contradictory 
information from county and state officials. As a result, local residents began to organize 
themselves. Two community organizations began to form in July 1978. Ms. Karen 
Schroeder began to organize residents whose homes were on 99th Street. These homes ran 
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alongside the former canal and were considered part of the “inner ring” homes (Mazur, 
1998). Likewise, Ms. Lois Gibbs began to organize the broader Love Canal 
neighborhood. This second group, which included homeowners from throughout the 
Love Canal neighborhood, became know as the Love Canal Homeowners Association 
(LCHA) (Gibbs and Levine, 1982; Gibbs, 1998; Mazur, 1998). The Ecumentical Task 
Force of the Niagara Frontier provides a detailed daily log of events that transpired 
during this time (ETF, 1998). 
In August 1978, the State of New York issued a Health Emergency following 
release of preliminary health findings that the residents of the Love Canal were exhibiting 
an above normal number of miscarriages and birth defects. The New York Health 
Commissioner, Mr. Whalen, ordered residents to not eat food from their gardens. He also 
ordered pregnant women and children under the age of two to move out of the Love 
Canal neighborhood, although the state did not provide funding and did not make any 
additional recommendations to the remaining residents.  
Later in August 1978, New York Governor Carey visited Love Canal and held a 
public meeting at the 99th Street School. The Governor announced that the state would 
buy the inner ring homes and would begin health studies in other portions of the 
neighborhood. President Carter declared the site a federal emergency, freeing up federal 
funding to support the relocation (NYS, 1988). The 236 homeowners from the inner rings 
began to sell their homes to the state and move out of the area. The area was fenced off 
and remediation efforts began. A system of drains was installed along the sides of the 
canal to lower the water table. Leachate was collected from the canal and treated on site 
and a three-foot clay cap was placed over the canal.   
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In 1979, preliminary results began to surface from the health studies initiated as 
part of the 1978 evacuation. In February 1979, the State of New York announced the 
temporary relocation of families living between 97th and 103rd street with pregnant 
women and children under two years of age.   
An initial lawsuit was filed September 1979 against Occidental Chemical 
Corporation (Occidental), which had acquired Hooker, and three New York State 
agencies. In December 1979, the federal Justice Department initiated a lawsuit against 
Occidental in connection with Love Canal (1979). This latter suit was eventually settled 
in December 1995. Under the terms of the agreement, Occidental agreed to pay the U.S. 
government $129 million to cover the costs of clean-up and interest (USDOJ, 1995a). 
On May 17, 1980, preliminary results from a USEPA study suggested possible 
chromosome damage in residents tested. On May 19, 1980, two USEPA representatives 
were detained as “hostages” at the offices of the LCHA. On May 21, 1980, President 
Carter declared a second federal emergency (NYS, 1988; USEPA, 2003c). This decision 
defined an Emergency Declaration Area (EDA) involving approximately 232 acres and 
provided federal support to relocate approximately 500 families and initiate remedial 
actions (NYS, 1988; USEPA, 2003c).  
The U.S. federal government enacted new legislation, CERCLA, on 
December 11, 1980 (CERCLA 1994). Remediation efforts at the Love Canal involved 
multiple operable units, several RODS, seven remedial stages and three Explanations of 
Significant Differences (ESDs). The remedial stages included: 1) Initial emergency 
actions, 2) Landfill containment, 3) Excavation of sewer/creek sediments, 4) Treatment 
and disposal of sewer/creek sediment, 5) Remediation of 93rd Street School soils, 6) EDA 
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home maintenance and 7) Buyout of homes in the EDA.  
The 1988 ROD considered six remedial alternatives for the remediation of this 
site (USEPA, 1988; USEPA, 1991b). The ROD determined that the most plausible routes 
of exposure were inhalation or inadvertent ingestion of contaminated soil. This could 
most likely occur from children playing on the site. The theoretical cumulative cancer 
risk for the no-action alternative was determined to be 2.4 x 10-4. If the site were 
disturbed without implementing direct contact or dust control measures, the cumulative 
cancer risk was estimated to increase to 1.3 x 10-3. 
The selected remedy called for soil excavation, on-site solidification and a low-
permeable cover. Specifically, the selected remedy required:  
• Excavation of approximately 7500 cubic yards of contaminated soil;  
• On-site solidification of the excavated material;  
• Re-disposal of the solidified material back into the same unit of contamination; 
• Treatability studies to evaluate the effectiveness of the solidification process; and  
• A low-permeability cap installed over the unit of contamination. 
In 1990, the USEPA determined that the excavated materials should be classified 
as RCRA F039 wastes (i.e., wastes containing dioxin) and should be treated to meet the 
universal treatment standards (UTS) for dioxin at 1 ppb. This treatment was performed at 
commercial facilities and the residues from the treatment were disposed of at a RCRA 
Subtitle C Landfill outside of the State of New York. In addition, contaminated sewer and 
creek sediments were analyzed, segregated, treated and disposed. A groundwater-
monitoring program was also established in accordance with RCRA. 
The landfill cover and leachate collection system was completed in 1985. The site 
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was deemed construction complete on September 29, 1999. The sewer, sediment and 
other waste materials were shipped off-site for disposal in 2000. 
The first five-year review of the Love Canal site was conducted in June 2003 in 
accordance with CERCLA requirements (USEPA, 2003b). The purpose of the review 
was to ensure that the implemented remedies remained protective of human health and 
the environment. This review concluded that the remedies as implemented continue to 
provide adequate control to the known contaminants. 
Institutional controls at this site include a permanent easement on the site property 
by the State of New York. This easement provides for the exclusive use and occupancy of 
the property by the state. Through a Consent Decree, the state has granted Occidental 
exclusive use of the site for continued maintenance (see Figure 12). Adjacent vacant 
properties are being maintained by zoning and deed restrictions (USEPA, 2003b). The 
deeds for these properties require that the state be notified if these properties are being 
considered for use other than commercial or light industrial. The state is also to be 
notified if these properties are sold (USEPA, 2004e).  
The USEPA issued a Notice of Intent to delete (i.e., de-list) the Love Canal site 
from the NPL in the Federal Register, March 17, 2004 (DePalma, 2004; Thompson, 
2004). This announcement states that the USEPA has determined that all appropriate 
response actions under CERCLA have been implemented and that no additional response 
actions are required (USEPA, 2004e). The Love Canal site was de-listed from the NPL 
on September 30, 2004 (USEPA, 2004d). 
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Figure 12. Photograph showing active maintenance at Love Canal. 
 
Observations 
The Love Canal area was visited on June 10, 2003. Although site personnel were 
not available at that time for an on-site tour, the site and its surroundings were observable 
from outside the access controls. Additional information was obtained from the Love 
Canal Collection at the State University of New York at Buffalo University Archives. 
Follow-up interviews were also conducted with Mr. Mike Basile, Public Affairs Officer, 
USEPA Niagara Falls Office (Basile, 2004). 
The Love Canal Case can be viewed as two separate cases: the original Love 
Canal and the current Love Canal. The original Love Canal case involves those events 
from the 1950s through the 1970s that resulted in the site being placed on the NPL. The 
current Love Canal involves the events resulting from the CERCLA remediation and 
represents the current configuration of the site. 
The original Love Canal disposal cell consisted of a low-hydraulic conductivity 
clay cap installed over the waste constituents, which were placed into the natural low-
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hydraulic conductivity clay soils. The site was fenced and separated from the surrounding 
area. There appeared to have been little government involvement, little information 
management or public notice at that time. The primary legal control was private property 
restrictions. 
Following the original disposal cell construction, the surrounding population 
encroached up to the site boundary (ingress scenario). Portions of the site were 
subsequently transferred to new owners. Notice was provided to the new owners, prior to 
and at the time of transfer, as to the types of waste disposed of on-site and their location 
(NYS, 1953). The new owners further transferred portions of the site to a second set of 
owners. It is not clear whether these later transfers included public notice. 
These various owners disturbed the cell cover during construction operations on 
the site. Natural events, such as multiple, consecutive years of above average 
precipitation, contributed to contaminant migration from the disposal cell. These events 
contributed to the site being placed on the NPL, which led to its remediation and its 
current configuration. 
The current Love Canal can be described as a sacrifice zone that is fenced off and 
separated from the surrounding population. No re-use potential is evident for this 
immediate site. Although there is no formal buffer zone beyond the site’s fenced 
boundary, many properties associated with the former “outer ring” still remain vacant 
(see Figure 13).   This surrounding area appears to be changing and new development is 
progressing up to the fence boundary along portions of the site. Properties to the north 
and west of the site continue to remain zoned as residential (see Figures 14 and 15). 
Properties to the east of Love Canal are being re-zoned light industrial (Basile, 2004). 
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This is consistent with the recommendation of the New York Habitability Study (NYS, 
1988). 
 
Figure 13. Photograph of vacant lots west of the current Love Canal site. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Photograph of new senior citizen housing at southeastern Love Canal. 
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 Figure 15. Photograph of residential property adjacent to Lave Canal. 
 
The remediation of the site captured national attention and directly contributed to 
the enactment of CERCLA. The agency involvement included the USEPA, the State of 
New York and the City of Niagara Falls.   
Although Love Canal continues to attract national attention, there is little local 
stakeholder involvement evident at the site. Local residents expressed very little interest 
in the site during informal discussions held with them as part of the site visit. In addition, 
the residential name for the community has been changed from Love Canal to Black 
Creek. Finally, as described in the USEPA Five-year Review Report, only two 
individuals, a New York State representative and a Congressional aid, attended the open 
house during the five-year review (USEPA, 2003b).  
There is a local, pre-ROD, historic information repository at the State University 
of New York at Buffalo. Also, the local USEPA office in Niagara Falls maintains a 
second public reading room specific to Love Canal (Basile, 2004). This local office has 
been maintained by the USEPA since 1982 (USEPA, 2003b).  
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A grassed soil cover overlays the disposal cell. The site is being maintained and 
the grass is routinely cut (see Figure 12). Groundwater and leachate are monitored and 
site maintenance personnel maintain operational support facilities at this site. 
Table 6 is a chronological timeline for the Love Canal Case Study. This timeline 
highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 7 is a summary of the 
contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls present at the Love Canal site.  
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Table 6. Chronological timeline of key events for the Love Canal Case Study. 
 
1894 William T. Love begins construction of canal. 
1941 Hooker acquires abandoned canal.  
1942 Hooker begins chemical waste disposal in canal. 
1942-
1953 
Waste disposal of 20,000-25,000 tons. 
     1943-1946 – disposal in northern portion of canal. 
     1946-1953 – disposal in southern portion of canal. 
1953 Hooker transfers canal property to Niagara Falls Board of Education. 
(April 28) 
1954 Construction of the Niagara Falls 99th Street School. 
1955 Niagara Falls 99th Street School opens. 
1955-
1962 
Portions of property transferred from Niagara Falls School Board to the 
City of Niagara Falls for infrastructure construction. 
1976-
1977 
Years of high precipitation. 
1976 New York Department of Environmental Quality visits site. 
1977 The USEPA initiates air sampling in residential basements. 
1978 Niagara Gazette publishes a series of articles on area health problems. 
(May) 
1978 New York issues a Health Emergency. (August 2) 
1978 NY Governor visits site and announces state will buy inner-ring homes. 
236 homeowners begin to move out. President Carter issues federal 
emergency. (August 7) 
1978 Initial remedial actions begin. (October 10) 
1979 NY State recommends temporary relocation of pregnant women and 
children living on outer-ring. (February 8) 
1979-
1980 
National media attention focuses on Love Canal neighborhood. 
1979 Initial lawsuit filed against Occidental. (September) 
1980 The USEPA reports on chromosome damage. (May 17) 
1980 Two USEPA representatives taken “hostage.” (May 19) 
1980 Federal health emergency declared. (May 22) 
1980 President Carter announces federal government’s intent to purchase outer-
ring homes. (October) 
1980 CERCLA signed by President Carter. (December 12) 
1985-
1991 
USEPA documents remedial actions in multiple Records of Decisions. 
1995 Landfill cover and leachate system completed. 
1995 Occidental agrees to $129M settlement with the USDOJ and the USEPA. 
(December) 
1999 Site was deemed construction complete. (September) 
2003 First Five-Year CERCLA Review. (June) 
2004 The USEPA proposes NPL site de-listing. (March) 
2004 Love Canal is de-listed from the NPL. (September) 
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Table 7. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
current Love Canal Site. 
 
Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site Security 1. Fenced disposal dell 
2. Emergency contact signs 
3. Site maintenance office 
Surface Covers 4. Multi-layer cap 
Subsurface Barriers 5. Stabilized waste 
Engineered 
Active Processes 6. Leachate collection/treatment 
system 
Information Management 7. Monitoring data collected by 
Occidental 
8. CERCLA Five-year Review 
9. Administrative records 
10. Local information repositories 
Stakeholder Awareness 11. Love Canal retains national attention 
12. Local information repositories 
Consent Decree 13. Multiple emergency decrees issued  
Zoning Restrictions 14. Light industrial zoning restrictions 
placed on property east of canal; 
residential elsewhere. 
Deed Restrictions 15. Deed restrictions placed on 
properties east of canal 
Government Ownership 16. State of New York ownership of 
property 
Institutional 
Ordinance/Statutes 17. CERCLA 
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Maxey Flats Case Study 
Historical Events 
The Maxey Flats Disposal Site, located near Hillsboro, Kentucky (see Figure 16), 
was used for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal from 1963 until December 
1977 (Kentucky, 1968). The Nuclear Engineering Company operated the facility at the 
252-acre site that it leased from the Commonwealth of Kentucky for 25 years beginning 
in 1963 (Kentucky, 1963). Approximately 4.8 million cubic feet of LLW, containing 
more than 2.4 million curies of radioactivity, was deposited into 52 unlined earthen 
trenches at this facility (USEPA, 1986; USEPA, 1991a). The trenches, ranging in size 
from 15- to 670-feet long, 10- to 70-feet wide and 10- to 35-feet deep, occupy some 
40 acres (USEPA, 1991a).   
 
Figure 16. Map showing location of Maxey Flats Disposal Site (USEPA, 2001d). 
 
Operational problems began to arise in the early 1970s (USEPA, 1991a). As the 
disposal trenches were filled with waste, they were subsequently covered with a three-
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foot low-hydraulic conductivity soil cap to prevent infiltration of precipitation. 
Subsidence problems with the soil cap, however, began to impact its performance. 
Repeated subsidence occurrences resulted in preferential infiltration routes through the 
cap. The infiltrated water accumulated in the disposal trenches and subsequently migrated 
from the trenches. The discovery of contaminated leachate some 300 feet from the source 
trenches ultimately prompted the site’s closure in 1977 (USDOJ, 1995b).   
The Maxey Flats Disposal Site was placed on the NPL in 1986 to be remediated 
under CERCLA (USEPA, 1986; CERCLA 1994). There were 832 Potentially 
Responsible Parties identified, including the USDOE, other federal agencies, federal 
contractors, medical facilities, physicians, clinics, industry, state agencies, transporters, 
broker/haulers and the landowner. The primary contaminants of concern were: 
plutonium238, plutonium239/240, strontium90, tritium, uranium235, uranium238, cobalt60, 
carbon14, benzene, toluene, xylenes, arsenic and cyanide. The off-site groundwater 
exposure pathway was determined to be the dominant pathway with tritium being the 
major contaminant of concern (USEPA, 1991a).   
The ROD was finalized in September 1991 (USEPA, 1991a). The settling private 
parties, the settling federal agencies, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the USEPA 
signed two Consent Decrees in 1995 (USDOJ, 1995b). Under one decree, six federal 
agencies (the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, DOE, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration [NASA] and National Institute of Health [NIH]) agreed to pay 
approximately $45M of the cleanup costs. Under the second decree, state, federal and 
private parties agreed to pay $8.5M of additional costs (USDOJ, 1995b). 
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Approximately one million gallons of contaminated leachate was removed from 
the original disposal trenches between 1998 and 2000 (USEPA, 2001d). This water was 
solidified and the resulting “concrete” was disposed of in earth-mounded concrete 
bunkers that were constructed at the disposal facility. A “natural stabilization” remedy 
was then selected and implemented for the final remediation of Maxey Flats. This remedy 
required the “initial” closure of the site, contouring of the site to reduce erosion and the 
subsequent capping of the site to prevent infiltration. The “interim” remediation cap, 
shown in Figure 17, was completed in 2003 and consists of a layer of compacted clay 
(21 inches) and a 40-mil polypropylene liner. This geomembrane-cap covers 
approximately 60 acres. Monitoring wells have been located under the cap and within the 
trenches to measure trench water levels. Additional groundwater monitoring wells are 
located around the perimeter of the site to identify any off-site contaminant migration. 
 
 Figure 17. Photograph of the Maxey Flats interim geomembrane-cap. 
 
Following completion of the “initial site closure” phase, the selected remedy 
further requires a 100-year “interim maintenance period,” which is to be followed by the 
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“final site closure” and a permanent “custodial maintenance” phase. The interim 
maintenance period involves the establishment and management of a buffer zone (an 
additional 450 acres) around the site, posting of perimeter signs and fences, installation of 
permanent site monuments, active maintenance and continued surface water and 
groundwater monitoring. The objectives of this phase of management are to minimize 
further infiltration of precipitation into the disposal trenches, prevent or mitigate the 
release of hazardous substances, control site drainage to minimize the potential for 
erosion, implement institutional controls, implement environmental monitoring and allow 
natural subsidence to further stabilize the site, thus improving the foundation for the final 
site cap (USEPA, 2002b).   
The system’s performance is being monitored via: 1) Groundwater wells installed 
adjacent to the disposal site and at the base of the surrounding hills (see Figure 18), 
2) Water-level monitors located within selected disposal trenches, 3) Surface-water 
discharge flow meters for the site detention basins, 4) Erosion control monuments, and 
5)  Cap subsidence reference benchmarks (IT-Corporation, 2000). 
Information obtained during the interim maintenance period is maintained by the 
Commonwealth and submitted to the USEPA. This monitoring information is not 
maintained in the CERCLA Administrative Record or at local public reading locations. 
Local public reading rooms, which maintain copies of the CERCLA Administrative 
Record, generally maintain only pre-ROD information. Post-ROD monitoring 
information is, however, available to interested stakeholders through Freedom of 
Information procedures via the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Heath, 2003).   
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 Figure 18. Photograph of groundwater monitoring station. 
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky remains the lead organization responsible for 
the long-term management of the Maxey Flat Disposal Site. Land use restrictions have 
been placed in property Deeds to prevent future inappropriate uses of this property 
(Kentucky, 1995; Kentucky, 2003). These restrictions prohibit the use of groundwater 
from the property, limit all action at the site that could disturb the integrity of the 
engineered controls and limit access to the property to Commonwealth personnel or their 
agents.  
A $10 million Emergency Trust Account (in 1996 dollars), as defined in the 
Consent Decree, has been established by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to cover 
emergency actions arising during the interim maintenance period (Hamilton, 2003). 
Funds remaining in this account following the site’s final closure will be returned to the 
Commonwealth. These funds are not associated with emergency actions for the post-
closure custodial maintenance period.     
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Observations 
The Maxey Flats site was visited on June 6, 2003. Mr. Omar Heath, Maxey Flats 
Project Manager for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Environmental 
Protection, Waste Management Division, provided a tour of the facility. Additional 
information was gathered from the Maxey Flats Administrative Record located at the 
Morehead University Library. 
Maxey Flats can be described as a permanent sacrifice zone. The 60-acre disposal 
cell is capped with a geosynthetic membrane. The cell’s perimeter is fenced to restrict 
access (see Figure 19).  No re-use potential is evident at this site. The disposal cell is also 
surrounded by a 450-acre buffer zone, which is primarily wooded. The buffer zone is not 
fenced but it is posted with warning signs. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky personnel serve as local site stewards and maintain 
an office at the site, which is staffed during normal work hours (see Figure 20). The site 
is actively maintained. Routine maintenance includes site inspections, groundwater 
monitoring, surface runoff monitoring, cap repairs and erosion monument monitoring.  
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Figure 19. Photograph of access controls surrounding the Maxey Flats disposal cell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Photograph of administrative area supporting Maxey Flats. 
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In addition to the site office, there is a local information repository at nearby 
Morehead University. This repository maintains a copy of the site’s administrative 
record. This record is quite complete with regard to pre-ROD information. Little post-
ROD information was observed. 
The site appeared to have benefited from an active public involvement during the 
RI/FS process and other pre-ROD activities. Currently there was little public involvement 
observed at the site.  
The site is currently considered to be in an interim maintenance period. This 
interim period is scheduled to last for 100 years to support natural subsidence at the site. 
Following this interim period the site will receive a final cover. Site stewards have 
indicated that the interim maintenance period could be reduced from 100 years if it 
appears that no further subsidence is anticipated. 
A financial trust has been established to support this site during the 100-year 
interim maintenance period. This trust only supports emergency actions at this site for the 
100-year interim maintenance period (Hamilton, 2003). State appropriations are still 
being used to fund the operation and maintenance activities. Following the interim 
maintenance period, the funds in this trust are to be returned to the state. This trust is not 
expected to support the final cap construction. 
Table 8 is a chronological timeline for the Maxey Flats Case Study. This timeline 
highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 9 is a summary of the 
engineered and institutional controls present at the Maxey Flats Disposal Site.  
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Table 8. Chronological timeline of key events for the Maxey Flats Case Study. 
 
 
1963 Commonwealth of Kentucky leases 252 acres to Nuclear Engineering 
Company 
1963 Commonwealth of Kentucky issues Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
disposal license to Nuclear Engineering Company 
1963-1977 4.8M cubic feet of LLW is disposed of at Maxey Flats 
1972 Studies by the Kentucky Department of Health and Environmental 
Monitoring reveal radionuclide migration 
1973-1986 Additional studies during this timeframe.   
Also, an Interim Action is conducted to treat 6 million gallons of 
trench leachate.  Leachate is treated on-site. 
1987-1991 RI/FS is conducted under CERCLA. 
1988-1989 USEPA emergency actions are conducted. These include 
solidification of leachate and on-site disposal. 
1991 Record of Decision (ROD) is signed 
1992-1995 Various legal actions and negotiations occur. 
1995 Two Consent Decrees are signed. 
1996-2003 Remedial Actions as specified in the ROD are conducted. 
2002 First Five-year CERCLA Review report released. 
2003 Initial Remediation Phase is completed. This phase includes 
construction of the 60-acre synthetic cap. 
2004~2100 Projected Interim Maintenance Period to be conducted by the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. 
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Table 9. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
Maxey Flats Site. 
 
Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site Security 1. 450-acre buffer zone surrounding 
disposal cell 
2. Fenced disposal cell 
3. Warning signs 
4. Site office 
Surface Covers 5. Multi-layer geosynthetic cap 
Engineered 
Subsurface Barriers 6. Stabilized waste 
7. Concrete cells 
Information 
Management 
8. Monitoring data collected by 
Kentucky 
9. CERCLA Five-year Review 
10. Administrative records 
11. Local information repositories 
Stakeholder Awareness 12. Local citizen advisory group during 
RI/FS 
13. Local information repositories 
Consent Decree 14. Multiple decrees issued  
Deed Restrictions 15. Land-use restrictions placed in 
property deeds 
Government 
Ownership 
16. Commonwealth of Kentucky 
ownership of property 
Ordinance/Statutes 17. CERCLA 
Institutional 
Financial Security 18. Trust Fund established for 
emergencies during interim 
maintenance period 
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Rocky Mountain Arsenal Case Study 
Historical Events 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) was created in 1942 when the U.S. Army 
purchased 17,000 acres northeast of Denver, CO. (USGAO, 1997). The site was 
established under the control of the U.S. Army in support of World War II (WWII) 
military operations. Specifically, RMA was established to manufacture chemical warfare 
agents. 
RMA is located approximately 8 miles from the City of Denver, CO., east of 
Commerce City, CO and west of the Denver International Airport, as shown in Figure 21. 
The site encompasses a 27 square mile area (17,000 acres). 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Map showing location of RMA  (USDOD, 2001b). 
 
Facility construction and manufacturing operations began at RMA in 1942 (see 
Figure 22). Initial operations were performed at the South Plants complex. The products 
produced at these facilities included mustard gas, lewisite and chlorine gas. Production 
continued for the duration of WWII.  
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 Figure 22. Historic photograph of production at RMA in 1942 (USDOD, 2001b). 
 
Following WWII, production declined at RMA resulting in excess capacity and 
facilities. Portions of the South Plants complex were leased to private industry for the 
manufacture of chemicals and pesticides. Nine companies conducted manufacturing 
operations at the South Plants between 1946 and 1982. Three primary leases included the 
Julius Hyman and Company from 1947 to 1952, the Shell Oil Company (Shell) from 
1952 to 1982 and Colorado Fuel and Iron from 1946 to 1948. 
In the early 1950s, the Army constructed the North Plants complex. In 1952, the 
Army initiated operations at these facilities. The North Plants were used from 1953 until 
1957 for the manufacturing of the nerve agent GB (i.e., Sarin).  
In addition, various incendiary munitions were also manufactured at RMA at this 
time. These munitions included M-47 bombs filled with napalm gel and M-74 bomblets 
filled with a mixture of agents. These munitions were manufactured at RMA in support 
of WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.  
Waste generated at RMA throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s was disposed of 
107  
on-site in basins, pits, trenches and burn pits. Liquid waste from RMA was often treated 
and discharged into catch basins. In 1961, the Army drilled a 12,045-foot-deep injection 
well. From 1961 until 1966 approximately 165 million gallons of treated effluent waste 
was disposed of in this manner (USEPA, 1996). 
On December 6, 1982, the USEPA, Army, Shell and the Colorado Department of 
Health signed a Memorandum of Agreement to investigate the decontamination of RMA. 
Despite this agreement, various parties pursued numerous legal actions and lawsuits 
during the 1980s and into the 1990s.  
A significant event occurred in 1986. A winter roost of bald eagles was 
discovered on the Arsenal (see Figure 23). The presence of bald eagles, an endangered 
species, prompted the involvement of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). In 
1987, the USFWS began managing the site's abundant wildlife, which included roughly 
300 wildlife species (USDOD, 2001b). 
 
       Figure 23. Bald Eagles were discovered at RMA in 1986. 
 
In 1989, the U.S. Army, Shell, the U.S. Department of Interior (USDOI) (i.e., the 
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USFWS) and the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry signed a Federal 
Facility Agreement (USDOD, 2001a).  
In 1992, Congress enacted the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National Wildlife Refuge 
Act of 1992 (RMANWRA 1992). This Public Law #102-402 designated the transfer of 
RMA from the Army to the USDOI and designated the site to be managed as a unit 
within the National Wildlife Refuge system (USFWS, 1996). Figure 24 shows the signs 
designating RMA as a wildlife refuge. 
 
Figure 24. Rocky Mountain Arsenal became a National Wildlife Refuge in 1992. 
 
The current regional land use is a combination of rural, industrial and residential. 
With the surrounding population steadily increasing (ingress scenario), additional 
conversion of rural lands to industrial and residential areas is expected. This conversion is 
expected to affect RMA. For example, such a conversion is anticipated to continue to 
increase surface runoff and is expected to transform intermittent streams to perennial 
streams (Jackson, 2003).  
RMA is classified as a temperate grassland region (see Figure 25). This area is 
considered a transition zone between mountain and plains habitat. As of 1996, 88% of 
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RMA was vegetated. Vegetation is a combination of early successional plant 
communities (41%), crested wheatgrass (19%) and a mix (28%) of shrubland, riparian 
woodland, marshes, wetlands and deciduous tree groves (USEPA, 1996).  
 
 
 
Figure 25. Photograph of RMA terrain, with Denver in the background. 
 
RMA has a large wildlife population. Wildlife is dominated by species of prairie, 
steppe and savanna communities. Twenty-six species of mammals and 176 species of 
birds have been observed on RMA. Included are populations of deer, bald eagles, hawks, 
waterfowl and the rare Cassin’s and Brewer’s sparrows (USEPA, 1996).  
Two RODs were approved for the arsenal. On December 19, 1995, the Off-site 
ROD was signed. On June 11, 1996 the on-site ROD was signed. To coordinate and 
implement the remedial actions specified in the RODs, a tri-party organization, the 
Remediation Venture Office (RVO), was formed in October 1996 between the U.S. 
Army, Shell and USFWS. 
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More than 600 chemicals have been associated with activities at RMA (USEPA, 
1996). Principal contaminants include: organochlorine pesticides, metals (arsenic, 
mercury) and chlorinated and aromatic solvents. Human health risks are associated with 
four chemicals: aldrin, dieldrin, dibromochloropropane (DBCP) and arsenic. The 1996-
ROD determined that the most plausible routes of human exposure were consumption, 
dermal contact and inhalation. The highest risks are associated with the central portions 
of RMA where chemical processing and disposal occurred. The theoretical cumulative 
cancer risk for the no-action alternative was determined to be greater than 1 x 10-4 
(USEPA, 1996). 
The remedial actions at RMA fall under CERCLA and are incorporated into two 
operable units (OU). The On-post OU addresses contamination within the fenced-in 
27 square miles of RMA proper. The Off-post OU addresses contamination outside of the 
RMA site (USEPA, 1996). 
The On-post OU addresses 3000 acres of soil, 15 groundwater plumes and 
798 structures. The selected remedy requires (USDOD, 2000b): 
• Continued operation of groundwater treatment systems, 
• Maintaining lake surface water levels to support aquatic ecosystems, 
• Continued monitoring of surface and groundwater, 
• Construction of a Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) compliant landfill, 
• Demolition and on-site disposal of contaminated structures, 
• In-situ stabilization of contaminated soils, 
• In-situ thermal treatment of selected waste (i.e., Hex Pit), and 
• Excavation and on-site disposal of contaminated soils and debris in a double-lined 
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RCRA-compliant landfill (see Figure 26). 
 
 
Figure 26. Photograph of RCRA landfill under construction at RMA. 
 
The Final Interim Institutional Plan was published February 2003 (RMA-RVO, 
2003). This plan defines the following institutional controls for the RMA: 
• Land Use Controls: residential development is prohibited, groundwater and surface 
water use as a potable source is prohibited, and fish and game consumption is 
prohibited.  
• Preservation: wildlife habitats are to be preserved; hydrogeologic characteristics are 
to be protected.  
• Access Control via multiple and redundant layers: a perimeter fence with controlled 
access points, a second inner layer is the Central Remediation Area (CRA) 
restricted to workers, and a third inner exclusion zone layer established for worker 
protection. 
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• Groundwater monitoring wells are protected via signs. The Army is responsible for 
ongoing operations and maintenance. 
• A Wildlife Management Plan will be developed by the USFWS. This will include 
protective measures for caps and covers. 
• Off-site institutional controls include notices of well restrictions. 
Additional institutional responsibilities include the acquisition and delivery of 
4000 acre-feet of potable water to the South Adams County Water and Sanitation 
District, establishment of a Trust Fund to cover an RMA Medical Monitoring Program 
and five-year CERCLA reviews to evaluate the remedy defined in the 1996-ROD. As of 
2003, the Trust Fund was not yet established. 
Active remedial operations are expected to run through 2011 and cost 
approximately $2.2B. On April 2, 2004, administrative jurisdiction of 4930 acres was 
transferred from the Army to the USFWS (USDOD, 2004; USFWS, 2004). This federal 
to federal land transfer did not include any environmental warranties or covenants 
(USDOD, 2004). A public ceremony commemorating this transfer took place April 17, 
2004 (Rundle, 2004). 
 
Observations 
RMA was visited on September 10, 2003. Included as part of this visit were 
discussions with Mr. Tom Jackson, USFWS. Mr. Jackson provided information 
concerning this case and hosted a tour of RMA. Following this tour, additional 
information was obtained from the RMA Technical Information Center. Ms. Amira 
Hamdy, the Research Librarian, provided valuable source material relevant to this case 
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study.  
RMA is a large site that includes both sacrifice zones and re-use areas. The 
configuration of the remediated arsenal will have the contaminated material consolidated 
into the center of the site and the perimeter areas will serve both as a buffer zone as well 
as a dedicated wildlife preserve.  
There is strong multi-agency involvement still evident at the site. Participating 
agencies include the USDOD/Army, USDOI/USFWS, USEPA, State of Colorado and the 
local county.  
The property has been in federal ownership since the 1940s when the arsenal was 
developed. With the enactment of the RMANWRA, this property will remain in 
permanent federal ownership. As such, the entire site will eventually transfer to the 
USDOI for the USFWS to serve as the site stewards. This is an important component of 
the long-term institutional management. 
With the USFWS as the site steward the environmental and ecological monitoring 
aspects of the site are expected to grow. This increased monitoring will likely offset the 
anticipated reduction in monitoring by the USDOD following completion of remedial 
activities. 
There is strong public interest evident at this site. This interest could be 
attributable in part to the fact that active remedial operations are still being performed at 
this site. Also, with this site transitioning into the National Wildlife Refuge, the USDOI 
is actively promoting its positive attributes.   
The local site stewards maintain a comprehensive administrative record at the site. 
This information repository is available to the general public. All monitoring information 
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appears to be well maintained and is being integrated by the local stewards. 
Currently, activities at the site are well funded. The entire remedial operation at 
RMA is anticipated to be $2.2B. 
Table 10 is a chronological timeline for the RMA Case Study. This timeline 
highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 11 is a summary of the 
contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls present at the RMA site. 
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Table 10. Chronological timeline of key events for the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Case 
Study. 
 
1942  RMA created by congressional action; operations begin at South 
Plants 
1946  Manufacturing sites leased to private industry: 
1946-1948 Colorado Fuel & Iron 
1947-1952 Julius Hyman and Company 
1952-1982 Shell Oil Company (Shell) 
1952  Shell acquires Julius Hyman and Company 
1952  Army initiated operations at the North Plants complex 
1953 – 1957 Nerve agent GB (i.e., Sarin) manufactured at North Plants 
1956  Basin F disposal pond installed on RMA 
1959  Crop damage observed around RMA 
1961  Army drills 12,045-foot-deep injection well 
1961- 1966 165 million gallons of effluent waste disposed of 
1974  Interim Response actions begin at RMA 
1982  Production stops at RMA 
1982  The USEPA, Army, Shell and Colorado Department of Health 
sign MOA 
1984  USEPA CERCLA RI/FS begins 
1986  Bald Eagle roosts discovered on RMA 
1987 The USFWS begins managing RMA wildlife 
1989  Federal Facilities Agreement signed 
1992  Congress designates RMA a National Wildlife Refuge 
1996  USEPA Record of Decision finalized 
2000  First five-year review conducted 
2004 Army transfers 4930 acres to the USFWS 
2011  Proposed completion date 
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Table 11. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal Site. 
 
Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site Security 1. Entire perimeter of site is fenced, 
including wildlife buffer area 
2. Site access office 
3. Exclusion zones identified for active 
remediation areas 
Active Processes 4. Groundwater treatment systems 
5. Leachate collection/treatment system 
Surface Covers 6. Multi-layer cap 
Engineered 
Subsurface Barriers 7. Stabilized waste 
8. Subsurface liners 
Information 
Management 
9. Monitoring data collected 
10. CERCLA Five-year Review 
11. Administrative records 
12. Local information repository 
Stakeholder 
Awareness 
13. RMA retains local and national attention 
Ordinance/Statutes 14. Rocky Mountain Arsenal National 
Wildlife Refuge Act 
Orders & Decrees 15. Federal Facility Agreement 
Institutional 
Government 
Ownership 
16. Federal ownership of property 
117  
Spring Valley Case Study 
Historical Events 
Spring Valley, located in the northwestern quadrant of Washington, D.C., is home 
to approximately 13,000 people and includes more than 1200 private residences and 
numerous businesses (Tucker, 2001). A key portion of this neighborhood involves the 
land currently and previously occupied by the American University.   
American University’s beginnings date back to 1889, when the Methodist 
Episcopal Church acquired a 90-acre tract of land in then rural northwestern Washington, 
D.C. (Gordon et al., 1994a; Gordon et al., 1994b). The area, previously known as the 
Davis Farm, as shown in Figure 27, was acquired to be the site of a new post-graduate 
university. The initial groundbreaking ceremony for the university occurred in 1896 for 
Hurst Hall, although the university’s initial class was not admitted until 1914 due to 
financial constraints (Tucker, 2001).  
 
 
Figure 27. Photograph of the entrance to the Davis Farm  (AU-Archives, 2002). 
 
World events significantly influenced the university’s operations from the very 
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beginning. On August 1, 1914, World War I (WWI) began in Europe. This conflict 
quickly escalated and on April 22, 1915, Germany used chlorine gas for the first time. 
Chemical warfare continued to expand on both sides and in July 1917, Germany was the 
first country to use mustard gas (Gordon et al., 1994a).  
On April 30, 1917, the Board of Trustees for American University offered the use 
of their campus to the U.S. government in support of the country’s war efforts. The U.S. 
government accepted this lease offer and initially established two independent entities on 
the university property. On May 28, 1917, the Department of War established Camp 
American University and on July 21, 1917 the U.S. Bureau of Mines established the 
American University Experiment Station (AUES) (Sagar, 1965; Gordon et al., 1994a; 
Gordon et al., 1994b; Fiala, 2001).  
Camp American University, later renamed Camp Leach, was operated by the 
Army Corps of Engineers. The mission of this Camp was to train portions of the U.S. 
Army’s Engineering Corps. An estimated 100,000 soldiers received training at this site 
(USEPA, 1999a). The various engineering units trained at the Camp included Gas and 
Flame Regiments, Construction Regiments and Camouflage Regiments (Gordon et al., 
1994b).   
At the time WWI began, the United States did not possess a chemical warfare 
capability. The U.S. Bureau of Mines did, however, have experience with noxious mine 
gases and rescue equipment. Because of this experience, the Bureau was commissioned 
to establish the AUES and support the war efforts through large-scale testing of gases. 
Within eight months of its creation, and consistent with the recommendations of the 
Bureau, President Wilson transferred control of AUES from the Bureau to the War 
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Department (Gordon et al., 1994a; Gordon et al., 1994b).  
Activities at AUES included toxic material studies for both offensive and 
defensive applications, pyrotechnical investigations, medical research and gas mask 
research. Toxic materials already in use in Europe (mustard gas, phosgene and 
superpalite) as well as new chemical agents (cyanogen chloride, bromobenzyl cyanide, 
etc.) were developed, manufactured and tested at AUES (Gordon et al., 1994b). To 
facilitate these operations, numerous structures were erected on university property. 
These structures included permanent facilities, temporary structures, laboratory units (as 
shown in Figure 28) and field-testing areas. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Photograph of open-air chemical weapons laboratory (AU-Archives, 2002). 
 
WWI ended in November 1918. Shortly thereafter, in December 1918, the War 
Department ordered the suspension of operations and the demobilization of AUES 
(Gordon et al., 1994b). The extent of operations at that time is shown in Figure 29. 
Demobilization efforts included returning the property to its original landscape (Arnold, 
2002). Temporary wooden structures were demolished, trenches and pits were backfilled 
and, following negotiations, permanent structures were transferred to the university. The 
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majority of the property was returned to the American University and other property 
owners during 1920 and the remaining portions were returned in 1921 (Gordon et al., 
1994b; Fiala, 2001; Arnold, 2002).  
 
 
Figure 29. Aerial photograph of Spring Valley area taken in 1918 (AU-Archives, 2002). 
 
Classes resumed on the American University campus in 1924. The university and 
the surrounding area benefited from the infrastructure upgrades made by the War 
Department, which included enhanced utility supply lines (i.e., water, gas), improved and 
paved roadways and rail service. The area surrounding American University continued to 
develop and additional residential homes were constructed (Gordon et al., 1994b). 
The university again supported the U.S. government during WWII. Portions of the 
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university were leased to the government, although the use of the property was limited to 
classroom education rather then any chemical operations (Engel, 1941; Gordon et al., 
1994b). 
Following WWII, the population of Washington, D.C. continued to grow and 
expand. The population in the Spring Valley area was reported to have doubled during 
the 1940s and additional residential developments were constructed throughout the area 
(Gordon et al., 1994b). Portions of the university property were transferred for 
development during that timeframe and as recently as 1990 (Santana, 2002). 
In 1986, American University was also expanding. A major construction project 
included the development of the Adnan Khasshogi Sports and Convocation Center (Jaffe, 
2000; Vogel, 2001; Arnold, 2002). Prior to construction, university representatives 
requested a review of historic records with regard to the past military operations. The 
USEPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) reviewed historic aerial 
photographs (see Figure 28) and concluded there was no evidence to take further action 
(Jaffe, 2000; Tucker, 2001; Vogel, 2001; Arnold, 2002; USGAO, 2002a). 
On January 5, 1993, construction workers were excavating trenches along the 
52nd Court area in Spring Valley when they uncovered several unknown items (Taylor, 
1993; Jaffe, 2000; Tucker, 2001; Vogel, 2001; USGAO, 2002a). The USACE conducted 
an emergency response and subsequently recovered approximately 141 suspect objects, 
including 43 containing chemical agents (Tucker, 2001; USACE, 2001; Vogel, 2001). 
Subsequent to these actions, the USACE initiated “Operation Safe Removal,” which 
included a broad area survey of approximately 492 properties (USACE, 2001; USACE, 
2002). Numerous anomalies were identified and investigated as part of this action. The 
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majority of anomalies were found to be construction debris and ordnance fragments, 
however, several intact ordnance were also recovered. This two-year effort concluded in 
a second “no further action” decision in 1996 (USACE, 2001; USGAO, 2002a). The 
District of Columbia subsequently questioned this decision. As a result of these 
questions, the USACE reviewed this decision and identified that there was an error in 
their previous survey (USACE, 2001; Vogel, 2001; USACE, 2002).  
In 1998, the USACE re-investigated a point of interest from the previous survey 
(USACE, 2003). This geophysical investigation centered on the Glenbrook Road area of 
Spring Valley. Two large metallic anomalies were identified at 4801 Glenbrook Road, 
which was the residence of the South Korean ambassador as shown in Figure 30 (Vogel, 
2001; USACE, 2002). During 1999, remedial operations began that ultimately recovered 
more than 600 items, including 288 ordnance-related items of which 14 were determined 
to contain chemical agents (Fiala, 2001; USACE, 2002; USGAO, 2002a; USACE, 2003).    
 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Photograph of remedial operations at Spring Valley. 
 
As a result of these discoveries, an expanded area involving 61 private residences 
123  
as well as portions of American University were surveyed in 2000 (Fiala, 2001). These 
surveys identified elevated arsenic levels in soils and additional buried anomolies (Fiala, 
2001). In 2001, the soil surveying was expanded to include 1200 residential properties 
and 400 non-residential lots (Fiala, 2001; USACE, 2001). Remedial operations have also 
continued to expand along adjacent properties in the Glenbook Road region (USACE, 
2002; USGAO, 2002a). As of 2001, the impact area included 70 acres of American 
University and 591 acres of homeowner residences, including 14 embassy residences 
(Fiala, 2001). The selected remedy is excavation and off-site landfill disposal (USACE, 
2003). The remediation endpoint for arsenic-contaminated soils is 20 mg/kg, which is a 
risk-based value for residential surface soils corresponding to a cancer risk of 1 x 10-4. 
(USACE, 2003). 
The primary health risks prevalent at the Spring Valley site include injuries or 
deaths resulting from ordnance explosions, leaking chemical agents and exposure to 
arsenic-contaminated soils (USGAO, 2002a). The costs associated with remedial 
operations have continued to escalate (USGAO, 2002a). As of 2002, the projected cost of 
remediation for the Spring Valley site was $125M (USGAO, 2002a). In addition, several 
civil lawsuits have been filed concerning potential damages resulting from the site’s 
residual hazards (Anderson, 2001; Santana, 2002). 
 
Observations 
The Spring Valley site was visited April 17, 2002. Included as part of this visit 
were discussions with Mr. George Arnold, the American University Archivist. Mr. 
Arnold provided background information concerning this case and made available for 
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review the university’s archive collection. This collection contained valuable source 
material relevant to this case study. An area tour was also conducted as part this site visit. 
This included observations at the active USACE remediation site along Glenbrook Road. 
The Spring Valley case can be viewed from two distinct timeframes: the original 
Spring Valley case and the current Spring Valley case. The original Spring Valley case 
involves those events from the 1920s through the 1980s. The current Spring Valley case 
involves relatively current events since the discovery of chemical weapons ordinance in 
1993 and represents the current activities at the site. 
Waste disposal at the original Spring Valley site involved shallow land disposal in 
earthen pits and trenches. No information management system was maintained. No active 
public involvement was evident. No local government involvement was evident. No 
monitoring was evident. Site security was not a concern.   
Following the landscape remediation in the 1920s (i.e., surface leveling and on-
site shallow land disposal), the properties were returned to American University and the 
surrounding landowners. These lands were re-used by the university and other property 
owners. Portions of these properties were subsequently transferred to other owners as the 
general population began to encroach on the site (ingress scenario). 
Considerable development occurred at this site and its surrounding areas. No 
significant events were reported for some 70 years. Issues began to surface in the early 
1990s.  
The current Spring Valley case can be characterized by a series of non-time 
critical and emergency actions. These actions arose as the result of the unexpected 
discovery of ordinance and chemical contaminants. As a result of these actions, there 
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remains an elevated interest by the local community. Local information repositories are 
maintained that include administrative records as well as historic archives.   
Active operations are taking place throughout the Spring Valley area as shown in 
Figure 31. These actions include non-time critical removal actions and emergency 
removal actions as well as area surveys to further characterize the site and define the 
problems. 
 
 
 
Figure 31. The USACE coordinates remedial operations at Spring Valley. 
 
Several legal disputes are still under consideration. These disputes appear to be 
focused on the issue of accountability with regard to the original on-site disposal. 
Multiple agencies are involved with the current Spring Valley site. These include the 
USDOD, USEPA and District of Columbia. 
Table 12 is a chronological timeline for the Spring Valley Case Study. This 
timeline highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 13 is a summary of the 
subsystem controls present at the Spring Valley site.  
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        Table 12. Chronological timeline of key events for the Spring Valley Case Study. 
 
1889-1890 Methodist Episcopal Church acquires 90 acres in NW Washington, 
D.C. to establish a post-graduate university. 
1896 Groundbreaking ceremony for first university building, Hurst Hall. 
1914 WWI begins in Europe. (August 1) 
1915 Germany uses chlorine gas. (April 22) 
1917 American University Board of Trustees offers use of the campus to 
the U.S. government in support of WWI via lease arrangement. 
(April 30) 
1917 Camp American University established by the Army Corps. 
(May 28) 
1917 Germany uses mustard gas. (July) 
1917 American University Experiment Station established by the Bureau 
of Mines. (July 21) 
1918 President Wilson transfers AUES to the War Department. (July 25) 
1918 WWI ends. (November 9) 
1918 War Department suspends operations and orders demobilization of 
AUES. (December) 
1921 Property transferred back to American University. (June 30) 
1924 American University resumes academic operations on campus. 
1937-1941 Portions of American University property leased to the U.S. 
government in support of WWII. 
1986 American University, preparing for a large construction project, 
requests the U.S. Army review historic records concerning past 
operations. Army concludes No Further Action needed. (October) 
1993 Excavation at a nearby residence discovers ordnance and unknown 
chemicals. (January 5)  A total of 141 munitions were found with 
43 containing chemical agents. 
1993-1994 Army Corps conducts emergency actions and area survey of 
53 additional locations.   
1996 Army concludes No Further Action required. (June)  The USEPA 
concurs. 
1997 The District of Columbia, Department of Health, raises additional 
concerns. Army discovers an error in its survey locations. 
(September)   
1998 Army Corps uncovers two buried ordnance pits at the South Korean 
Ambassador’s residence during its re-survey. (February) 
1998-2001 Emergency actions and active remediation.  
2002 Army Corps initiates a broader survey of 1483 properties. 
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Table 13. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
current Spring Valley Site. 
 
Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site 
Security 
1. Site security at current Removal 
Action sites 
Surface Covers 2. Earthen-covered shallow burial 
from original disposal 
Subsurface Barriers 3. Unlined shallow burial from 
original disposal 
Engineered 
Active Processes 4. Emergency and non-time critical 
removal actions 
5. Site surveys and site sampling 
Information 
Management 
6. Local information repository  
7. Survey and sampling data 
collected 
8. Administrative records 
Stakeholder 
Awareness 
9. Spring Valley has local and 
federal attention 
Institutional 
Ordinance/Statutes 10. CERCLA 
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Canonsburg UMTRCA Disposal Cell Case Study 
Historical Events 
The Canonsburg UMTRCA Disposal cell is located within the Borough of 
Canonsburg, PA, which is located 20 miles southwest of Pittsburgh, PA, as shown in 
Figure 32. The site is directly adjacent to Chartiers Creek on the north and west, Strabane 
Ave. on the east and a railroad on the south.  
 
Figure 32. Map showing location of Canonsburg UMTRCA site (USDOE, 2001f). 
 
The site’s association with radioactive material began in 1911. At that time, a   
19-acre site within the Borough and owned by Standard Chemical, was selected as the 
location for a radium extraction plant (USDOE, 1997a; USDOE, 2001b). This plant 
extracted radium from uranium ore. In addition to the extracted radium, large volumes of 
tailings were produced as operational by-products. These uranium tailings contained 
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naturally occurring radioactive material. This material decays to radium and produces 
radon, a radioactive gas. In addition to this radioactive material, the tailings contained 
trace metals that were associated with the ore as well as the chemicals used during the 
extraction process.  
Standard Chemical operated this radium extraction plant from 1911 until 1922. 
Operations continued at the site between 1930 and 1942 for the extraction of uranium and 
radium salts (USDOE, 2002c). In 1942, Vitro Manufacturing Company (Vitro), later 
known as Vitro Corporation of America, acquired the property (USDOE, 2002c). From 
1942 through 1957, Vitro processed uranium ore under contract to the federal 
government. In 1957, the Vitro plant closed. From 1957 through 1966 the site was used 
for storage under an Atomic Energy Commission contract (USDOE, 2002c). In 1967, the 
property was purchased by the Canon Development Company and portions of the site 
were leased to private companies for light industrial use as the Canon Industrial Park 
(USDOE, 1996; USDOE, 1997a; USDOE, 2002c). 
The UMTRCA of 1978 established the requirements for the clean-up of 
24 abandoned mill tailing sites that had processed uranium and related ores for the federal 
government. Under UMTRCA, the USEPA was directed to set general standards for the 
clean-up at these sites and vicinity properties. In addition, UMTRCA authorized the 
USDOE to clean-up the sites to meet USEPA standards and authorized the USNRC to 
oversee and certify the clean-up and license the completed disposal cell (USNRC, 2003a; 
UMTRCA 1978). 
In 1982, the USDOE and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered into a 
Cooperative Agreement. This agreement defined the roles and responsibilities of each 
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party as they related to the remediation of the Canonsburg site. Included in this 
agreement was definition of the cost-sharing arrangements. These arrangements stated 
that the USDOE was accountable for 100% of the site assessment costs and 90% of the 
site remediation costs. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was accountable for 10% of 
the site remediation costs, although the USDOE was accountable for 90% of the 
Commonwealth’s costs. Thus, the USDOE was accountable for 99% of the site 
remediation costs (USDOE, 1996). 
In accordance with UMTRCA, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania acquired the 
designated properties during the period of November 1983 through February 1985 
(USDOE, 1995). The Commonwealth acquired these parcels through its Department of 
Environmental Resources. Subsequent to these acquisitions the site has been organized 
into three parcels, Area A, B and C. Figure 33 is a map of the site showing these areas.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Site map showing Areas A, B, C and the disposal cell (USDOE, 1995). 
 
Remedial actions at the Canonsburg site began in 1983. In addition to these three 
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primary site parcels (Areas A, B and C), approximately 163 vicinity properties were also 
identified as being potentially contaminated. The remedial operations involved the on-site 
consolidation and stabilization of residual radioactive material (RRM) from the former 
processing operations. The estimated volume of RRM consolidated at the Canonsburg 
site ranges from 192,000 to 376,100 cubic yards (USDOE, 1996; USDOE, 2001f; 
USDOE, 2002c; USDOE, 2004b). This includes RRM from the three primary site parcels 
as well as from the 163 adjacent properties. The total activity of this RRM is estimated to 
be 100 curies (USDOE, 2004b). 
One vicinity property, the Burrell site, was handled under a separate remedial 
action due to the volume of RRM transported from the Canonsburg site and subsequently 
located at that site. Approximately 54,000 cubic yards of material were moved from the 
Canonsburg site to the Burrell site from 1956 and 1957. Refer to the Burrell Case Study 
for additional details on this site.  
The consolidated RRM was disposed of on-site in the Canonsburg Disposal Cell. 
This disposal cell is approximately six acres in size. The cell includes a multi-layer 
engineered cover as well as engineered subsurface barriers. A compacted clay bottom-
liner serves as the base layer on which the RRM tailings were placed. The RRM was then 
covered with a 3-foot radon barrier, which consists of a clay-and-soil mixture. The radon 
barrier was subsequently covered with a two-foot-thick riprap erosion protection layer of 
rock and a one-foot-thick soil layer that was seeded with native grass (USDOE, 1996; 
USDOE, 2002c). Construction of the disposal cell were completed in 1985. 
Following the completion of remedial actions and concurrence by the USNRC, 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania transferred the ownership of two primary properties 
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(Areas A and B) to the United States on September 13, 1995 (Pennsylvania, 1994). The 
third portion, Area C, was to be transferred to the Borough of Canonsburg for public use 
consistent with provisions of UMTRCA (USDOE, 1995; USDOE, 1996; UMTRCA 
1978). According to recent USDOE reports, the Commonwealth still retains title to Area 
C and is currently attempting to sell it (USDOE, 2004b; USDOE, 2004a). 
In 1996, the USNRC issued a license for the Canonsburg Disposal Cell and 
management of the Canonsburg site was transferred to the DOE Grand Junction Office, 
which manages the site through its Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance Program 
(LTSM) (USDOE, 1997a). The LTSM Program was established to maintain human 
health and environmental protection at former nuclear research and development sites 
(USDOE, 2004b). In December 2003, the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) was 
established. The LTSM Program responsibilities have been incorporated into this new 
LM organization (USDOE, 2004b). 
A long-term surveillance plan was prepared specifically for the Canonsburg site. 
This surveillance plan defines the management requirements for the site. These 
requirements include: annual inspections of the site to evaluate the condition of surface 
features, routine site maintenance including cutting the grass at least once each year and 
control of other vegetation, performing other maintenance as necessary and continuing to 
monitor groundwater.  
The surveillance plan also defines the specific institutional controls that need to 
be implemented at the site. These institutional controls include:  
• Access controls/fencing,  
• Warning signs,  
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• Site markers and monuments,  
• Erosion control markers along Chartiers Creek,  
• Annual inspections,  
• Routine maintenance, and  
• Groundwater monitoring (USDOE, 1995). 
The site has required a variety of maintenance actions since the disposal cell was 
completed. The most significant maintenance repair included the stabilization of the 
stream bank of Chartiers Creek, which runs adjacent to the disposal cell. Bank erosion 
was reported in the late 1990s. The eroded areas were repaired in 2000-2001 (USDOE, 
2002a). Included in these repairs were the decommissioning of impacted groundwater 
wells and the replacement with new wells.  
The site monitoring program includes annual requirements for both surface water 
and groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is expected to continue at the site 
due to detection of uranium, at levels in excess of the maximum concentration limit, in 
two groundwater wells (USDOE, 2002a; USDOE, 2004a). 
 
Observations 
The Canonsburg site was visited June 13, 2003. Since there are no local site 
stewards at this site, this visit was un-hosted, but approved by Mr. Carl Jacobson of the 
LTSM Project Office in Grand Junction, CO. Mr. Jacobson provided a map of the site 
and an access key for the locked access gate. Following this visit, additional information 
was obtained from Grand Junction and other sources to complete this case study.  
The Canonsburg UMTRCA Site can best be described as a permanent “sacrifice 
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zone.” There is no buffer zone around the disposal cell. At the present time, the site that 
involves Areas A and B, as illustrated in Figure 33, is fenced off and separated from local 
use, as shown in Figure 34. Area C is adjacent to the disposal cell. This area is not fenced 
but warning signs are present at this location. 
 
Figure 34. Photograph of Canonsburg UMTRCA Disposal Cell. 
 
There is no re-use evident at the site. However, because of the site’s location 
within the Borough of Canonsburg and its very close proximity to the local population, 
there would appear to be considerable potential for the area’s re-use. For example, the 
USDOE reports that the State of Pennsylvania is considering the sale of Area C (USDOE, 
2004a). 
The current land use of the immediate area is primarily residential, although 
historic land use was a combination of industrial and residential use. The population of 
Canonsburg was approximately 9200 as of 1990. The site is highly visible as it is directly 
adjacent to a public roadway, a railroad track, residential housing and Chartiers Creek.   
There is no local involvement evident at the site. There was no evidence of a local 
information repository or of local community involvement. The responsible site stewards 
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are located more than 1000 miles away in Grand Junction, CO. Notification arrangements 
have been made with state and federal agencies to notify the site stewards if certain 
natural events happen in the general vicinity of the site (USDOE, 2001c). These events 
include earthquakes and floods. 
There was multi-agency involvement and cooperation at the Canonsburg site. 
This appeared particularly evident during the remedial design phase. This involvement 
included multiple federal agencies (USEPA, USDOE, USNRC, USACE) and the State of 
Pennsylvania. Local government participation, however, was not obvious.  
The site is being maintained. The cell has a grassed soil cover. The grass is cut at 
least annually. The site stewards also perform an annual inspection (USDOE, 2004b). 
Annual inspections include surface water and groundwater monitoring (USDOE, 2004c). 
Groundwater samples continue to detect uranium (USDOE, 2002a).  
The cell is directly adjacent to Chartiers Creek  as shown in Figure 35. Bank 
erosion along the creek damaged two groundwater wells and erosion monuments since 
the cell was completed. These wells have since been repaired. 
The DOE in Grand Junction, CO maintains information relative to this site. This 
information appears to be maintained in paper form. A limited amount of information is 
also available and distributed in electronic form via the Internet. Additional information 
is also becoming displayed in a geographical information system (GIS) format. 
Performance data appears to be readily maintained by site stewards. This information 
appears to be integrated and evaluated and performance trends are being determined. 
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 Figure 35. Photograph of Chartiers Creek with Canonsburg Disposal Cell in background. 
 
Table 14 is a chronological timeline for the Canonsburg Case Study. This timeline 
highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 15 is a summary of the 
contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls present at the Canonsburg site. 
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Table 14. Chronological timeline of key events for the Canonsburg Case Study. 
 
1911 Standard Chemical acquires 19 acres in Canonsburg, PA.  Property 
is adjacent to railroad tracks and Chartiers Creek. 
1911-1922 Standard Chemical operates radium extraction processing plant. 
1930-1942 Additional extraction operations conducted at site. 
1942 Vitro Manufacturing Company (Vitro), later known as Vitro 
Corporation of America, acquires property. 
1942-1957 Vitro operates radium extraction processing plant at site. 
1956-1957 Vitro ships 11,600 tons of RRM to Burrell site. 
1957 Vitro extraction plant closes. 
1957-1966 Property and facilities used for storage under an Atomic Energy 
Commission contract. 
1967 The Canon Development Company purchases the property. 
1967 Portions of property leased private industry as part of Canon 
Industrial Park. 
1978 UMTRCA enacted. 
1982 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the USDOE sign Cooperative 
Agreement. 
1983 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the U.S. government take 
title to the property. 
1983 Record of Decision signed. 
1983-1985 Remedial actions at site. 
1985 UMTRCA disposal cell completed on-site. 
1995 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania transfers ownership of two primary 
portions of the site to the U.S. government (USDOE).  
1996 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues license for disposal 
cell.  
1996 USDOE/USNRC concur that remedial action is complete and is site 
transferred to USDOE LTSM Program. 
2000-2001 Chartiers Creek bank erosion repairs completed. 
2003 LTSM responsibilities transferred to new DOE Office of LM. 
2004 Proposed sell of a portion of the site (Area C). 
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Table 15. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
Canonsburg Site. 
 
 
Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site Security 1. Disposal cell area is fenced 
2. Warning signs posted on fence 
Surface Covers 3. Multi-layer cap 
Engineered 
Subsurface Barriers 4. Low-permeable compacted clay 
bottom liner 
5. Groundwater monitoring wells 
Information 
Management 
6. Annual site inspections (reports 
available for 2001) 
7. Groundwater measurements 
- Levels measured annually 
- Samples collected annually 
8. Records maintained at Grand 
Junction, CO 
Stakeholder Awareness 9. Internet webpage maintained 
Ordinance/Statutes 10. The Uranium Mill Tailings 
Radiation Control Act of 1978 
Orders & Decrees 11. U.S. Department of Energy and 
State of Pennsylvania Cooperative 
Agreement 
Institutional 
Government 
Ownership 
12. Federal ownership of disposal cell 
area 
13. State ownership of adjacent 
property 
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Burrell UMTRCA Disposal Cell Case Study 
Historical Events 
The Burrell UMTRCA Disposal Site is located in a rural setting approximately 
1 mile from the Borough of Blairsville in Indiana County, PA and approximately 
40 miles east of Pittsburgh, PA, as shown in Figure 36. The Conemaugh River directly 
borders the site on the south. A railroad track of the Norfolk Southern Rail Corporation 
directly borders the site on the north (USDOE, 2001a).   
 
 
 
Figure 36. Map showing location of Burrell UMTRCA Disposal Cell (USDOE, 2000b). 
 
The property has been associated with rail service since 1882 when the Western 
Pennsylvania Railroad Company acquired the property (USDOE, 2002b). Ownership of 
the Burrell site property has changed several times since the 1880s. Each of the 
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subsequent owners has been a railroad company that has continued to use and modify or 
enhance the property for the purposes of supporting rail operations.  
During the 1940s the Pennsylvania Railroad Company used the area as a landfill 
and a considerable amount of fill material was placed on the property to level its grade. 
This fill material consisted of gravelly loam, cinders, gravel, sandstone, construction 
debris, etc. As a result of these activities, the site is in essence, a small man-made plateau 
consisting of fill material measuring 50 to 60 feet in depth. Beneath this fill, claystone 
and shales of the Pennsylvanian Casselman Formation underlie the entire site (USDOE, 
2000b).   
A portion of this fill material, approximately 11,600 tons of RRM, was 
transported from the previously discussed Canonsburg site, from 1956 through 1957 
(USDOE, 2000b). Since the Canonsburg site was classified as an UMTRCA Title I site, 
the Burrell site was subsequently classified as a “vicinity property” also subject to 
environmental remediation under UMTRCA. Due to the large volume of RRM involved, 
an on-site disposal cell was constructed at Burrell rather than relocating the material back 
to the Canonsburg site. 
UMTRCA established the requirements for the environmental remediation of 
24 abandoned, uranium mill tailing sites located throughout the U.S. Each of these sites 
was involved with the mining or processing of uranium and related ores for the federal 
government (USDOE, 2001g). UMTRCA directed the USDOE to coordinate the 
remediation of these sites, authorized the USEPA to establish standards for the 
remediation of these sites and authorized the USNRC to certify and license the completed 
disposal cells (USNRC, 2003a; UMTRCA 1978). 
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On July 14, 1986, the U.S. federal government (i.e., the USDOE) took title to the 
land from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (USDOE, 2000b).The Burrell site 
encompasses approximately 72 acres. RRM has been consolidated into a five-acre on-site 
disposal cell. The cell contains 86,000 tons of RRM with the total cell radioactivity 
calculated to be 4 Ci 226Ra (USDOE, 2001a). The Burrell disposal cell was capped and 
closed in 1987. The disposal cell is intended to properly function for 1000 years but at a 
minimum it is required to last at least 200 years (USDOE, 2001a). 
The Burrell Disposal Cell cap consists of three layers. A 3-foot-thick low-
permeability radon barrier, consisting of a compacted soil layer, was installed directly 
above the RRM. The purpose of this primary layer is to prevent the escape of radon gas 
and prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Above the radon barrier a 1-foot-thick soil-
bedding layer was installed. The purpose of this second drainage layer was to promote 
precipitation runoff. The third, and outer-most layer, consists of a 1-foot-thick riprap 
layer. This cover layer was designed to prevent surface erosion (USDOE, 2001a).   
Soon after the cell was constructed, the USDOE began to report observations of 
plant growth on the cell’s riprap cover. These observations were reported in 1988. Within 
three years of the cell’s construction, a diverse plant community was reported to be 
present on the cell cap. Within ten years of construction, the two top layers of the cap, the 
riprap cover layer and the compacted soil drainage layer, were believed to have been 
penetrated by the vegetative community (USDOE, 1999b; Waugh, 2004). The vegetative 
growth was evident during the site visit and is shown in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37. Photograph of Burrell UMTRCA Disposal Cell illustrating vegetative 
community present on riprap cover. 
 
In 1988, the DOE Grand Junction Office was assigned the responsibility of 
managing the site, as well as all UMTRCA sites, through the DOE LTSM Program. The 
LTSM Program was established to maintain human health and environmental protection 
at former nuclear research and development sites (USDOE, 2004b). In December 2003, 
the DOE LM Office was established. The LTSM Program responsibilities have been 
incorporated into this new LM organization (USDOE, 2004b). 
Ongoing LM management responsibilities include the development and 
implementation of a long-term surveillance and maintenance plan for each site. A long-
term surveillance plan was prepared for the Burrell site. In accordance with this long-
term surveillance plan, the USDOE maintains access controls, permanent markers and 
signs; conducts annual inspections; performs routine maintenance as necessary; monitors 
the groundwater; and maintains appropriate emergency response capabilities (USDOE, 
2000b; USDOE, 2004a).   
The initial long-term surveillance and monitoring plan required monitoring both 
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groundwater and surface water at the site as a best management practice to evaluate 
potential performance trends. Recommended changes to the monitoring plan have been 
noted in the 2002 Annual Compliance Report (USDOE, 2000b). These modifications 
include discontinuing vegetation control on the cell cover, reducing groundwater 
monitoring frequency to once every five years, elimination of two wells for groundwater 
monitoring, eliminating surface water monitoring on the Conemough River, 
discontinuing analyses for ammonia, cyanide, gross alpha, radium-226, radium-228 and 
vanadium and removing reference to a site marker that was never installed. 
 
Observations 
The Burrell site was visited on June 12, 2003. Since there are no local site 
stewards at this site this visit was un-hosted but approved by Mr. Carl Jacobson of the 
LTSM Project Office in Grand Junction, CO. Mr. Jacobson provided a map of the site 
and an access key for the locked access gate. Following this visit, additional information 
was obtained from Grand Junction and other sources to complete this case study.  
The Burrell UMTRCA Site can best be described as a permanent “sacrifice zone.” 
There is no re-use potential evident at the site. The disposal cell area is fenced off and 
separated from local use. A second gate and warning sign was located at the main 
entrance road on neighboring railroad property. This gate was observed to be damaged 
and permanently open during the site visit. Apparently, this had been a recurring 
problem. The LTSM Project Office, with the concurrence of the USNRC, removed this 
gate later in 2003 (USDOE, 2004d; USDOE, 2004b; USDOE, 2004a).    
There is no local involvement evident at the site. There was no evidence of a local 
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information repository or of local community involvement. The responsible site stewards 
are located in Grand Junction, CO, which is more than 1000 miles away. Notification 
arrangements have been made with state and federal agencies to notify the site stewards if 
certain natural events happen in the general vicinity of the site (USDOE, 2001c). These 
events include earthquakes and floods. 
There was multi-agency involvement and cooperation at the Burrell site, 
particularly during the remedial design phase. This involvement included multiple federal 
agencies (USEPA, USDOE, USNRC, USACE) and the State of Pennsylvania. Local 
government participation was not obvious.   
Original post-closure environmental monitoring at this site involved groundwater 
and surface water sampling. However, within 15 years of the cell completion, monitoring 
has been reduced. Surface water is no longer monitored and the groundwater sampling 
frequency has been reduced from annual sampling to once every five years (USDOE, 
2004c). 
The engineered cover on the disposal cell has experienced unanticipated plant 
growth. Within one year of construction, local plant species were found growing on the 
cover. These plants were established communities on the cover within three to five years. 
The site stewards attempted to minimize the growth of these plants through periodic 
spraying of herbicides. This practice has since been halted. Site stewards have estimated 
that the hydraulic conductivity through the barrier has increased by two orders of 
magnitude as the result of the plant growth. A revised risk analysis, however, showed that 
this plant growth did not increase the risk potential to unacceptable levels (USDOE, 
2004a). This decision is to be reevaluated in 10 or 20 years (USDOE, 2004a).    
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The DOE Grand Junction, CO Office maintains information relative to this site. 
This information appears to be maintained in paper form. A limited amount of 
information is also available and distributed in electronic form via the Internet. 
Additional information is also becoming displayed in a GIS format. Performance data 
appears to be readily maintained by site stewards. This information appears to be 
integrated and evaluated and performance trends are being determined. 
Table 16 is a chronological timeline for the Burrell Case Study. This timeline 
highlights the key events that occurred at this site. Table 17 is a summary of the 
contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls present at the Burrell site.  
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Table 16. Chronological timeline of key events for the Burrell Case Study. 
 
1882 Portions of property acquired by Western PA Railroad. 
1937 Portions of property acquired by PA Railroad Co. 
1940s PA Railroad constructs berm along Conemaugh River. 
1940-1960 Railroad wastes disposed of on property . 
1956-1957 Vitro Rare Metals Plant in Canonsburg, PA ships 11,600 tons of 
RRM to Burrell site. 
1978 UMTRCA enacted. 
1979 Environmental assessment of site performed. 
1980 Mr. George Burrows takes title of property. 
1986 U.S. government (i.e., the USDOE) takes title to the property. 
1986-1987 Remedial actions at site performed. 
1987 UMTRCA disposal cell completed on-site. 
1988 Growth of plants observed on rock cover. 
1990 Plant community established on rock cover. 
1994 USDOE/USNRC concur that remedial action complete and site 
transferred to DOE LTSM Program. 
1995-1997 Plant intrusion field studies conducted. 
1999 Determination made to stop herbicide spraying of cover. 
2000 Long-term surveillance plan revised 
   - vegetative controls discontinued 
   - surface water sampling discontinued 
   - groundwater sampling frequency changed from annual to 5 years 
2003 LTSM responsibilities transferred to new DOE Office of LM. 
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Table 17. Summary of contaminant isolation facility subsystem controls in place at the 
Burrell Site. 
Subsystem Control Description 
Physical Site Security 1. Disposal cell area is fenced 
2. Warning signs posted on fence 
3. Access road has sign and gate, 
although gate is permanently open 
and in a state of decay 
Surface Covers 4. Multi-layer cap 
Engineered 
Subsurface Barriers 5. Groundwater monitoring wells 
Information Management 6. Annual site inspections (reports 
available for 2002 and 2003) 
7. Groundwater measurements 
• Levels measured annually 
• Samples collected every 5 years 
8. Records maintained at Grand 
Junction, CO 
Stakeholder Awareness 9. Internet webpage maintained 
Ordinance/Statutes 10. The Uranium Mill Tailings 
Radiation Control Act of 1978 
Orders & Decrees 11. U.S. Department of Energy and 
State of Pennsylvania Cooperative 
Agreement 
Institutional 
Government Ownership 12. Federal Ownership 
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Case Study Summary 
These seven case studies illustrate the variations currently being used to isolate 
residual contaminants at various sites in different states and managed by a variety of 
responsible parties. Each of these cases highlights the historic events and the regulatory 
framework that have shaped the site’s current situation. These studies also describe the 
types of controls that are being used to maintain isolation of the known contaminants. 
The contaminant isolation facility constructed at each of these sites and the 
management structure employed to maintain the integrity of the contaminant isolation 
facility have been described. This discussion presents an overview of the subsystem 
elements that are being used at each location. The two primary subsystems employed are 
the engineered subsystem and the institutional controls subsystem. 
Although each of the cases has unique contaminant isolation facility 
configurations they all share a multi-control approach. Table 18 summarizes the controls 
implemented at each of the selected case studies. As discussed in Chapter II, each of 
these controls must be monitored and maintained to ensure their long-term effectiveness. 
As evidenced in these case studies, not all controls are performing as expected. Several of 
the cases exhibit errors at the individual control levels. Table 19 highlights the individual 
controls that could be precursors to future problems including contaminant isolation 
facility failure. Chapter VI will begin to explore the failure mechanisms evident in these 
controls.  
149  
 
 
 
Table 18. Summary of current controls implemented at the selected case studies. 
 
 
  Information 
Management 
Stakeholder 
Awareness
Zoning Ordinances Orders & 
Decrees 
Permit 
System 
Deed 
Restrictions 
Contracts Government 
Ownership 
Physical 
Site 
Security 
Surface 
Covers 
Subsurface  
Barriers 
Active 
Processes 
Anaconda ★  ★  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  
Love Canal 
(original) NA ★  NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ★  ★  ★  NA 
Love Canal 
(current) ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  
Maxey Flats ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  NA ★  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  
Rocky Mt. 
Arsenal ★  ★  NA ★  ★  NA   NA NA ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  
Spring 
Valley 
(original) 
NA NA NA NA NA NA  NA ★  NA ★  ★  ★  NA 
Spring 
Valley 
(current) 
★  ★  NA ★  NA NA NA NA  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  
Canonsburg ★  ★  NA ★  ★  NA  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  NA 
Burrell ★  ★  NA ★  ★  NA  NA ★  ★  ★  ★  ★  NA 
 
★   = Controls in place 
NA = Controls Not Applied at this Site 
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Table 19. Summary of individual controls exhibiting error characteristics at the selected case studies. 
 
 
  Information 
Management 
Stakeholder 
Awareness
Zoning Ordinances Orders & 
Decrees 
Permit 
System 
Deed 
Restrictions 
Contracts Government 
Ownership 
Physical 
Site 
Security 
Surface 
Covers 
Subsurface  
Barriers 
Active 
Processes 
Anaconda              + + NA + + + + + NA + + + +
Love Canal 
(original) NA ⎯ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA + + + NA 
Love Canal 
(current) + ⎯ + + + NA + + + ⎯ + + + 
Maxey Flats 
+             + + + + NA + NA + + + + +
Rocky Mt. 
Arsenal +             + NA + + NA NA NA + + + + +
Spring 
Valley 
(original) 
NA NA NA NA NA NA  NA ⎯ NA ⎯ ⎯ ⎯ NA 
Spring 
Valley 
(current) 
+ + NA + NA NA NA NA  NA + + + + 
Canonsburg           + ⎯ NA + + NA NA + ⎯ + + + NA
Burrell           + ⎯ NA + + NA NA + + + ⎯ + NA
  
+     = Controls in place 
 ⎯  = Controls exhibiting “Error” characteristics 
NA = Controls Not Applied at this site 
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 CHAPTER VI 
 
CROSS CASE ANALYSIS 
 
The case studies presented in Chapter V highlight the various institutional 
controls and engineered barriers used to isolate contaminants for long periods. The 
individual mechanisms used as well as how they are applied, tend to differ from site to 
site. In each of these cases, multiple controls are being employed. The applied controls 
can be viewed as a collection of institutional and engineered controls as presented in 
Table 18. 
The combination of selected controls is believed to offer increased protection 
against system failure. This approach is often referred to as defense-in-depth or a layering 
of controls (NRC, 2000). Through the application of multiple controls, the contaminant 
isolation facility is considered to be more robust and less likely to result in the re-
exposure of receptors to the residual contaminants.  
This chapter evaluates the complete set of institutional controls and engineered 
barriers routinely employed at contaminant isolation facilities. The individual controls are 
analyzed to determine how these controls could ultimately fail. This evaluation describes 
the most probable error pathways for each control as well as identifies interactions 
between controls.      
This analysis is focused on unintentional precursors and events that could 
contribute to failure. Intentional violations and deliberate acts with the intent to destroy or 
damage the contaminant isolation facility, such as sabotage, fraud or other illegal actions, 
152  
 present unique concerns and are not included in this analysis.  
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
As previously stated, FTA is an analytical technique that describes the collection 
of events that must occur to explain a described state of a system. Fault trees are routinely 
used by the USNRC for reliability engineering (Vesely et al., 1981; Gertman and 
Blackman, 1994). Recently, master logic diagrams have been used to evaluate active 
chemical storage plants (Papazoglou and Aneziris, 2003).  
The FTA process is initiated by first defining an undesired state of the system. For 
the purposes of this research the undesired state is described as Failure of Contaminant 
Isolation Facility Controls. An analysis of the details of this condition was then 
performed to determine logical ways in which the undesired event could occur (Vesely et 
al., 1981).  
Fault trees were developed and are presented that illustrate the major potential 
failure pathways for each of the contaminant isolation facility controls. It is believed that 
this is the first application of FTA for the evaluation of the effectiveness of long-term 
management of residual waste sites.  
Fault trees are cause-and-effect diagrams useful for evaluating the root causes of 
failure modes. These trees provide a graphical means of displaying the qualitative 
information included in the case studies.  
This FTA taxonomy is useful for organizing and analyzing institutional controls 
and engineered barriers. These trees provide a logical approach for clarifying how the 
undesired event (e.g., control error) could occur and, likewise, how mitigation efforts can 
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 reduce system failure. 
Additionally, if more quantitative data becomes available, FTA could be used to 
estimate the probability of the undesired state occurring.  
 
FTA Symbology 
This FTA uses a simplified set of standard symbols to represent fault events and 
logic gates as shown in Figure 38. Functional descriptions of what occurred or did not 
occur are described in each symbol. The top event, represented by an oval, describes the 
system fault. This is the undesired state of the system. Basic faults are intermediate 
events representing observable problems. These basic fault events are illustrated as 
rectangles. Circles are used to represent initiating events. Initiating events represent the 
lowest point of examination for this research and require no further development. 
Diamonds represent undeveloped events either because of insufficient consequences or 
because of inadequate information. A triangle is a transfer symbol, which indicates that 
this branch of the tree is further developed in another portion of the tree.  
Two types of logic gates are used to connect events as input and output. The And-
Gate is used to represent the situation in which the output event occurs only when all of 
the input events occur. The Or-Gate represents the situation in which the output occurs if 
at least one of the inputs occurs. In terms of strengthening controls and thus reducing the 
likelihood of failure, the And-Gate is viewed as the more robust condition because 
multiple input events are required for the output to occur. Conversely, the conditions 
illustrated with an Or-Gate are less robust because these gates indicate that a single point 
failure could lead to the undesired output state. 
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Diamond – undeveloped event; due to insufficient 
consequences or information for this study. 
Rectangle – intermediate event; represents basic faults or 
observable problems. 
Oval – top-tier event; represents the system-level fault. 
Circle – basic initiating event; represents the lowest point 
of examination for this study. 
Triangle – a transfer symbol indicating a duplicate branch 
that is further developed elsewhere in the tree. 
And-Gate – a logic gate indicating that all input events 
must occur for the output event to occur. 
Or-Gate – a logic gate indicating that if at least one input 
event occurs then the output event will occur. 
an
d
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Figure 38. A simplified set of standard symbols is used in FTA to represent fault events 
and logic gates. 
 
 
 
Contaminant Isolation Facility Failure Analysis 
The results of the case study analysis presented in Chapter V highlight the 
variations currently being used to isolate residual contaminants. These studies have 
shown that the various controls can be logically organized for further analysis. Table 18 
summarizes the controls used at each of the selected case studies. Errors within these 
various controls can be viewed as intermediate events potentially contributing to the 
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 ultimate failure of the contaminant isolation facility. As such, each of these events are 
organized within a fault tree for further analysis. This analysis describes how potential 
errors for each of the individual controls could occur. This analysis is not an evaluation of 
facility failure but rather an analysis of individual control error. Further analysis at the 
site-specific facility level will be required consistent with the individual controls 
implemented at each selected site. 
Figure 39 represents the fault tree for the undesired state of the system, which is 
Failure of Contaminant Isolation Facility Controls. This figure shows two primary 
categories of controls representing the errors of the two subsystems: Institutional Control 
Error and Engineered Barrier Error. An Or-Gate connects these two events to the 
system-level fault.  
Contributing to the subsystem-level faults are 13 individual events, labeled 
A through M. These events, shown in Figure 39, correspond to the error events of the 
various individual institutional controls and engineered barriers employed by site 
stewards at the contaminant isolation facilities evaluated in the case studies. All of these 
events are connected with Or-Gates, which illustrates the independent nature of each 
event.  
To further explore the mechanisms leading to potential system failure, the 13 
events (A through M) were analyzed in greater detail and were expanded into individual 
branches of the tree. These branches are presented in the following sections.
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Figure 39. Contaminant isolation facility system-level and primary intermediate-level faults. 
  
 Analysis of Contaminant Isolation Facility Control Branches 
The 13 events, labeled A through M as illustrated in Figure 39, represent the 
undesired error state of individual controls used for the management of contaminant 
isolation facilities. These events represent the error conditions of the individual 
institutional controls and engineered barriers.  
Each of these 13 control-error modes has been further evaluated to better 
understand how each undesired state can occur. Identifying the unique events that 
contribute to each of these error states has resulted in the development of individual 
branches of the system fault tree. All events within these branches are numbered 
sequentially from left to right within each sub-branch. Further descriptions of each event 
are provided in the accompanying tables. 
 
Information Management Error 
Figure 40 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Information Management 
Error (A) branch. All events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates, indicating that 
only one input event is needed to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. 
Contributing events leading to Information Management Error (A) include Input 
Error (1), Analysis Error (2) and Output Error (3). Further descriptions of these 
intermediate events and their subsequent faults, initiating events and undeveloped events 
are presented in Table 20. 
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Figure 40. Information Management Error branch. 
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 Table 20. Description of events contributing to the Information Management Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
A. Information 
Management Error 
Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control Error via the loss 
of knowledge. 
1. Input Error Basic fault: indicates problems with regard to the input stream of 
information management. 
1.1 Input Incorrect Basic fault: indicates that the input is not correct. 
1.1.1 Information 
Incorrect 
Initiating event: indicates that the information is not correct, it is 
inaccurate or it is wrong.  
1.1.2 Information 
Incomplete 
Initiating event: indicates that the information is not complete 
(i.e., portions of data are missing). 
1.1.3 Information 
Mishandled 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the information is not managed 
properly. This includes data migration to newer media. 
1.2 No Available Input Basic fault: indicates that there is no input to information 
management.  
1.2.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate funding or 
personnel.  
1.2.2 Communication 
Error 
Initiating event: indicates that information is not properly 
transmitted or received.  
2.  Analysis Error Basic fault: indicates that the information is not properly 
analyzed. 
2.1 No Analysis Basic fault: indicating that no analysis is performed. 
2.1.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate funding or 
personnel. 
2.1.2 Lack of Incentives Undeveloped event: indicates that there is no motive to perform 
the analysis. 
2.1.3 Communication 
Error 
Initiating event: indicates that information is not properly 
transmitted or received. 
2.2 Analysis Incorrect Basic fault: indicates that the analysis is not correct, it is 
inaccurate or it is wrong. 
2.2.1 Lack of Integration Initiating event: indicates that the data is not integrated.  
2.2.2 Information 
Misinterpreted 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the interpretation of the 
information is not correct, it is inaccurate or it is wrong. 
3. Output Error Basic fault: indicates problems with regard to the output stream of 
information management. 
3.1 No Output Basic fault: indicates that there is no output from information 
management. 
3.1.1 Communication 
Error 
Initiating event: indicates that information is not properly 
transmitted or received. 
3.1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate funding or 
personnel. 
3.2 Output Incorrect Basic fault: indicates that the output is not correct. 
3.2.1 Information 
Incorrect 
Initiating event: indicates that the information is not correct, it is 
inaccurate or it is wrong. 
3.2.2 Information Not 
Understandable 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the information is not 
comprehendible. 
3.2.3 Information 
Mishandled 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the information is not managed 
properly. 
160  
 Lack of Stakeholder Awareness 
Figure 41 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Lack of Stakeholder Awareness 
(B) branch. All events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates, indicating that only 
one input event is needed to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. 
Contributing events leading to Lack of Stakeholder Awareness (B) include Notice 
Error (1) and Lack of Stakeholder Involvement (2). Further descriptions of these 
intermediate events and their subsequent faults, initiating events and undeveloped events 
are presented in Table 21. The transfer symbols indicate that the Information 
Management branches have been described previously.   
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Figure 41. Lack of Stakeholder Awareness branch. 
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 Table 21. Description of events contributing to the Lack of Stakeholder Awareness.  
 
Label Event Description 
B. Lack of Stakeholder 
Awareness 
Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control Error via 
loss of knowledge. 
1. Notice Error Basic fault: indicates an error with regard to the public 
disclosure of information. 
1.1 No Notice Basic fault: indicates no public disclosure of information. 
1.1.1 Intentional Lack of 
Notice 
Initiating event: indicates that no public disclosure of 
information is an intentional decision.  
1.1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate funding 
or personnel.   
1.1.3 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
1.2 Implementation of  
Notice Error 
Basic fault: indicates that the public disclosure of 
information is not properly conducted.  
1.2.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate funding 
or personnel.  
1.2.2 Lack of Mechanisms Undeveloped event: indicates that the proper mechanisms 
are not available to properly achieve public disclosure of 
information. 
1.2.3 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2. Lack of Stakeholder 
Involvement 
Basic fault: indicates that stakeholders are not actively 
involved or engaged. 
2.1 Intentional Lack of 
Involvement 
Initiating event: indicates that the lack of stakeholder 
involvement is intentional. 
2.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate funding 
or personnel. 
2.3 Lack of Mechanisms Undeveloped event: indicates that the proper mechanisms 
are not available to properly achieve stakeholder 
involvement. 
2.4 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
 
 
Zoning Error 
Figure 42 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Zoning Error (C) branch. 
Contributing events leading to Zoning Error (C) include Monitoring Error (1), Zoning 
Changed (2), Current Zoning Enforcement Error (3) and Inadequate Zoning Defined (4). 
Most of the events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates, although the Zoning 
Changed branch is controlled by an And-Gate. Further descriptions of the intermediate 
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 events and their subsequent faults, initiating events and undeveloped events are presented 
in Table 22. The transfer symbol indicates that a portion of this branch is described 
elsewhere in the tree.   
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Figure 42. Zoning Error branch. 
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 Table 22. Description of events contributing to Zoning Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
C. Zoning Error Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control 
Error. One type of Government Control Error. 
1. To Monitoring Error Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
 
2.  Zoning Changed Basic fault: indicates that the zoning 
classification of land was changed. 
2.1 Zoning Change Requested Initiating event: indicates that there was a 
request to change the zoning requirements. 
2.2 Zoning Request Approved Initiating event: indicates that the zoning change 
request was approved. 
3. Current Zoning 
Enforcement Error 
Basic fault: indicates that the current zoning 
requirements have not been enforced. 
3.1 Intentional Lack of 
Enforcement 
Initiating event: indicates that the lack of 
enforcement was an intentional decision. 
3.2 Implementation of  
Requirements Error 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the 
requirements are not implemented properly. 
4. Inadequate Zoning 
Defined 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the proper 
zoning requirements were not established given 
the site’s condition. 
 
 
 
Ordinance Error 
Figure 43 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Ordinance Error (D) branch. 
Three contributing events lead to Ordinance Error (D). These events include Monitoring 
Error (1), Enforcement of Ordinance Requirements Error (2) and Ordinance Voided (3). 
All of the events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that only one input 
event is needed to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. Further descriptions 
of the intermediate events and their subsequent faults, initiating events and undeveloped 
events are presented in Table 23. The transfer symbols indicate that portions of this 
branch are described elsewhere in the tree. 
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Figure 43. Ordinance Error branch. 
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 Table 23. Description of events contributing to Ordinance Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
D. Ordinance Error Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control 
Error. A type of Government Control Error. 
1. To Monitoring Error Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
 
2. Enforcement of Ordinance 
Requirements Error 
Basic fault: indicates that existing ordinance 
requirements are not being enforced. 
2.1 Intentional Lack of 
Enforcement 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision to not 
enforce requirements was an intentional decision. 
2.2 Requirements are Unclear Undeveloped event: indicates that the requirements 
are not understood. 
2.2.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2.2.2 To Stakeholder Awareness 
Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2.3.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
3. Ordinance Voided Undeveloped Event: indicates that the ordinance 
was nullified or dismissed. 
 
 
 
Orders and Decrees Error  
Figure 44 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Orders and Decrees Error (E) 
branch. Two contributing events lead to Orders and Decrees Error (E). These events 
include Monitoring Error (1) and Enforcement of Orders and Decree Requirements 
Error (2). The events within this tree are all connected by Or-Gates indicating that only 
one input event is needed to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. Further 
descriptions of the intermediate events and their subsequent faults and initiating events 
are presented in Table 24. The transfer symbols indicate that portions of this branch are 
described elsewhere in the tree. 
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Figure 44. Orders and Decrees Error branch. 
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 Table 24. Description of events contributing to Orders and Decrees Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
E. Orders and Decrees Error Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control error. 
A type of Government Control Error. 
1. To Monitoring Error Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
 
2. Enforcement of Order and 
Decree Requirements 
Basic fault: indicates that existing order and decree 
requirements are not being enforced. 
2.1 Intentional Lack of 
Enforcement 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision to not 
enforce requirements was an intentional decision. 
2.2 Requirements are Unclear Undeveloped event: indicates that the requirements 
are not understood. 
2.2.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2.2.2 To Stakeholder Awareness 
Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2.3. Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
2.4 Land Transfer Initiating event: indicates that the land associated 
with the order and decree has been transferred from 
one owner to another. 
 
 
Permit System Error 
Figure 45 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Permit System Error (F) 
branch. Three contributing events lead to Permit System Error (F). These events include 
Monitoring Error (1), Notice Error (2) and Enforcement of Permit Requirements Error 
(3). Most of the events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that only one 
input event is needed to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. The event, 
Permit Improperly Awarded, is controlled by an And-Gate indicating that both 
contributing events must occur for this condition to occur. Further descriptions of the 
intermediate events and their subsequent faults and initiating events are presented in 
Table 25. The transfer symbols indicate that portions of this branch are described in other 
branches of the tree. 
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Figure 45. Permit System Error branch. 
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 Table 25. Description of events contributing to Permit System Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
F. Permit System Error Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control Error. 
A type of Government Control Error. 
1. To Monitoring Error Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
 
2. To Notice Error Transfer Symbol to B.1. 
 
3. Enforcement of Permit 
Requirements Error 
Basic fault: indicates that existing permit system 
requirements are not being enforced. 
3.1 Intentional Lack of 
Enforcement 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision to not 
enforce requirements was an intentional decision. 
3.2 Permit Improperly 
Awarded 
Basic fault: indicates that the permit was incorrectly 
issued. 
3.2.1 Permit Requested Initiating event: indicates that a landowner requested 
a permit. 
3.2.2 Verification of 
Compliance Error 
Initiating event: indicates that compliance with 
established permit requirements was not verified.  
This could include the lack of verification of 
additional site remediation required to be consistent 
with the permit request. 
3.3 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
 
 
Deed Restriction Error 
Figure 46 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Deed Restriction Error (G) 
branch. Three contributing events lead to Deed Restriction Error (G). These events 
include Monitoring Error (1), Notice Error (2) and Enforcement of Deed Restriction 
Error (3). All of the events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that 
only one input event is needed to occur for the corresponding output event to occur. 
Further descriptions of the intermediate events and their subsequent faults and initiating 
events are presented in Table 26. The transfer symbols indicate that portions of this 
branch are described elsewhere. 
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Figure 46. Deed Restriction Error branch. 
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 Table 26. Description of events contributing to Deed Restriction Error.  
 
 
Label Event Description 
G. Deed Restriction Error Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control Error. 
A type of Property-based Control Error. 
1. To Monitoring Error Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
2. To Notice Error Transfer Symbol to B.1. 
3. Enforcement of Deed 
Restriction Error 
Basic fault: indicates that deed restrictions are not 
being enforced. 
3.1 Intentional Lack of 
Enforcement 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision to not 
enforce the restrictions was an intentional decision. 
3.2 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
3.3 Unable to Enforce Basic fault: indicates that the ability to enforce the 
requirements does not exist.  
3.3.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
3.3.2 Lack of Legal Authority Basic fault: indicates that deed restrictions cannot be 
legally enforced. 
3.3.2.1 Restriction is Ambiguous Initiating event: indicates that the restriction is not 
clearly defined in legal terms. 
3.3.2.2 Does not Touch and 
Concern the Land 
Initiating event: indicates that restrictions did not run 
with the title of the land as interpreted by common 
property law. 
3.3.2.3 Actions Taken by Non-
beneficiary 
Initiating event: indicates that a third party rather 
than the covenanting parties or their successors took 
the legal action. 
 
 
 
Contractual Error 
Figure 47 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Contractual Error (H) branch. 
Two contributing events lead to Contractual Error (H). These events include Monitoring 
Error (1) and Enforcement of Contract Requirements Error (2). All of the events within 
this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that only one input event is needed to 
occur for the corresponding output event to occur. Further descriptions of the 
intermediate events and their subsequent faults and initiating events are presented in 
Table 27. The transfer symbols indicate that portions of this branch are described 
elsewhere. 
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Figure 47. Contractual Error branch.
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Table 27. Description of events contributing to Contractual Errors.  
 
Label Event Description 
H. Contractual Error Basic fault: contributes to Contractual Error. A 
type of Property-based Control Error. 
1. To Monitoring Error Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
 
2. Enforcement of Contract 
Requirements Error 
Basic fault: indicates that existing contract 
requirements are not being enforced. 
2.1 Intentional Lack of 
Enforcement 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision to not 
enforce requirements was an intentional decision. 
2.2 Requirements are Unclear 
 
Basic fault: indicates that the contractual 
requirements are not understood. 
2.2.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2.2.2 To Stakeholder Awareness 
Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
3.3 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
3.4 Actions taken by Non-
contractual Party 
Initiating event: indicates that a non-contractual, 
therefore a non-binding, party initiated the legal 
actions. 
 
 
 
Government Ownership Error 
Figure 48 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Government Ownership Error 
(I) branch. Two contributing events lead to Government Ownership Error (I). These 
events include Land Transfer (1) and Lack of Alternative Controls (2). These two events 
are connected to the Government Ownership Error (I) event via an And-Gate indicating 
that both of these events must occur for the output event (i.e., Government Ownership 
Error) to occur. The remaining events within this tree are governed by Or-Gates 
indicating that only one of the underlying events need occur for the above output event to 
occur. Further descriptions of the intermediate events and their subsequent faults and 
initiating events are presented in Table 28. The transfer symbols indicate that portions of 
this branch have been previously described.                          
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Figure 48. Government Ownership Error branch. 
 
 
 
Table 28. Description of events contributing to Government Ownership Error.  
 
 
Label Event Description 
I. Government Ownership 
Error 
Basic fault: contributes to Institutional Control Error. 
A type of Property-based Control Error. 
1. Land Transfer Basic fault: indicates that the land associated with the 
government ownership has been transferred to a non-
government owner. 
1.1. To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A.  
1.2. To Lack of Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B.  
2. Lack of Alternative 
Controls Error 
Basic fault: indicates that new alternative controls 
have not been established.  
2.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
2.2 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A.  
2.3 Intentional Lack of 
Alternative Controls 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision not to 
establish alternative controls was intentional. 
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 Physical Site Security Error 
Figure 49 illustrates the complete fault tree for the Physical Site Security Error (J) 
branch. Two contributing events lead to Physical Site Security Error (J). These events 
include Physical Control Error (1) and Response Error (2), which are connected by an 
And-Gate. All remaining events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating 
that only one of the underlying events need occur for the above output event to occur. 
Further descriptions of the intermediate events and their subsequent faults, initiating 
events and undeveloped events are presented in Table 29. The transfer symbols indicate 
that portions of this branch are described elsewhere. 
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Figure 49. Physical Site Security Error branch. 
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Table 29. Description of events contributing to Physical Site Security Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
J. Physical Site Security 
Error 
Basic fault: contributes to Engineered Barrier Error. 
1. Physical Control Error Basic fault: indicates that the physical controls have 
been breached. 
1.1 Signage Error Basic fault: indicates that the site’s signs are 
inadequate in disseminating necessary information. 
1.1.1 Inadequate Design Initiating event: indicates that the signage design was 
inadequate, including the adequacy of the message. 
1.1.2 Inadequate Construction Initiating event: indicates that the signage 
construction was inadequate. 
1.1.3 To Maintenance Error 
 
Transfer Symbol to N. 
1.2.  Access Control Error Basic fault: indicates that the access controls have 
been breached. 
1.2.1 Inadequate Design Initiating event: indicates that the access control 
design was inadequate. 
1.2.2 Inadequate Construction Initiating event: indicates that the access control 
construction was inadequate. 
1.2.3 To Maintenance Error 
 
Transfer Symbol to N. 
1.2.4 Operating Procedure 
Error 
Undeveloped event: indicates that the operating 
procedures were inadequate. 
2. Response Error Basic fault: indicates that physical site security 
breach was not adequately responded to. 
2.1 To Monitoring Error 
 
Transfer Symbol to N.2. 
2.2 Intervention Error Undeveloped event: indicates that the intervening 
response was unsuccessful in protecting the site’s 
security.  
 
 
 
Surface Control Error 
Figure 50 illustrates the fault tree for the Surface Control Error (K) branch. Three 
contributing events lead to Surface Control Error (K). These events include Inadequate 
Design (1), Inadequate Construction (2) and Maintenance Error (3). The events within 
this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that only one of the underlying events need 
occur for the above output event to occur. Further descriptions of the initiating events are 
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 presented in Table 30. The transfer symbol indicates that the maintenance portion of this 
branch is described elsewhere. 
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Figure 50. Surface Control Error branch. 
 
 
Table 30. Description of events contributing to Surface Control Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
K. Surface Control Error Basic fault: contributes to Engineered Barrier Error. A 
type of Engineered Barrier Error. 
1. Inadequate Design Initiating event: indicates that the design of the surface 
controls was inadequate. 
2. Inadequate Construction Initiating event: indicates that the construction of the 
surface controls was inadequate. 
3. Maintenance Error Transfer Symbol to N. 
 
 
 
 
Subsurface Barrier Error 
Figure 51 illustrates the fault tree for the Subsurface Bartrier Error (L) branch. 
Three contributing events lead to Subsurface Barrier Error (L). These events include 
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 Inadequate Design (1), Inadequate Construction (2) and Maintenance Error (3). The 
events within this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that only one of the 
underlying events need occur for the above output event to occur. Further descriptions of 
the initiating events are presented in Table 31. The transfer symbol indicates that the 
maintenance portion of this branch is described elsewhere. 
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Figure 51. Subsurface Barrier Error branch. 
 
 
 
Table 31. Description of events contributing to Subsurface Barrier Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
L. Subsurface Barrier Error Basic fault: contributes to Engineered Barrier Error. 
 
1. Inadequate Design Initiating event: indicates that the design of the 
subsurface controls was inadequate. 
2. Inadequate Construction Initiating event: indicates that the construction of 
the subsurface controls was inadequate. 
3. To Maintenance Error Transfer Symbol to N. 
 
 
 
180  
 Active Process Error 
Figure 52 illustrates the fault tree for the Active Process Error (M) branch. Three 
contributing events lead to Active Process Error (M). These events include Inadequate 
Design (1), Inadequate Construction (2) and Maintenance Error (3). All of the events 
within this tree are connected by Or-Gates indicating that only one of the underlying 
events need occur for the above output event to occur. Further descriptions of the 
initiating events are presented in Table 32. The transfer symbol indicates that the 
maintenance portion of this branch is described elsewhere. 
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Figure 52. Active Process Error branch. 
 
 
Table 32. Description of events contributing to Active Process Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
M. Active Process Error 
 
Basic fault: contributes to Engineered Barrier 
Error. 
1. Inadequate Design Initiating event: indicates that the design of the 
active remediation processes was inadequate. 
2. Inadequate Construction Initiating event: indicates that the construction of 
the active remediation processes was inadequate. 
3. To Maintenance Error Transfer Symbol to N. 
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 Review of Errors 
The fault trees presented in this section illustrate how errors can occur for each of 
the defined controls. These fault trees when considered in relation to the previous case 
study discussion begin to illustrate why the potential implementation errors are prevalent 
at the selected case studies.  
For example, the current Love Canal site was observed to have error 
characteristics for Physical Site Security and Stakeholder Awareness. The event 
contributing to the Physical Site Security error is described on Figure 49 as Inadequate 
Design (J.1.1.1). This initiating event involves an intentional decision by the regulators to 
limit the information present on the signs surrounding the disposal cell. Although this 
decision was made to accommodate local public concern it may not prove effective over 
the long-term. 
The second implementation error noted for the current Love Canal site involved 
Stakeholder Awareness. The initiating event for this error appears to be Intentional Lack 
of Stakeholder Involvement (B.2.1) as shown on Figure 41. The intentional lack of 
involvement appears to be by the local stakeholders as evidence in their lack of 
participation in public meetings regarding the de-listing of the site. 
The original Love Canal site was also observed to have error characteristics for 
Stakeholder Awareness. Although the property transfer deed contained information with 
regard to the chemical waste disposed of on the site, satisfying notice during this 
transaction, there was no evidence of further public notice or stakeholder involvement.  
The Spring Valley case study identified four potential implementation errors. All 
four of these errors are related to the original disposal conditions at the site. These errors 
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 include Contractual Requirements are Unclear (H.2.2) as shown on Figure 47, 
Inadequate Design (J.1.2.1) with regard to access control as illustrated on Figure 49, 
Inadequate Design (K.1) with regard to surface controls as illustrated on Figure 50 and 
Inadequate Design (L.1) with regard to subsurface barriers as illustrated on Figure 51. 
The ramification of these errors is being addressed via the non-time critical and 
emergency actions at the current Site Valley site. 
The Canonsburg case study identified two potential implementation errors. 
Stakeholder Awareness exhibited error characteristics with regard to the Lack of 
Stakeholder Involvement (B.2) as illustrated on Figure 41. The initiating events for this 
error appear to be local communication errors, which contribute to the Information 
Management Error event (B.2.4). The second potential implementation error was 
associated with Government Ownership (I.1.1) as shown on Figure 48. The initiating 
event for this error appears to be Information Misinterpreted (A.2.2.2) on Figure 41, 
which contributes to the Information Management Error (I.1.1) on Figure 48. 
Finally, the Burrell case study was observed to have two potential implementation 
errors. The first error involves the Stakeholder Awareness functions and is similar to that 
described in the Canonsburg case. The second potential error at Burrell is associated with 
the Surface Controls. This error is best described as a Maintenance Error (K.3) as shown 
on Figure 50. This condition is described as an error because the control is not 
performing as designed. The vegetative growth on the surface cover was not originally 
anticipated. It is noted that the site stewards have completed a risk assessment and this 
deviation is not anticipated to increase risk to the public or the environment. Nonetheless, 
the situation is described as an error because a significant deviation from the planned 
183  
 objective has occurred.  
 
Analysis of Maintenance and Monitoring 
The previous analysis shows how deviations and errors can occur to each of the 
institutional controls and engineered barriers. Basic contributing faults and initiating 
events have been described. To mitigate these errors and events it is recognized that an 
active maintenance and monitoring program is required. 
The following section provides an analysis of the maintenance and monitoring 
required for a contaminant isolation facility to remain effective. This analysis illustrates 
the cross-cutting nature of the maintenance function and links back to the individual 
control errors described on the previous branches (A through M). It is evident through 
this analysis that a complete maintenance and monitoring program should have integrated 
responsibilities with regard to engineered barriers and institutional controls. 
 
Maintenance Error 
Figure 53 illustrates the top levels of the Maintenance Error (N) branch. Three 
contributing events lead to Maintenance Error (N). The contributing events include Site 
Security Error (1), Monitoring Error (2) and Implementation of Corrective Action 
Error (3). The contributing errors are connected by an Or-Gate indicating that only one 
of the underlying events need occur for the above output event to occur. Further 
descriptions of the intermediate events and their subsequent faults, initiating events and 
undeveloped events are presented in Table 33. The transfer symbols indicate that portions 
of this branch are described elsewhere. 
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Figure 53. Maintenance Error branch. 
  
 Table 33. Description of events contributing to Maintenance Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
N. Maintenance Error Basic fault: contributes to Contaminant Isolation 
Facility Failure. 
1. Site Services Error Basic fault: indicates that there was a deviation from 
approved operating procedures.  
1.1 Deviation from 
Operating Procedures 
Basic fault: indicates that the site’s signs are 
inadequate in disseminating necessary information. 
1.1.1 Intentional Deviation Basic fault: indicates that the deviation from the 
approved operating procedures was intentional. 
1.1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
1.1.3 Requirements Unclear 
 
Basic event: indicates that operating procedure 
requirements are not understood. 
1.1.3.1  To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
1.1.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
1.2 Improper Operating 
Procedures 
Basic event: indicates that the operating procedures 
are inadequate for proper site services. 
1.2.1  To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
1.2.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2. Monitoring Error Basic event: indicates that the monitoring efforts 
were inadequate for the maintenance functions. 
2.1 No Monitoring 
 
Basic event: indicates that no monitoring was 
conducted. 
2.1.1 Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Initiating event: indicates that the lack of monitoring 
was intentional. 
2.1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
2.1.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that the monitoring 
requirements are not understood. 
2.1.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2.1.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2.1.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate monitoring. 
2.2 Inappropriate 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the monitoring was not 
appropriate for the maintenance efforts. 
2.2.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
2.2.2 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that the monitoring 
requirements are not understood. 
2.2.2.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
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 Table 33, continued. 
 
2.2.2.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2.2.3 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate monitoring. 
2.2.4 To Incomplete 
Monitoring 
Transfer Symbol to N.2.2.4, Figure 54. 
2.3 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
3. Implementation of 
Corrective Action Error 
Basic event: indicates that corrective actions were 
not implemented correctly to solve a problem. 
3.1 No Action Taken Basic event: indicates that no corrective action was 
taken. 
3.1.1 Intentional Lack of 
Action 
Initiating event: indicates that the decision to not take 
corrective actions was intentional. 
3.1.2 Unable to Respond Basic event: indicates that the site stewards were 
unable to take corrective actions. 
3.1.2.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
3.1.2.2 Lack of Mechanisms Undeveloped event: indicates that corrective action 
mechanisms were not available to solve the problem. 
3.1.2.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that the corrective action 
requirements are not understood. 
3.1.2.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
3.1.2.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
3.2 Actions do not Correct 
Situation 
Undeveloped event: indicates that implemented 
actions did not correct the identified problems.  
 
 
Incomplete Monitoring 
A major branch of this tree, not previously analyzed, is illustrated by the transfer 
symbol N.2.2.4, To Incomplete Monitoring. This branch is expanded on to further 
evaluate the contributing events that could lead to Inappropriate Monitoring (N.2.2) and 
subsequently Maintenance Error (N). 
The proper monitoring of a contaminant isolation facility involves five areas of 
monitoring. These five areas of monitoring, as illustrated in Figure 54, include in-system 
performance monitoring, vadose zone monitoring, groundwater sampling, site inspections 
187  
 and land use control monitoring. Further details of the intermediate events and their 
subsequent faults, initiating events and undeveloped events are presented in Table 34. 
The transfer symbols indicate that portions of this branch are described elsewhere.  
A major branch of this tree is reflected by the transfer symbol To Land Use 
Control Monitoring Error (N.2.2.4.5). This branch is expanded on to further evaluate the 
contributing events that could lead to Incomplete Monitoring (N.2.2.4), Inappropriate 
Monitoring (N.2.2) and subsequently Maintenance Error (N). 
 
Land Use Control Monitoring Error 
The transfer symbol To Land Use Control Monitoring Error (N.2.2.4.5) in 
Figures 54 and 55 reflects a major branch in the Maintenance Error (N) branch. Three 
basic events, No Land Use Control Monitoring (1), Inappropriate Land Use Control 
Monitoring (2) and Failure of Information Management (3) contribute to the Land Use 
Control Monitoring Error (N.2.2.4.5). An important sub-branch to the Inappropriate 
Land Use Control Monitoring event is the Inadequate Land Use Control Monitoring 
branch. This branch reflects a major monitoring error that could directly relate back to the 
Institutional Control Error branches (C through I) illustrated in Figures 42 through 48.
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Figure 54. Incomplete Monitoring branch. 
  
 Table 34. Description of events contributing to Incomplete Monitoring.  
 
Label Event Description 
N.2.2.4 Incomplete Monitoring Basic event: contributes to Inappropriate 
Monitoring (N.2.2). 
1. Inadequate In-System 
Performance Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the performance of the 
internal components (moisture content, material 
properties, radon emanation, etc.) of the 
contaminant isolation facility is not adequately 
monitored. 
1.1 Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the lack of monitoring 
was an intentional decision. 
1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
1.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that monitoring 
requirements are not understood. 
1.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
1.3.2  To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
1.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate monitoring. 
2. Inadequate Vadose Zone 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the monitoring of the 
vadose zone is not adequate with respect to 
moisture content, contaminant concentrations, etc. 
2.1  Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the lack of monitoring 
was an intentional decision. 
2.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
2.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that monitoring 
requirements are not understood. 
2.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate monitoring. 
3. Inadequate Groundwater 
Sampling 
Basic event: indicates that the sampling of 
groundwater is inadequate (frequency, 
constituents, etc.). 
3.1 Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the lack of monitoring 
was an intentional decision. 
3.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
3.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that monitoring 
requirements are not understood. 
3.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
3.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
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 Table 34, continued. 
 
3.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate monitoring. 
4. Inadequate Site Inspection Basic event: indicates that site inspections are 
inadequate. 
4.1 Lack of Physical Site 
Security Inspection 
Basic event: indicates that the physical site 
inspections were inadequate with respect to fences, 
gates, wells, signs, etc. 
4.1.1 Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the lack of inspection 
was an intentional decision. 
4.1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
4.1.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that inspection requirements 
are not understood. 
4.1.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
4.1.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
4.1.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate monitoring. 
4.2 Lack of Surface Control 
Inspection 
Basic event: indicates that the surface control 
inspections were inadequate with respect to cover 
material (geo-membranes, riprap, etc.), vegetation, 
drainage systems, etc. 
4.2.1 Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the lack of inspection 
was an intentional decision. 
4.2.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
4.2.3 Requirements Unclear Basic event: indicates that inspection requirements 
are not understood. 
4.2.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
4.2.3.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
4.2.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are 
not in place for appropriate inspection. 
5. To Land Use Control 
Monitoring Error 
Transfer Symbol to N.2.2.4.5 
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Figure 55. Land Use Control Monitoring Error branch. 
  
 Table 35. Description of events contributing to Land Use Control Monitoring Error.  
 
Label Event Description 
N.2.2.4.5 Land Use Control 
Monitoring Error 
Basic event: contributes to Incomplete Monitoring 
(N.2.2.4). 
1. No Land Use 
Control Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that there is a lack of Land Use 
Control monitoring. 
1.1 Intentional Lack of 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the lack of monitoring was 
an intentional decision. 
1.2 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
1.3 Requirements 
Unclear 
Basic event: indicates that monitoring requirements are 
not understood. 
1.3.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
1.3.2  To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
1.4 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are not 
in place for appropriate monitoring. 
2. Inappropriate Land 
Use Control 
Monitoring 
Basic event: indicates that the monitoring of the land 
use controls is not adequate. 
2.1 Lack of Resources Initiating event: indicates that there is inadequate 
funding or personnel. 
2.2 Requirements 
Unclear 
Basic event: indicates that monitoring requirements are 
not understood. 
2.2.1 To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
2.2.2 To Stakeholder 
Awareness Error 
Transfer Symbol to B. 
2.3 Lack of Monitoring 
Mechanisms 
Undeveloped event: indicates that mechanisms are not 
in place for appropriate monitoring. 
2.4 Inadequate 
Monitoring of Land 
Use Controls 
Basic event: indicates that the monitoring of land use 
controls is inadequate. 
2.4.1 To Zoning Error Transfer Symbol to C with respect to monitoring 
Zoning Change Requests, Zoning Requirements and 
Zoning Definitions. 
2.4.2 To Ordinance Error Transfer Symbol to D with respect to Ordinance 
Requirements, Enforcement Resource Requirements 
and Related Legislative Actions. 
2.4.3 To Orders & 
Decrees Error 
Transfer Symbol to E with respect to Order & Decree 
Requirements, Enforcement Resource Requirements, 
Related Legislative & Judicial Actions and Property 
Transfer Records. 
2.4.4 To Permit System 
Error 
Transfer Symbol to F with respect to Permit 
Requirements, Permit Requests, Permit Compliance 
Requirements and Enforcement Resource 
Requirements. 
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2.4.5 To Deed 
Restriction Error 
Transfer Symbol to G with respect to Deed Restriction 
Requirements, Enforcement Resource Requirements 
and Property Transfer Records. 
2.4.6 To Contractual 
Error 
Transfer Symbol to H with respect to Contractual 
Requirements and Resource Requirements 
2.4.7 To Government 
Ownership Error 
Transfer Symbol to I with respect to Ownership 
Requirements and Resource Requirements. 
3. To Information 
Management Error 
Transfer Symbol to A. 
 
 
Management Responsibilities 
 The management of a contaminant isolation facility is a complex dynamic 
process.  Temporal changes require site stewards to adjust their management approach 
accordingly. Maintenance and monitoring are key mitigating actions that are necessary to 
prevent precursor errors and system failure.  
 Additional institutional management responsibilities of site stewards include 
properly managing and disseminating information about the site and the contaminant 
isolation facility’s performance, maintaining a multi-generational awareness of the site 
within the local community, maintaining financial security for the site and for the 
associated maintenance functions and continually assessing the performance of the 
system as well as the components of the system. 
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 CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Contaminant isolation facilities are designed to maintain isolation of known 
contaminants until such time that they are no longer a risk to humans or the environment. 
Contaminant isolation facility configurations involve a collection of individual controls to 
achieve the contaminant isolation objective. These individual controls include a 
combination of engineered barriers and institutional controls. Operating experience with 
modern contaminant isolation techniques shows that contaminant isolation facilities and 
associated management techniques do not always perform as expected. The results of this 
research show that precursor errors can occur to both institutional controls and 
engineered barriers. This research has also shown how these errors can lead to system 
failure. Without continued human intervention to correct these errors, contaminant 
isolation facilities will fail, given the longevity of the contaminants. 
 
Case Studies 
The selected case studies, Anaconda, Burrell, Canonsburg, Love Canal, Maxey 
Flats, Rocky Mountain Arsenal and Spring Valley, illustrate several variations in system 
configurations being applied for the near-surface isolation of residual contaminants for 
long-term periods. These configurations include sacrifice zones such as those found at 
Burrell, Canonsburg, Love Canal and Maxey Flats that are not being re-used for purposes 
other than contaminant isolation. The three other selected sites, Anaconda, Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal and Spring Valley, are examples of sites with portions of their property 
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 actively being re-used for other applications in addition to contaminant isolation. 
The contaminant isolation facility configurations investigated through this case 
study research involved the following 13 individual controls: 
• Information Management, 
• Stakeholder Awareness, 
• Zoning, 
• Ordinances, 
• Orders and Decrees, 
• Permit Systems, 
• Deed Restrictions, 
• Contracts, 
• Government Ownership, 
• Physical Site Security, 
• Surface Covers, 
• Subsurface Barriers, and  
• Active Processes. 
The number of individual controls employed as part of the contaminant isolation 
strategies at the selected cases ranged from six to 12 controls per site with the average 
being 10 individual controls per site. Information management, stakeholder awareness, 
ordinances and physical site security were found to be the most frequently applied 
controls having been applied at all investigated sites. 
The performance of implemented controls varied from site to site. Not all controls 
were performing as expected. Four of the seven investigated cases exhibited error 
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 characteristics at the individual control level. The Spring Valley site exhibited the most 
control implementation errors with four. Canonsburg, Burrell and Love Canal each 
exhibited two control implementation errors.  
Stakeholder awareness was the control that most frequently exhibited error 
characteristics. Three of the seven sites showed implementation errors with regard to 
stakeholder awareness.  
Maintenance and monitoring, although not a defined control, was found to be a 
critical institutional responsibility for ensuring the long-term performance of contaminant 
isolation facilities. Active maintenance and monitoring was evident at all investigated 
sites. Reduced monitoring strategies were applied at several sites within a few years of 
the isolation cell’s completion. 
Monitoring is shown to be an important component of site maintenance. Current 
site monitoring programs are structured to satisfy regulatory compliance in a 
confirmatory manner. Monitoring efforts are designed to confirm contaminant release 
and thus system failure. In other words, current management efforts operate in the fix-as-
fail mode rather than in a more predictive and preventative mode. 
Multi-organizational involvement was found to be a routine component of 
contaminant isolation facility operations. Independent regulatory oversight was observed 
at both UMTRCA and CERCLA sites. The USNRC, operating as a licensing body, 
provides federal oversight of operations consistent with USEPA regulations at UMTRCA 
sites while state involvement was observed to be minimal. For the CERCLA sites, the 
operations were again performed consistent with the federal regulations although the 
regulatory lead varied between state and federal oversight. 
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 Contaminant Isolation Facility Failure Analysis 
The evaluation of the performance of the individual controls and their associated 
errors supported the development of logical fault trees. Fault trees are cause-and-effect 
diagrams useful for evaluating the root causes of failure modes. These trees were 
developed to illustrate the major potential failure pathways for each of the contaminant 
isolation facility controls. This analysis provided a graphical means of displaying the 
qualitative information included in the case studies. 
This analysis focused on unintentional precursors and events that could contribute 
to failure. Intentional violations, catastrophic natural events and deliberate acts with the 
intent to destroy or damage the contaminant isolation facility, such as sabotage, fraud or 
other illegal actions, present unique concerns and were not included in this analysis. 
This fault tree taxonomy was useful for organizing and analyzing both 
institutional controls and engineered barriers. Fault trees provided a logical approach for 
clarifying how the undesired event (i.e., control error and system failure) could occur 
and, likewise, how mitigation efforts can reduce implementation errors and subsequent 
system failure.  
Individual isolation controls were found to contain many single point errors. 
Controls with single point errors can be described as non-robust in that one single event 
could potentially result in a significant error rendering the control incapable of fulfilling 
its intended objective. 
Contaminant isolation facility failure, as defined in this research, was found to 
require the breach of an engineered barrier. Engineered barriers include the passive 
physical components (i.e., the stabilized wasteform, surface controls and subsurface 
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 barriers) as well as the active processes (i.e., groundwater and leachate treatments). The 
completed failure analysis shows that for an engineered barrier error to occur an 
institutional control error must first occur. Institutional control errors, therefore, should 
be viewed as precursors to potential system failure. This research also showed that 
institutional control error alone does not directly lead to system failure.  
Figure 56 illustrates the layering relationship of engineered barriers and 
institutional controls. Two distinct layers of protection are formed via the collection of 
implemented engineered barriers and institutional controls. Individual controls represent 
integral but independent pieces of these two layers. Additional controls are not 
necessarily redundant and therefore do not always reduce the likelihood of system failure. 
Institutional control errors could be described as an erosion of protection. If 
uncorrected, these gaps in protection could negatively contribute to engineered barrier 
error via both the ingress or egress scenarios and ultimately system failure. Figure 57 
illustrates this potential erosion of protection. This concept is similar to the “Swiss cheese 
model of defenses” suggested by Reason (1997). 
Inadequate information management, stakeholder awareness and available 
resources were found to be key initiating events potentially leading to individual control 
error. These initiating events could be latent errors resulting in no immediate impact to 
the system performance. The consequences resulting from these latent errors may not be 
realized until additional events occur.  
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Figure 56. An illustration of the layering of engineered barriers and institutional controls. 
 
 
Figure 57. An illustration of the erosion of protection. 
 
An analysis of the maintenance and monitoring functions of a contaminant 
isolation facility found that such functions are designed to validate and detect system 
failure. Current monitoring techniques do not necessarily provide site stewards with 
timely information sufficient to intervene and prevent failure.  
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 Recommendations 
To mitigate the potential errors and events illustrated through this research an 
expanded maintenance and monitoring program is required. Such a program must be 
designed to address the potential individual control errors so that system failure can be 
prevented. 
 
Maintenance and Monitoring 
More sustainable approaches are needed that should involve pro-active system 
monitoring focused on the detection of system changes prior to failure. Monitoring 
efforts should include identifying precursors to failure, thus providing more timely 
information that permits the implementation of corrective action before system failure 
occurs. In this manner, monitoring should be used as a guide to drive system maintenance 
rather than simply a strategy designed to satisfy compliance. 
Maintenance and monitoring programs need to include the ability and the 
incentive to site stewards to make complete use of all existing information and 
monitoring data. Site stewards need to not only collect the required monitoring data but 
they also need to actively integrate this information and interpret and translate it into 
active site knowledge. This knowledge management should be the responsibility of the 
site steward who has an inherent interest in the site and the associated success of the 
contaminant isolation facility. Additional incentives may be required to motivate site 
stewards to maintain this site knowledge for future generations. 
Monitoring should include self-monitoring by the site stewards as well as 
independent third party monitoring by regulators, stakeholders and the general public. 
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 The transparency of monitoring, including independent oversight, could be a valuable 
technique for identifying significant operational errors. Third party oversight could also 
serve to strengthen the overall monitoring process and could in essence shift a number of 
FTA logic gates from or-gates to and-gates. This would result in more robust controls. 
A risk-informed approach could be useful for establishing appropriate monitoring 
strategies for individual sites. Such a strategy could incorporate expanded monitoring of a 
site’s performance including appropriate initiating events, which could potentially 
contribute to institutional control and engineered barrier errors. Sites that pose a high risk 
of negative consequences should failure occur may warrant this expanded monitoring. 
Expanded monitoring in support of institutional control maintenance could 
include: zoning change requests, legislative and judicial actions, permit requests, property 
transfer records, enforcement resource requirements and specific control requirements. 
Expanded monitoring in support of engineered barrier maintenance could include: in-
system performance monitoring (in-cell moisture content, material properties and barrier 
integrity measurements, radon emanation, etc.), vadose zone monitoring (moisture 
content, contaminant concentrations, etc.), groundwater sampling (sampling frequency, 
contaminant concentrations, etc.), site inspections (signs, fences, wells, etc.) and surface 
cover inspections (geo-membranes, riprap, vegetation, drainage systems, etc.). 
The results of this research should also be useful during the design phase of new 
contaminant isolation facilities. These results suggest, that at a minimum, contaminant 
isolation facilities should utilize the following appropriate controls: physical site security, 
surface covers, subsurface barriers, information management, stakeholder awareness and 
ordinances. State land control ordinances, which are consistent with the UECA, are also 
202  
 recommended. Additionally, buffer zones incorporated into the facility design can reduce 
the likelihood of human ingress. Buffer zones can be incorporated into both sacrifice sites 
such as illustrated in the Maxey Flats case as well as into reuse sites such as the Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal.  
Finally, new facility design should embrace information management. This 
research highlights the significant role that information management plays throughout the 
facility’s existence. The objective of information management should be to maintain an 
adequate knowledge of the site so as to support not only current but future generations.  
 
Follow-on Research 
In addition to the above recommendations the results of this research suggest the 
need for follow-on research in several areas. 
First, the potential failure pathways were determined using the case study 
approach. Further investigation using a representative sample of applicable sites should 
be performed to validate the proposed fault trees identified through this research. An 
appropriate sample of sites could readily be obtained from the approximately 900 
completed CERCLA sites to perform this validation (USEPA, 2004f). Such a study could 
potentially determine probabilities for each of the identified pathways to failure. This 
analysis would support development of future mitigation measures applicable to the most 
probable pathways.  
In addition to investigating sites with on-site contaminant isolation facilities, other 
types of residual waste sites (i.e., sites with contaminated groundwater) should be 
investigated using the same fault tree approach. Such an analysis would identify the 
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 unique characteristics of these sites, which are also a significant national and 
international problem.  
Third, additional analysis of contaminant isolation facilities should be performed 
with regard to the various levels of risk posed by these sites. For example, CERCLA sites 
with high risk (i.e., high potential for negative consequences) could be evaluated to 
determine if unique management strategies are being applied at these sites or whether the 
potential failure pathways identified in this research are still prevalent. Results from such 
research could support resource planners in that limited management resources could be 
directed towards the more high-risk sites to minimize potential negative consequences. 
Further analysis is warranted in the area of organizational responsibilities. This 
analysis should include an investigation of organizational mission with regard to the 
long-term management of contaminant isolation facilities. An analysis of the role of 
collective federal ownership as a management strategy should be conducted. Such a 
management strategy could potentially achieve an economy of scale through the 
consolidation of management efforts for a collection of residual waste sites. This analysis 
should also investigate the relationship of organizational mission as a means of shifting 
from the current strategy of monitoring for compliance (e.g., failure) to the recommended 
expanded monitoring of error precursors.  
Finally, additional considerations should be given to the potential impact that 
natural resource damage claims may play with regard to current and future long-term 
contaminant isolation facilities. For example, future sacrifice zones may in particular be 
subject to significant litigation and damage claims.   
The research of Dr. James Clarke and other members of the Consortium for Risk 
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 Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP) continues to improve the long-term 
management of residual contaminants. CRESP, in partnership with the USDOE, USEPA, 
USNRC, national laboratories and universities should continue collaborative research 
projects to investigate and implement the recommendations of this research. 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
Action Memorandum 
An official document describing the actions that need to be taken to remediate a 
site as part of a removal action. 
 
Activity and Use Limitations (AULs) 
Legal or physical restrictions or limitations on the use of, or access to, a site or 
facility to eliminate or minimize potential exposures to chemicals of concern, or 
to prevent activities that could interfere with the effectiveness of a response 
action, to ensure maintenance of a condition of “acceptable risk” or “no 
significant risk” to human health and the environment (ASTM, 2000b). 
 
Administrative Order 
A legal agreement (between the USEPA and the potentially responsible parties 
[PRP]) through which the PRP agrees to pay for or take the required corrective 
action or refrain from an activity (USEPA, 2004i). 
 
Baseline Risk Assessment 
An evaluation of the potential threat to human health and the environment in the 
absence of any remedial action (USEPA, 1992). 
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 Best Practices 
Standard, published operating methods found to produce the best performance 
and results in a given industry or organization (Bridgefield, 2004). 
 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act  (CERCLA) 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 1980, commonly known as Superfund, establishes the framework 
for the federal response to the release of hazardous substances that endanger 
public health or the environment (CERCLA 1994). 
 
Consent Decree 
A legal document (approved by a judge, that formalizes an agreement between 
the USEPA and PRP) that describes the actions that the PRP will take (USEPA, 
2004i).  
 
Conservation Easement 
A legal agreement authorized by a property owner that limits the type and 
amount of development that can take place on their property.  
 
Contaminant 
Any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance found in air, water, 
soil or biological matter that has a harmful effect on plants or animals; harmful 
or hazardous matter introduced into the environment (USEPA, 2004c). 
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 Contaminant Isolation Facility (CIF) 
A near-surface, engineered structure suitable for the permanent disposal of 
hazardous, radioactive, or toxic materials.  
 
Contaminant of Concern (COC) 
Any contaminant that is shown to pose possible risk to a site; also known as 
Contaminants of Concern, Contaminants of Potential Concern, or Contaminants 
of Interest [modified from (USEPA, 2004c)]. 
 
Covenant 
A promise made by one landowner to another in connection with the conveyance 
of property (USEPA, 2004i).  
 
Decree  
A decision or order of the court. A final decree is one that fully and finally 
disposes of the litigation.  
 
Deed 
A signed legal instrument defining a transfer, bargain, or contract (Webster, 
1977). 
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 Deed Notice 
A non-enforceable, informational document generally filed in public land 
records (USEPA, 2004i).  
 
Deed Restriction 
A restriction or limitation on an interest in real property, created in conveyance 
from one party to another (ASTM, 2000b). 
 
Easement 
A property right conveyed by a landowner to another party that gives the second 
party rights with regard to the first party’s land (USEPA, 2004i).  
 
Enforcement 
The ability to compel compliance with a use restriction, or such other injunctive 
relief as may be necessary to protect human health and the environment (Miller, 
2003). 
 
Engineered Barrier (EB) or Engineered Control (EC) 
Physical modification to the natural setting, including the site, facility and/or the 
residual materials themselves, in order to reduce or eliminate the potential for 
exposure to contaminants of concern (COCs). 
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 Environmental Use Restriction 
A prohibition of one or more uses of or activities on specified real property; or a 
requirement to perform certain acts; or both, where such prohibitions or 
requirements are relied on in the remedial decision for the purpose of protecting 
human health or the environment (Miller, 2003). 
 
Equitable Servitudes 
Building restrictions and restrictions on the use of land which may be enforced 
in equity (ASTM, 2000b). 
 
Error 
Unwanted actions or inactions that arise from problems in sequencing, timing, 
knowledge, interfaces and/or procedures that result in deviations from expected 
standards or norms that places people, equipment and systems at risk (Gertman 
and Blackman, 1994). 
Errors are events in which a planned sequence of activities do not achieve the 
intended outcome. In the context of this research, errors are potential precursors 
to contaminant isolation facility failure. 
Failure  
Inability to achieve an objective. In the context of this research, failure refers to 
a contaminant isolation facility’s inability of maintaining contaminant isolation. 
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 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)  
An analytical technique, whereby an undesired state of the system is specified 
and the system is then analyzed in the context of its environment and operation 
to find all credible ways in which the undesired event can occur (Vesely et al., 
1981). 
 
Fault  
Higher order event (Vesely et al., 1981). 
 
Government Controls or Government-based Controls 
Controls using the regulatory authority of a government entity to impose 
restrictions on citizens or sites under its jurisdiction (USEPA, 2004i).  
 
Hazard 
The inherent danger a material possesses for causing harm to human health, the 
environment, physical property and/or business continuity (Abkowitz, 2003). 
 
Institutional Controls (IC) 
Non-engineered instruments such as administrative and/or legal controls that 
minimize the potential for human exposure to contamination by limiting land or 
resource use (USEPA, 2000).   
Institutional controls can be viewed as processes, instruments and mechanisms 
designed to influence human behavior and activity.   
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 Institutional Responsibilities 
All of the necessary functions that need to be conducted by the site stewards to 
ensure the long-term integrity of a waste isolation facility; these include all 
conventional institutional controls as well as site security, financial security, 
community involvement, information management and emergency preparedness. 
 
Land Disposal Facility 
The land, building, structures and equipment that are intended to be used for the 
disposal of radioactive wastes (10-CFR-61, 1982). 
 
Near-surface Disposal Facility 
A land disposal facility in which radioactive waste is disposed of in or within the 
upper 30 meters of the earth’s surface (10-CFR-61, 1982). 
 
Notice 
The public disclosure of information.  
 
Order  
A decision of a judge that is put in writing and filed in the court case. An order 
often requires action and, if not complied with, can result in contempt charges. 
 
Ordinance  
A written law enacted by the legislative body of a county, city or town. 
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 Permits 
Permits are land use control mechanisms that authorize specific limitations and 
requirements. For example, permits may be required before building 
construction or groundwater well installation. 
 
Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) 
A person or company who is or who could be liable and therefore responsible 
for the remediation of a site under federal or state laws (USEPA, 2004i). 
 
Property-based Controls 
Controls based on private property law used to restrict or affect the use of a 
property; also referred to as Proprietary Controls (USEPA, 2004i). 
 
Proprietary Controls 
Controls based on private, real property law used to restrict or affect the use of a 
property; also referred to as Property-based Controls (USEPA, 2004i). 
 
Record Of Decision (ROD) 
Official CERCLA documentation describing the selected remedy and associated 
rationale for a site’s remediation.  
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 Remediation 
Cleanup or other methods used to remove or contain a toxic spill or hazardous 
materials from a Superfund site (USEPA, 2004c). 
Residual Hazards 
Hazards arising from on-site residual waste/contaminants. 
 
Residual Hazards Management 
The collective use of engineered and institutional controls to isolate residual 
contaminants from the biosphere to minimize the associated hazards. 
 
Residual Waste  
Hazardous/contaminated material remaining on-site following remedial action. 
 
Restrictive Covenant 
A covenant acknowledged in a deed or lease that restricts the use of a property.  
 
Reversionary Interest 
A real estate interest created when a landowner deeds property to another, which 
specifies that the property will revert to the original owner under specified 
conditions (USEPA, 2004i). 
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 Risk 
The potential for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to human life, 
health, property, or the environment; risk is usually based on the expected value 
of the conditional probability of the event occurring times the consequence of 
the event given that it has occurred (SRA, 2004). 
 
Servitude 
A burden resting on one estate for the benefit or advantage of another. An 
agreement granting limited permission to use the property. 
 
State Land Use Controls 
State statutes providing owners of contaminated property with the authority 
to establish use restrictions specifically for contaminated property (USEPA, 
2000). 
 
Statute  
A law enacted by the legislative branch of the national or state government. 
Statutory law is distinguished from case law (i.e., law made by courts). 
 
Success  
Adherence to Best Practices to ensure the continued isolation of known residual 
contaminants. 
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 System  
A deterministic entity comprising an interacting collection of discrete elements 
(Vesely et al., 1981). 
 
Waste 
Hazardous, radioactive and other toxic substances resulting from energy 
production, mineral extraction, national defense programs, industrial operations 
and manufacturing operations. 
 
Zoning 
A local government land use control instrument used to regulate activity and 
development on private property located within its jurisdiction.  
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 APPENDIX B 
 
CASE STUDY CHECKLISTS 
 
Anaconda Checklist 
Case Study Name: 
 
Anaconda Smelter NPL Site, Old Works/East Anaconda 
Development Area Operable Unit  
 
Site Location: 
 
Anaconda, MT 
Site Point of 
Contact(s): 
 
Milo Manning, USEPA Technical Assistance Group (TAG) 
406-563-5538 
mmaeei00@in-tch.com 
Location of 
Information: 
Anaconda Environmental Education Institute  
Date of Site Visit: October 2-3, 2003 
Participants in Visit: Kevin Kostelnik 
Background The Anaconda site was established in 1883, by the Anaconda Mineral 
Company, to process copper ore that was being mined at Butte, MT some 30 
miles away. The site was selected because of the dependable water supply 
provided by Warm Springs Creek. Construction of the Upper Works area 
was completed from 1883-1884. The Lower Works, constructed in 1888, 
expanded the processing capacity. The two Works also operated two copper 
smelters. The smelters were connected to brick stacks atop adjacent hills by 
masonry flues.  
 
The Old Works and the two smelters operated from 1884 to 1901. 
Operations included separating ore with copper concentration greater than 
6%. Ore of this concentration was sent to the smelters and processed. Slag 
and flue ash were the residual waste. Ore with concentration less than 6% 
was first crushed, segregated, concentrated and then processed. This process 
produced additional waste streams jig tailings, which were discharged onto 
the floodplain. 
 
Operations at the Old Works ended in 1901. A newer smelting operation, 
known as the Washoe Works or the Anaconda Reduction Works, started 
operating across the valley. This facility operated from 1902 through 1980. 
During the 1930s and 1940s portions of the residual waste were reworked. 
From 1940 to 1943 approximately 26 million pounds of copper and more 
than 1 million pounds of silver were retrieved from the reworking of the 
Red Sands. The Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) acquired the 
Anaconda Mineral Company in 1977 and continued operation until 1980. 
 
In 1983, the USEPA placed the Anaconda site on the National Priority List 
(NPL) as part of the recently enacted Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) program. In October 
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 1984, ARCO entered into an Administrative Order Consent and began to 
conduct a Remedial Investigation of the site. An expedited Remedial 
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) was entered into in July 1986 for the 
Mill Creek area of the site. Young children were temporarily relocated due 
to the elevated arsenic levels in soil. A 1987-ROD determined that 
permanent relocation was warranted. A second Administrative Order 
Consent was established in September 1988 for the Flue Dust and Smelter 
Hill OUs. A 1991-ROD was finalized for these sites. 
 
An Action Memorandum was signed in July 1991 for the Old Works area. 
This Action included stabilization of the Red Sands, repairs to Warm 
Springs Creek levees and access control fencing. The March 1994 ROD 
refers to this area as the Old Works/East Anaconda Development Area 
(OW/EADA) OU. Additional OUs are currently being investigated and 
remediated. The final OU to be resolved will be the Anaconda Soils, 
Community Soils, and Regional Water and Wastes OU. 
Site Characteristics 
 Annual 
Precipitation 
The average annual precipitation for the area is 13.7 
inches.   
 Surface Waters 
 
Warm Springs Creek flows east across the site of the 
OW/EADA OU. This perennial stream is a tributary 
to the upper Clark Fork River and is the principle 
drainage of the Deer Lodge Valley.  
 
Approximately 2.8 miles of stream lie within this 
OU. Warm Springs Creek was channeled by levees in 
the 1880s to support the smelter operations.  
 Aquifer/Ground 
Water  
 
Residents in the area are on public water supplies.  
 
An alluvial aquifer underlies the site. This aquifer 
ranges in thickness from 20 feet in the western 
portion of the site to 100 feet along the eastern 
boundary.  Groundwater flow is from west to east.  
 
Groundwater measurements of arsenic, cadmium, 
copper and zinc exceed the Federal Safe Drinking 
Water Act (FSDWA) maximum contaminant levels 
(MCL). 
 Biological 
Indicators 
 
Vegetation within the OU consists of secondary 
growth of weedy forbs, grasses and shrubs. Large 
portions of the site were bare before remedial 
operations. 
 Annual 
Freeze/Thaw 
Cycles 
Mean maximum temperature 81oF is observed in the 
summer, while the mean minimum temperature of 
15oF is observed in winter. 
 Ecosystem “Value” The site is not consider a critical habitat although 
endangered species such as bald eagles, peregrine 
falcons and Rocky Mountain wolfs have been 
observed in the general vicinity. 
 
Regional wildlife includes mule and white-tailed 
deer, elk, moose, antelope, mice, voles, rabbit, small 
birds, brown trout, insects and other invertebrate 
organisms.  
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  Size  The Anaconda Smelter NPL site encompasses 
approximately 300 square mile area. This site 
involves 15 Remedial Design Units (i.e., Operable 
Units). 
 
Waste volumes are estimated to be approximately 
230 million cubic yards of concentrated mine 
tailings, 30 million cubic yards of furnace slag, 
500,000 cubic yards of flue dust, 20,000 acres of 
contaminated soil and millions of gallons of 
contaminated groundwater. The OW/EADA OU 
encompasses approximately 1300 acres. 
Approximately 1.4 million cubic yards of waste 
material (jig tailings, “heap roast” slag, Red Sands 
and other wastes) were associated with this OU. 
 
The site is bounded by Highway 1 on the south, 
Highway 273 to the east, Stuckey Ridge to the north 
and Cedar Street to the west. 
 
The OW/EADA OU is further divided into 6 
subareas: the Old Works Structural area, the Heap 
Roast Slag and Waste Piles, the Warm Springs Creek 
floodplain, Red Sands, East Anaconda yard and the 
Drag Strip. 
 Site Geology The Anaconda site is described as three distinct soil 
areas. The floodplain area involving silt and clay 
loam soils, the lowland area involving broad alluvial 
fans with silt loam soils and the foothills, which are 
characterized as steeply sloping alluvial fans, 
colluvium and bedrock of sedimentary and volcanic 
rock.  
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary 
Contaminants of 
Concern 
Human health risks are associated with five 
chemicals: arsenic, cadmium, lead, zinc and copper. 
 
 Primary Exposure 
Routes 
 
The historical release and transport mechanisms for 
the contaminants of concern at this site include 
discarded waste materials, aerial deposition form 
stack emissions, in situ leaching from waste material, 
fluvial erosion and redeposition of wastes and 
demolition of structures. 
 
Pathways for potential migration were determined to 
be air, surface water, infiltration of precipitation and 
groundwater.  
 
The 1994 Record Of Decision (ROD) determined 
that the most plausible routes of human exposure for 
this OU were direct ingestion of dust, soil or surface 
wastes, inhalation exposure to respirable particulate 
matter and ingestion of contaminants in ground 
water. 
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 This determination was made because no human 
populations live within the OU. Current and future 
land use is assumed to remain recreational and 
commercial. Therefore, the exposed population is 
assumed to be recreational visitors and on-site 
workers. 
 
Residential development is considered to be low and 
therefore on-site residential scenarios were not 
considered. 
 Primary Risk 
 
The theoretical Reasonable Maximum Exposure 
cancer risk for on-site workers was determined to be 
greater than 1 x 10–4. The range was 2 x 10-5 to            
4 x 10-4. 
 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population Density 
within 1 mi. 
Approximately 10,000 persons lived within 1 mile of 
the site as of 1990. 
 Population Density 
within 3 mi. 
 
The surrounding population increases only slightly 
due to the rural nature of the site. 
 
 Demographic 
Pattern 
 
The current surrounding population appears to be 
stable.  
 
When operations stopped in 1980, thousands of 
workers lost their jobs. The regional economics were 
difficult resulting in a demographic shift away from 
this area.  
 
The site is immediately adjacent to the town of 
Anaconda. The surrounding area is characterized as 
rural lands.  
 Current Regional 
Land Use 
The current regional land use is a combination of 
residential and rural.   
 Historic Regional 
Land Use 
The historical regional land use is ranchland and 
agricultural.  
 
 Current Site Land 
Use 
 
The OU has been remediated consistent with the 
1994 ROD. This OU now contains a Championship 
Golf Course that incorporates the institutional and 
engineered controls required under this ROD.  
 
Waste materials are contained beneath this golf 
course. 
 Potential 
Alternative Land 
Use(s) 
None foreseen as long as the Golf Course remains 
economically viable. Surrounding areas are 
beginning to promote residential development.  
Regulatory Characteristics 
 Principle 
Regulation 
The response actions are performed under the 
CERCLA. 
 Current Land 
Owner 
US Army, US Fish and Wildlife Service 
 
 Land Transfers 
 
Anaconda Minerals Company operated ore 
processing facilities on the site from 1884 through 
1977. Atlantic Richfield Company purchased AMC 
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 in 1977 and continued operations on site until 1980.  
 
Portions of the remediated OW/EADA OU were 
transferred to Anaconda-Deer Lodge County May 5, 
1994.  
 Former Land 
Owner(s) 
Anaconda Minerals Company 
 Potentially 
Responsible Parties 
 
 
Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) 
System Characteristics 
 Engineered Barriers 
(EB) Description 
 
The remedial actions for Anaconda fall under 
CERCLA. The selected remedy for the OW/EADA 
OU requires:  
- Construction of engineered covers of waste 
materials exceeding arsenic levels of 1000 parts 
per million for areas designated as recreational 
and potentially commercial, 
- Treatment of soils exceeding arsenic levels of 
1000 parts per million (ppm) for areas 
designated as recreational and potentially 
commercial, 
- Cover or treat soils exceeding arsenic level of 
500 ppm in current commercial areas, 
- Construction of surface controls to manage 
surface water runoff, 
- Repair and upgrade levees to Warm Springs 
Creek. 
 Institutional 
Controls (IC) 
Description 
 
The remedial actions for Anaconda fall under 
CERCLA. The selected remedy for the OW/EADA 
OU require that institutional controls:  
- Assure that future land and water use is 
consistent with residual risks, 
- Preserve and maintain the remedial structures, 
- Assure that future construction be performed 
consistent with the remedial actions, 
- As development occurs, ensure that future 
remediation is conducted. 
 
To achieve these objectives four layers of ICs are 
envisioned. The first layer is the Community 
Protective Measures Program (CPMP). CPMP is 
primarily an informational process including deed 
notices, warning signs, maps, remedial status reports 
and public health advisories. 
 
The second layer of IC is the Anaconda Deer Lodge 
County Master Plan and Anaconda-Deer Lodge 
County Development Permit System. All new 
development in the impacted area will require a 
County Permit. This permit system provides for 
identification of potential future remediation of 
proposed residential or commercial development at 
the time of development to the appropriate arsenic 
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 levels. 
 
 
The final two layers are not in existence at the time 
of this writing. It is anticipated that the final set of 
ICs will be defined in the last Regional OU. 
 
The third protective layer is control of groundwater. 
It is envisioned that the State of Montana or the local 
water district will establish procedures for managing 
groundwater use. 
 
The fourth layer of control envisioned is specific to 
the area of the site were waste has been left in-place. 
Restrictive covenants, conservation easements and 
dedicated development areas are anticipated to serve 
the foundation for these controls. It is anticipated that 
these restrictive techniques will be designed to: 
- Protect the engineered controls and manage land 
and water use; 
- Implement long-term monitoring;  
- Preserve, to the extent practicable, historic 
features in the Old Works Historic District; and  
- Conduct five-year reviews of selected remedy.  
 Date of Site 
Closure 
   
This OU is covered under the 1994 ROD.  
 
The USEPA issued a Unilateral Administrative Order 
to ARCO in April 1994 to implement the preferred 
alternative remedy. Construction of the Golf Course 
sub-area began in June 1994 and was completed in 
1996. The course was opened for business in May 
1997. Construction in the last sub-area of the OU was 
completed in 2001. 
 
The OU is considered to be in an Interim Status 
because the remediation of groundwater in this area 
has been deferred to the Anaconda Regional Water, 
Waste, & Soils OU. 
 State of Practice at 
that time 
1994 ROD. Active remedial operations completed in 
2001. 
 
 Repair Actions to 
Date 
None noted. 
Graphics  
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline Attached 
Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction (i.e., Construction 
QA/QC) 
Construction QA/QC Plan was in 
place during construction. 
 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan 
  
Yes 
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  Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated system) 
Yes 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
Yes 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, biorem., etc.) 
Yes 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
Yes 
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
Yes, Baseline Risk Assessment 
evaluated ecological risk. 
 Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
Yes 
 Perform Active Monitoring 
 
Yes, bio-monitoring was performed by 
USFW, USEPA and Texas Tech in 
1999-2001. But it does not to appear to 
be an on-going process.  
 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
Yes 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Limited access and signs posted. 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
 
Limited access and signs posted. 
 Detect Security Violations 
 
Informal 
 Deter Security Violations No 
 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
Yes 
 Establish Property-based Controls (i.e., 
Real Estate Provisions, easements, 
covenants, restrictions) 
Yes, County Permit System 
 Maintain Reporting Requirements 
 
Yes 
Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
Yes, via terms of land transfer. 
 
Appears to exclude Golf Course parcel 
due to its economic benefits.  
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
Yes, ARCO funds O&M costs of 
County for lands transferred to County 
unless County obtains an economic 
benefit from the land.  
 Maintain Funding 
(i.e., long-term financial security) 
Yes, but only as long as ARCO exists. 
 
Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders 
 
Yes. Local involvement. Local 
USEPA TAG. 
 Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
Yes, local repository, frequent public 
meetings because operations are still 
active. Some information available 
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 through golf course.  
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
Yes 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
Yes, local repository houses 
Administrative Record.  Includes 
information up to ROD. Periodic fact 
sheets published. 
 
Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users No 
 
 Define Information Requirements Administrative Record is very 
complete. First two 5-year reviews 
were obtained. 
 
 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
None evident. 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
None evident. 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
None evident. 
 Maintain data current with information 
technology platforms 
None evident. 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
Still have on-going remedial 
operations 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
Still have on-going remedial 
operations. 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
Operation & Management (O&M) 
staff located at the site. 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
O&M staff located at the site. 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
Still have on-going remedial 
operations. 
 Define Best Available Technology 
 
Based on results of 1994 ROD. 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of Repair 
versus Replace versus Re-remediate 
Still active remediation in other areas 
of NPL site. 
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 Love Canal Checklist 
Case Study Name: 
 
Love Canal Waste Disposal Facility 
Site Location: 
 
Niagara Falls, NY 
Site Point of 
Contact(s): 
Mr. Michael Basile 
Public Affairs Officer 
USEPA Public Information Office 
Carborundum Center, 
Niagara Falls, NY 
(716) 285-8842 
Location of 
Information: 
University at Buffalo, The State University of New York  
Date of Site Visit: June 10, 2003 
Participants in 
Visit: 
Kevin Kostelnik 
Dr. James Clarke 
Background The origins of Love Canal date back more than 100 years. In the 1890s, 
William T. Love had a vision to create a “model city” in the Niagara Falls 
region of New York State. Love’s plan was to construct a canal between the 
upper and lower reaches of the Falls. Love acquired property rights in the La 
Salle region of the City of Niagara Falls. The clay soils of the area made 
them suitable for construction of the canal. In 1894, construction of the 
canal began with both state and private financial backing. A portion of the 
canal, measuring between ½ to 1 mile was constructed. The canal, however, 
was never finished. The canal unfinished, subsequently served as a 
swimming hole for local residents for some 40 years until another 
entrepreneur arrived on the scene.   
 
Elon H. Hooker began the Hooker Electrochemical Company in the early 
1900s.  Hooker established a very successful company by generating 
chlorine and caustic soda. Hooker’s enterprise grew to be one of the largest 
chemical corporations in America (later known as Occidental Chemical 
Corporation). With this growth came the need to dispose of residues and 
waste. Hooker disposed of waste in the former canal from 1942 through 
1953. 
Site Characteristics 
 Annual 
Precipitation 
 
The 30-year average annual precipitation for the area is 
36 inches.  For the years 1976 and 1977, the average 
annual precipitation was 47 and 50 inches respectively.  
These levels were significantly higher than the average.   
 Surface Waters 
 
The site is within ¼ mile of the Niagara River 
 Aquifer/Ground 
Water  
Residents in the area are on public water supplies.  
Groundwater resources in the area are minimal. 
 Biological 
Indicators 
 
The region is classified as a deciduous mixed forest.  
Vegetation is primarily hickory, oak, ash and maple. 
 
Due to the residential nature of the site the primary 
wildlife include small animals such as squirrel, birds and 
waterfowl. 
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  Annual 
Freeze/Thaw 
Cycles 
Temperatures can range from approximately –10F o to 
90 o F. 
 Ecosystem 
“Value” 
No threatened or endangered species are known to exist 
near this site. 
 Size  The landfill measures approximately 16 acres.  
 
The dimensions of the canal at the time of waste disposal 
measured 3000 feet long and varied from 60 to 80 feet 
wide.  The depth varied from 8 to 16 feet.  Hooker 
conducted disposal operations in the northern section of 
the canal from 1943 through 1946.  The southern portion 
of the canal served the period from 1946 through 1953.  
In addition, Hooker dug a number of disposal pits outside 
of the canal.  These pits measured approximately 40 feet 
by 40 feet and were 25 feet in depth.   
 
After reaching capacity in 1953, Hooker filled the site 
with layers of dirt. 
 
Following remediation the size of the site consists of 70 
acres fenced with a 40-acre clay/synthetic liner cap. 
 Site Geology The impermeable clay soils that made the site suitable for 
holding the canal water were also appealing to Hooker for 
containing the hazardous waste.   
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary 
Contaminants 
of Concern 
 
22,000 tons of chemical waste materials were disposed of 
in the canal. Chlorides, chlorobenzenes, sulfides, dioxin, 
metals, pesticides, phenols, toluenes, xylenes, arsenic, 
chromium, lead and VOCs. 
 Primary 
Exposure 
Routes 
The 1988-ROD determined that the most plausible routes 
of exposure were inhalation or inadvertent ingestion of 
contaminated soil, most likely occurring with children 
playing on the site.  
 Primary Risk 
 
The theoretical cumulative cancer risk for the no-action 
alternative was determined to be 2.4 x 10–4. If the site 
were disturbed without implementing direct contact or 
dust control measures, the cumulative cancer risk was 
estimated to increase to 1.3 x 10-3. 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population 
Density within 
1 mi. 
Approximately 10,000 persons lived within 1 mile of the 
site as of 2003. 
 Population 
Density within 
3 mi. 
Approximately 70,000 persons lived within 3 miles of the 
site as of 2003. 
 Demographic 
Pattern 
 
Beginning as early as 1942, the LaSalle Housing 
Development was established one block from Love 
Canal. By the early 1950s, small single-family homes 
began to surround the rectangular canal site.   
 
 
In 1954 the Niagara Falls Board of Education built the 
99th Street School on the acquired Love Canal property 
(see Land Transfer section). During the initial excavation 
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 for the school waste was encountered. Construction 
continued and the 99th Street School opened in 1955.  In 
addition to this construction project, the Board sold 
portions of the former Love Canal property for residential 
development. Additionally, in 1955, portions of the 
property were used for the construction of streets and 
sidewalks.  Storm sewers were installed at a ten-foot 
depth under sections of Wheatfield and Read Avenue. All 
of these construction activities involved disturbances to 
the clay soils that served as the containment system for 
the original Love Canal disposal cell.   
 Current 
Regional Land 
Use 
The current regional land use remains primarily 
residential. 
 Historic 
Regional Land 
Use 
Residential.  See demographic section. 
 Current Site 
Land Use 
Waste disposal, surrounded by residential areas. 
 Potential 
Alternative 
Land Use(s) 
Portions of the area surrounding the disposal facility are 
now vacant. Alternative uses of these areas are potential 
(i.e., parks and recreation). 
Regulatory Characteristics 
 Principle 
Regulation 
 
The initial response actions were performed under both 
state and federal emergency actions. The U.S. federal 
government enacted new legislation, the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, on 
December 11, 1980. Enactment of this Act was a direct 
result of the attention raised by the Love Canal disaster.    
 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
was also critical in determining alternative treatments and 
land disposal. 
 Current Land 
Owner 
Multiple landowners.  Need further information. 
 
 Land Transfers 
 
As the city’s population increased its infrastructure 
continued to expand to accommodate the demand. In the 
early 1950s the Niagara Falls Board of Education 
approached Hooker with regard to its interest in acquiring 
a portion of the canal lot. The Board was interested in 
acquiring a suitable property for a new school.  Hooker 
informed the Board of the type of waste disposed of in 
the canal and suggested that this site was not suitable for 
excavation or construction. The Board continued its 
pursuit of the site. On at least two occasions Hooker 
appeared at Board meetings to again present their 
warnings. Finally, on April 28, 1953, after further 
discussions, the entire Love Canal property was 
transferred to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for 
$1. Language in the Deed acknowledged that waste was 
buried on the site and released Hooker of all liability and 
risk associated with the site. 
 Former Land 
Owner(s) 
Hooker Chemical Co. (Occidental Chemical Co.) 
City of Niagara Falls (Board of Education) 
227  
  Private Land Owners 
State of New York 
 Potentially 
Responsible 
Parties 
Occidental Chemical Corporation (OCC), formerly 
Hooker; 
US Army 
System Characteristics 
 Engineered 
Barriers 
Description 
 
The site consisted of several operable units resulting in 
several RODS, seven remedial stages and three 
Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD). The 1987 
ROD considered six remedial alternatives for the 
remediation of this site.  The selected remedy called for 
soils excavation, on-site solidification and a low 
permeable cover.     
 
Specifically, the selected remedy required:  
1. Excavation of approximately 7500 cubic yards of 
contaminated soil. 
2. On-site solidification of the excavated material. 
3. Re-disposal of the solidified material back into the 
same unit of contamination. 
4. Treatability studies to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the solidification process. 
5. A low permeability cap installed over the unit of 
contamination. 
 
OCC, USEPA, NY entered into a Partial Consent Decree 
in 1989 to implement portions of the 1987 ROD. In 1990, 
USEPA determined that the excavated materials should 
be classified as RCRA F039 wastes (i.e., wastes 
containing dioxin).  This waste needed to be treated to 
meet the Universal Treatment Standards (UTS) for dioxin 
1 ppb. This treatment was first considered to be 
conducted at the OCC Buffalo Plant. This was later 
changed and treatment was performed by commercial 
facilities. Residues from the treatment were disposed of at 
a RCRA Subtitle C Landfill outside of the State of New 
York. In addition, contaminated sewer and creek 
sediments were analyzed, segregated, treated and 
disposed of.  
 Institutional 
Controls 
Description 
 
Groundwater monitoring program will be established in 
accordance with RCRA. The remedy will be reviewed at 
least every five years in accordance with CERCLA. 
O&M are required for maintaining the groundwater-
monitoring program and maintaining the low permeable 
cover.  
 Date of Site 
Closure 
   
The landfill cover and leachate collection system was 
completed in 1985. The site was deemed construction 
complete on September 29, 1999. The sewer, sediment 
and other waste materials were shipped off-site for 
disposal in 2000. 
 State of 
Practice at that 
time 
1985-1993 
 Repair Actions 
to Date 
Portions of the canal cover required the liner to be 
repaired and replaced.  Also, portions of the cap required 
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  regrading. These short-term remedial actions were 
completed in September 1993. 
Graphics 
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline In 1978, New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (NYSDEC) installed a system to collect 
leachate from the Site. The landfill area was covered and 
fenced and a leachate treatment plant was constructed. In 
1981, the USEPA erected a fence around Black Creek 
and conducted environmental studies. 
 
In 1982, the USEPA selected a remedy to contain the 
landfill by constructing a barrier drain and a leachate 
collection system; covering the temporary clay cap with a 
synthetic material to prevent rain from coming into 
contact with the buried wastes; demolishing the 
contaminated houses adjacent to the landfill and nearby 
school; conducting studies to determine the best way to 
proceed with further site cleanup; and, monitoring to 
ensure the cleanup activities are effective. In 1985, 
NYSDEC installed the 40-acre cap and improved the 
leachate collection and treatment system. With the first 
Record of Decision (ROD) in May 1985, the USEPA 
implemented a remedy to remediate the sewers and the 
creeks that included 1) hydraulically cleaning the sewers; 
2) removal and disposal of the contaminated sediments; 
3) inspecting the sewers for defects that could allow 
contaminants to migrate; 4) limiting access, dredging and 
hydraulically cleaning the Black Creek culverts; and, 5) 
removing and storing Black and Bergholtz creeks' 
contaminated sediments. In 1986 the state cleaned 62,000 
linear feet of storm and sanitary sewers. An additional 
6,000 feet were cleaned in 1987.  
 
In 1989, Black and Bergholtz creeks were dredged of 
approximately 14,000 cubic yards of sediments. Clean 
riprap was placed in the creek beds, and the banks were 
replanted with grass. Prior to final disposal, the sewer and 
creek sediments and other wastes (33,500 cubic yards) 
were stored at OCC’s Niagara Falls RCRA-permitted 
facilities. 
 
In October 1987, as identified in a second ROD, the 
USEPA selected a remedy to address the destruction and 
disposal of the dioxin-contaminated sediments from the 
sewers and creeks: 1) construction of an onsite facility to 
dewater and contain the sediments; 2) construction of a 
separate facility to treat the dewatered contaminants 
through high temperature thermal destruction; 3) thermal 
treatment of the residuals stored at the site from the 
leachate treatment facility and other associated Love 
Canal waste materials; and, 4) on-site disposal of any 
nonhazardous residuals from the thermal treatment or 
incineration process.  
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In 1989, OCC, USEPA and the State of New York 
entered into a partial consent decree (PCD) to address 
some of the required remedial actions, i.e., the 
processing, bagging and storage of the creek sediments, 
as well as other Love Canal wastes, including the sewer 
sediments. Also, in 1989, the USEPA published an 
Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD), which 
provided for these sediments and other remedial wastes to 
be thermally treated at OCC's facilities rather than at the 
site. In November 1996, a second ESD was issued to 
address a further modification of the 1987-ROD to 
include off-site USEPA-approved thermal treatment 
and/or land disposal of the stored Love Canal waste 
materials. In December 1998, a third ESD was issued to 
announce a 10-ppb treatability variance for dioxin for the 
stored Love Canal waste materials. The sewer and creek 
sediments and other waste materials were subsequently 
shipped off-site for final disposal; this remedial action 
was deemed complete in March 2000. 
 
A 1988 ROD selected a remedy for the 93rd Street 
School property including the excavation of 
approximately 7500 cubic yards of contaminated soil 
adjacent to the school followed by on-site solidification 
and stabilization. This remedy was reevaluated as a result 
of concerns raised by the NFBE, regarding the future 
reuse of the property.  An amendment to the original 
1988 ROD was issued in May 1991; the subsequent 
selected remedy was excavation and off-site disposal of 
the contaminated soils. This remedial action was 
completed in September 1992. Subsequently, Love Canal 
Area Revitalization Agency (LCARA) purchased the 93rd 
Street School property from the NFBE and demolished 
the building. (Region 2 Summary) 
Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction  
(i.e., Construction QA/QC) 
Construction QA/QC Plan was in place 
during construction. 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan 
  
Yes 
 Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
GW monitoring 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
GW monitoring. 
State Rehabilitation Study 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, biorem., etc.) 
Yes 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
Yes 
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
None observed 
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  Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
NA 
 Perform Active Monitoring NA 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
 
NA 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Yes 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
Physical access is limited by locked 
fence.  Project staff is located at site 
during work hours.   
 Detect Security Violations 
 
NA 
 Deter Security Violations 
 
NA 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
Yes 
 Establish Property-based Controls 
(i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
The federal government and the State of 
New York purchased the affected 
properties. LCARA is the coordinating 
New York State agency in charge of 
maintaining, rehabilitating and selling 
the affected properties. Pursuant to 
Section 312 of CERCLA, as amended, 
the USEPA has been providing funds to 
LCARA for the maintenance of those 
properties and for the technical 
assistance. The USEPA awards these 
funds to LCARA directly through an 
USEPA cooperative agreement for home 
maintenance and technical assistance. 
The rehabilitation and sale of these 
homes have been completed. Since the 
rehabilitation program began, 
approximately 260 homes have been 
sold. Also, a new senior citizen housing 
development has been constructed on 
vacant property in the habitable portion 
of the area. (Region 2 Summary) 
 Maintain Reporting Requirements OCC performs monitoring and reports to 
State of New York and USEPA. 
Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
OCC is performing active maintenance.  
But likely does not include emergency 
contingency. 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
Corporate budget for O&M.  This has not 
yet been verified. 
 Maintain Funding 
(i.e., long-term financial security) 
OCC funds operations and maintenance 
efforts. 
 
Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders High profile site. Very active local 
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  involvement in 70s and 80s. Major 
participants have left the area. Little local 
interest/excitement observed.  Currently 
celebrating the 25th anniversary. 
 Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
No information obtained concerning 
current local involvement.  
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
No 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
Local public reading rooms house 
Administrative Record. Includes 
information up to ROD. 
Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users 
 
No 
 Define Information Requirements 
 
Information appears limited to that 
defined in the ROD.  No 5-year reviews 
obtained yet. 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified. 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
No 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified. 
 Maintain data current with 
information technology platforms 
No historic data located yet. 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
None observed on site. 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
None observed on site. 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
Operation & Management (O&M) staff 
located at the site. 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
O&M staff located at the site. 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
Appears OCC has this responsibility.  
 Define Best Available Technology Based on results of 1988 ROD 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of 
Repair versus Replace versus Re-
remediate 
Not obvious. 
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 Maxey Flats Checklist 
Case Study Name: Maxey Flats Disposal Site 
Site Location: 
 
 
Hillsboro, KY; 
Fleming County 
Site Point of 
Contact(s): 
 
Omar Heath, Department for Environmental Protection, 
Division of Waste Management,  
Maxey Flats Project, 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 
Route 2, Box 238A 
Hillsboro, KY 41049 
(606) 784-6612 
(606) 784-7862 fax 
Location of 
Information: 
Morehead State University Library and  
Maxey Flats Project Office 
Date of Site Visit: June 6, 2003 
Participants in Visit: 
 
Kevin Kostelnik 
Dr. James Clarke 
Dr. Ann Clarke 
Background Maxey Flats was used for low-level radioactive waste disposal from 1963 
until December 1977. Approximately 4.8 million cubic feet of Low Level 
Waste containing more than 2.4 million curies of activity was disposed of 
in 52 trenches on site. 
 
Trenches were unlined and measured 15 to 670 feet long, 10 to 70 feet 
wide and 10 to 35 feet deep. Problems began to arise in the early 1970s.   
 
The site has a low permeability. Continuous subsidence in the soil cap, 
which was ~3 feet in depth, produced infiltration routes. Water 
accumulation in the trenches was observed. Subsequently, this leachate 
migrated from the trenches. Contamination was detected 300 feet from 
source trenches prompting site closure. 
Site Characteristics 
 Annual Precipitation 
 
Average annual precipitation 
measured 44.3 inches for the period 
1941-1970. 
 Surface Waters 
 
The site is located on a large terrace 
some 280-350 feet above the valley 
floor.   
 
Two perennial streams are located 
adjacent to the site.  Rock Lick Creek 
runs to the south of the site.  Crane 
Creek runs along the north. 
 Aquifer/Ground Water  
 
Groundwater resources in the area are 
very limited.  Groundwater quality is 
considered poor. Since 1985, residents 
in the area are on public supplies.  
Prior to 1985, residents used shallow 
wells. 
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  Biological Indicators 
 
The region is classified as deciduous, 
evergreen and mixed forest.  
Vegetation is primarily hickory, oak, 
ash and maple. Wildlife include deer, 
turkey, squirrel, waterfowl, etc.  
 Annual Freeze/Thaw Cycles 
 
The area is classified as temperate 
continental. 
 
Temperatures can range from 100o F 
to –22o F. 
 Ecosystem “Value” 
 
No threatened or endangered species 
are known to exist near this site. 
 Size  The site originally involved 
approximately 40 acres of disposal 
trenches and 280 acres of land.   
 
Following remediation the size of the 
site consists of 55 acres of disposal 
trenches and a total of 800 acres 
(expanded buffer zone). 
 Site Geology Clay-rich soils range from 1- to 15-
feet deep.  The underlying geology 
consists of shale interbedded with 
lenses of fine-grained sandstone and 
siltstone.   
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary Contaminants of 
Concern 
 
Radionuclides: plutonium-238, 
plutonium-239/240, strontium-90, 
tritium, uranium-235, uranium-238, 
cobalt-60, carbon-14.  
 
Chemicals: benzene, toluene, xylenes, 
arsenic, cyanide 
 Primary Exposure Routes 
 
Groundwater (i.e., the off-site 
exposure Well Water pathway in the 
dominant pathway as determined in 
the baseline risk assessment.)  Tritium 
is the critical radionuclide. 
 Primary Risk 
 
Off-Site 
The total dose equivalent from all 
combined off-site pathways (in the no 
action scenario) would be 75 mrem 
per year for the average case. The 
upper bound estimate from such a 
scenario would be 4300 mrem. The 
average lifetime risk of cancer from 
prolonged exposure from off-site 
pathways would be approximately 1 x 
10-3.  The upper bound is 6 x 10-2. 
 
On-Site 
Various intruder/trespasser scenarios 
were considered in the ROD. The 
direct exposure pathway was most 
critical if the cap is disturbed. The 
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 lifetime risk of cancer approaches 1 
for prolonged exposures. This risk is 
reduced by a factor of 3 if the 100-
year institutional control period is 
assumed to be successful. 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population Density within 1 mi. 
 
Approximately 152 persons lived 
within 1 mile of the site as of 1991. 
 Population Density within 2.5 
mi. 
Approximately 663 persons lived 
within 2.5 miles of the site as of 1991. 
 Demographic Pattern 
 
The regional population is projected to 
increase by 15% through 2020. The 
estimated population living within 2.5 
miles of the site by 2020 is 767. 
Nearest municipality is Morehead, KY 
located 10 miles southeast of the site. 
 Current Regional Land Use 
 
The area is primarily mixed 
woodlands, open farmland, agriculture 
and rural residential. 
 Historic Regional Land Use 
 
Agriculture, rural residential 
 Current Site Land Use 
 
Waste disposal. Surrounding forested 
area serves as a buffer zone. 
 Potential Alternative Land Use(s) 
 
None 
Regulatory Characteristics 
 Principle Regulation 
 
The site was placed on the NPL in 
1986 to be remediated under 
CERCLA. The Record of Decision 
was finalized September 1991. 
  
A Consent Decree was signed July 
1995 by the settling private parties, 
the settling federal agencies, the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky and 
USEPA.  
 Current Land Owner 
 
Commonwealth of Kentucky 
 Land Transfers 
 
The Commonwealth of Kentucky 
owned the property since disposal 
practices began.   
During the operational phase the 
Commonwealth leased (25 year lease 
with options for 25 more years) the 
property (January 1963) to Nuclear 
Engineering Company, Inc. In 1977, 
the State of Kentucky repurchased the 
leasehold estate. 
 Former Land Owner(s) 
 
Owned by State of Kentucky. Leased 
to Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. 
for original waste disposal.   
 Potentially Responsible Parties 
 
823 potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs). In 1987, 82 PRPs formed the 
Maxey Flats Steering Committee to 
perform the RI/FS. 
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 System Characteristics 
 Engineered Barriers Description 
 
The selected remedy calls for “natural 
stabilization.” The initial closure of 
the site includes grading the site then 
capping it to prevent infiltration. The 
initial cap consists of a layer of 
compacted clay (21 inches) and a 40-
mm synthetic liner. 
 
Monitoring wells are located under the 
cap in the trenches to detect the degree 
of infiltration. Additional monitoring 
wells are located around the perimeter 
of the site. 
 Institutional Controls Description 
 
Following the initial site closure, the 
selected remedy has a 100-year 
“interim maintenance period,” which 
is then followed by the final closure 
and custodial maintenance (in 
perpetuity). 
 
The interim maintenance period 
involves the establishment of a buffer 
zone around the site, posting of signs 
and fences, active maintenance, 
groundwater monitoring. 
 Date of Site Closure 
   
Interim cap completed 2003. 
 State of Practice at that time 
 
Current 
 Repair Actions to Date 
 
QA check done on cap integrity and 
cap sealed.  No major repairs required 
to date. 
Graphics 
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline See five-year review. 
Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction  
(i.e., Construction Quality 
Assurance/Quality Control). 
Construction QA/QC Plan was in place 
during construction. 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan 
  
Yes 
 Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
GW monitoring 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
For GW monitoring only. 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, biorem., etc.) 
None 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
As needed, no major post-ROD repairs 
required to date. 
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 Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
  
None being monitored. Since no 
contamination is observed in streams fish 
monitoring is no longer performed. 
 Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
NA 
 Perform Active Monitoring 
 
NA 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
NA 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Yes 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
Physical access is limited by locked 
fence.  Project staff is located at site 
during work hours.   
 Detect Security Violations 
 
NA 
 Deter Security Violations 
 
NA 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
Yes 
 Establish Property-based Controls 
(i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
Property ownership is under the direct 
control of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky.  Five-year review notes that 
Deed Restrictions are in place.  
 Maintain Reporting Requirements 
 
Property ownership is under the direct 
control of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky.   
Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
Annual maintenance budget.  But likely 
does not include emergency contingency. 
 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
State Trust Fund has been established per 
discussion with Omar Heath.   
 Maintain Funding 
(i.e., long-term financial security) 
State Trust Fund has been established per 
discussion with Omar Heath.   
Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders 
 
Local interest group formed during 
RI/FS. 
 Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
 
Involved group during RI/FS through 
Initial Closure Period. No information 
available concerning involvement during 
Interim Maintenance Period.  
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
No 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
 
Local public reading rooms house 
Administrative Record. Includes 
information up to ROD. Periodic USEPA 
fact sheets published. 
Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users 
 
No 
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  Define Information Requirements 
 
Information is limited to that defined in 
the ROD. 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified. 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
No 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified. 
 Maintain data current with 
information technology platforms 
No historic information yet. 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
Staff located at the site. 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
Site is currently adjusting its 
infrastructure for maintenance and 
operations. 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
Staff located at the site. 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
Staff located at the site. 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
Maxey Flats Project Office appears to 
have the responsibility for total site 
management.   
 Define Best Available Technology 
 
Based on results of 1991 ROD. 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of 
Repair versus Replace versus Re-
remediate 
No 
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 Rocky Mountain Arsenal Checklist 
Case Study Name: 
 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
Site Location: 
 
Commerce City, (Denver) CO 
Site Point of Contact(s): Mr. Tom Jackson 
(303) 289-0232 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Agency  
Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
Commerce City, CO 
Location of Information: 
 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal  
Technical Information Center (Ms. Amira Hamdy) 
Commerce City, CO 
(303) 289-0342 
Date of Site Visit: 
 
September 10, 2003 
Participants in Visit: 
 
Kevin Kostelnik 
 
Background 
 
 
Following WWII, portions of the South Plants complex were 
leased to private industry for the manufacture of chemicals and 
pesticides. Nine companies operated manufacturing operations at 
the South Plants between 1946 and 1982 including three primary 
leases. These included the Julius Hyman and Company from 
1947-1952, the Shell Chemical Company from 1952-1982 and 
Colorado Fuel and Iron from 1946 to 1948. Waste generated at 
RMA throughout the 40s, 50s and 60s was disposed on on-site in 
basins, pits, trenches and burn pits. Liquid waste from RMA was 
often treated and discharged into catch basins. In 1961, the Army 
drilled a 12,045-foot-deep injection well.  From 1961 until 1966 
approximately 165 million gallons of treated effluent waste was 
disposed of in this manner. 
The USEPA, Army, Shell and the Colorado Department of Health 
signed a Memorandum of Agreement on December 6, 1982 to 
investi
An Act of Congress created the Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) 
in 1942. RMA was established to manufacture chemical warfare 
agents for use in World War II. Manufacturing operations began 
in 1942 at the South Plants complex. Initial products included 
mustard gas, lewisite and chlorine gas. In 1952, the Army initiated 
operations at the North Plants complex. North Plants 
manufactured the nerve agent GB (i.e., Sarin) from 1953 until 
1957. Demilitarization of GB munitions began at the North Plants 
in the early 1970s.  
Various incendiary munitions were also manufactured at RMA. 
These included M-47 bombs filled with napalm gel and M-74 
bomblets filled with a mixture of agents. Munitions were 
manufactured at RMA in support of WWII, the Korean War and 
the Vietnam War. 
 
gate the decontamination of RMA. Throughout the 80s and 
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 into the 90s numerous legal actions and lawsuits were pursued. In 
1992, Congress enacted the Rocky Mountain Arsenal National 
Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992. This Public Law #102-402 
designated the transfer of RMA from the Army to the Department 
of Interior and designated the site as a unit within our National 
Wildlife Refuge system. 
Site Characteristics 
 Annual Precipitation 
 
The average annual precipitation 
for the area is 15 inches.   
 Surface Waters 
Note: With development of Denver 
International Airport and 
surroundings, First Creek is 
expected to change from an 
intermittent stream to a perennial 
stream.  This will complicate RMA 
management strategies. 
 
The site has a network of streams, 
lakes and canals.  Four drainage 
basins are recognized. These 
include First Creek, Irondale Gulch, 
Sand Creek and Second Creek. 
Streamflow is variable but is 
generally intermittent. 
 
 Aquifer/Ground Water  
 
Residents in the area are on public 
water supplies.  
 
Groundwater flow within the 
uppermost weathered, alluvium 
portion of the Denver Formation 
has been designated as the 
Unconfined Flow System (UFS).  
This system is separated from 
deeper water-bearing units that are 
designated as the Confined Flow 
System  (CFS).  Some interchange 
between systems is possible.   
 Biological Indicators 
 
RMA is classified as a temperate 
grassland region.  This area is 
considered as a transition zone 
between mountain and plains 
habitat.   
 
As of 1996, 88% of RMA was 
vegetated. Vegetation is a 
combination of early successional 
plant communities (41%), crested 
wheatgrass (19%) and a mix (28%) 
of shrubland, riparian woodland, 
marshes, wetlands and deciduous 
tree groves. 
 
RMA has a large wildlife 
community and is designated as a 
U.S. Wildlife Refuge. Wildlife is 
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 dominated by species of prairie, 
steppe and savanna communities. 
26 species of mammals and 176 
species of birds have been observed 
on RMA. Included are populations 
of deer, bald eagles, hawks, 
waterfowl and the rare Cassin’s and 
Brewer’s sparrows.  
 Annual Freeze/Thaw Cycles 
 
Mean maximum temperature (88oF) 
are observed in July while the mean 
minimum temperature (16oF) is 
observed in January. 
 Ecosystem “Value” 
 
RMA has a large wildlife 
community and is designated as a 
U.S. Wildlife Refuge. Wildlife is 
dominated by species of prairie, 
steppe and savanna communities. 
26 species of mammals and 176 
species of birds have been observed 
on RMA. Included are populations 
of deer, bald eagles, hawks, 
waterfowl and the rare Cassin’s and 
Brewer’s sparrows. 
 Size  The RMA encompasses a 27 square 
mile area (17,000 acres). Upon 
closure 2000 acres will be 
contained within an inner fence and 
USDOD will be responsible. The 
surrounding 15,000 acres will be 
managed by USDOI as a wildlife 
refuge controlled at outer fence.  
 Site Geology RMA lies within the Denver Basin.  
The entire site is covered with 
unconsolidated alluvial and 
windblown sediments. Depth of 
these materials is approximately 
130 feet.   
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary Contaminants of 
Concern 
 
More than 600 chemicals have been 
associated with activities at RMA. 
Principal contaminants include: 
organochlorine pesticides, metals 
(arsenic, mercury) and chlorinated 
and aromatic solvents. Human 
health risks are associated with four 
chemicals: aldrin, dieldrin, DBCP 
and arsenic. 
 Primary Exposure Routes 
 
The 1996 ROD determined that the 
most plausible routes of human 
exposure were consumption, 
dermal contact and inhalation. The 
highest risks are associated with the 
central portions of RMA where 
chemical processing and disposal 
occurred. 
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  Primary Risk 
 
The theoretical cumulative cancer 
risk for the no-action alternative 
was determined to be greater than      
1 x 10–4. 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population Density within 1 mi. 
 
Approximately 21,000 people lived 
within 1 mile (e.g., Commerce 
City) of the site as of 2000. 
 Population Density within 10 mi. 
 
Approximately 555,000 people 
lived within 10 miles (e.g., Denver) 
of the site as of 2000. 
 
 
Conversion of rural lands to urban 
areas is expected to increase 
surface runoff and thereby 
transform intermittent streams to 
perennial streams.  
Demographic Pattern 
 
The surrounding population is 
increasing.  RMA is located 
approximately 8 miles from the 
City of Denver.  Directly adjacent 
to RMA is Commerce City.  East of 
RMA is the new Denver 
International Airport.  
 
Also as the result of Commerce 
City’s growth (i.e., population 
expansion north of RMA), original 
plans to locate the visitor center in 
the southwest portion of RMA are 
being reconsidered. 
 Current Regional Land Use 
 
The current regional land use is a 
combination of industrial, 
residential and rural.  RMA proper 
has been retained in federal 
ownership since 1942.  Therefore 
RMA has retained a degree of 
separation from the surrounding 
influences. 
 Historic Regional Land Use 
 
The historical regional land use in 
the direct vicinity of RMA has been 
ranchland and agricultural.  
Although the site has always been 
in close proximity to the City of 
Denver (i.e., 8 miles) and 
Commerce City (i.e., immediate). 
 Current Site Land Use 
 
Waste disposal in the central 
portion of RMA.  Wildlife refuge in 
the surrounding portions (i.e., 
doughnut configuration). 
 Potential Alternative Land Use(s) 
 
None foreseen as a result of the 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal National 
Wildlife Refuge Act of 1992.  
Regulatory Characteristics 
 Principle Regulation The response actions are performed 
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  under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA). 
 
The Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
National Wildlife Refuge Act of 
1992, Public Law 102-402, was 
also enacted to govern this site. 
 
The Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) plays a role 
in determining alternative 
treatments and land disposal 
practices. 
 US Army, US Fish and Wildlife 
Service 
Current Land Owner 
 
 Land Transfers 
 
None, although several companies 
(i.e., Julius Hyman and Company 
1947-52, Shell Chemical 1952-82, 
Colorado Fuel and Iron 1952-82) 
leased property for their operations. 
 Former Land Owner(s) US Army 
 
 
 
US Army, Shell Oil Company Potentially Responsible Parties 
System Characteristics 
 Engineered Barriers Description The remedial actions for RMA fall 
under CERCLA and are 
incorporated into two operable 
units. The On-post OU addresses 
contamination within the fenced in 
27 square miles of RMA proper. 
The Off-post OU addresses 
contamination outside of the RMA 
site. 
 
 
The On-post OU addresses 3000 
acres of soil, 15 groundwater 
plumes and 798 structures. The 
selected remedy requires: continued 
operation of groundwater treatment 
systems, maintaining lake surface 
water levels to support aquatic 
ecosystems, continued monitoring 
of surface and groundwater, 
construction of a Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA) compliant 
landfill, demolition and disposal 
on-site of contaminated structures, 
in situ stabilization of contaminated 
soils at Former Basin F, in situ 
thermal treatment of Hex Pit waste, 
and excavation and on-site disposal 
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 of contaminated soils and debris in 
a triple-lined RCRA-compliant 
landfill.  
 Institutional Controls (IC) 
Description 
 
Final Interim Institutional Plan was 
published February 2003. Plan 
defines the following ICs: Land 
Use Controls:  residential 
development is prohibited, 
groundwater and surface water use 
as a potable source is prohibited, 
fish and game consumption is 
prohibited. Preservation: wildlife 
habitats are to be preserved, 
hydrogeologic characteristics are to 
be protected. Access Control via 
multiple and redundant layers. 
Perimeter fence with controlled 
access points. Second inner layer is 
the Central Remediation Area 
(CRA) restricted to workers. (A 
third inner layer is the exclusion 
zones established for worker 
protection.). GW monitoring wells 
are protected via signs. Army is 
responsible for ongoing operations 
and maintenance. 
Off-site ICs include notices of well 
restrictions. 
 
A Wildlife Management Plan will 
be developed by USFW. This will 
include protective measures for 
caps and covers. 
 
 
Additional institutional 
responsibilities include: Acquisition 
and delivery of 4000 acre-feet of 
potable water to the South Adams 
County Water and Sanitation 
District (SACWSD), Establishment 
of a Trust Fund to cover an RMA 
Medical Monitoring Program (as of 
2003 this was not yet established), 
Five-year reviews. 
 Date of Site Closure 
   
1996 ROD. Active remedial 
operations expected through 2011. 
 State of Practice at that time 
 
1996 ROD. Active remedial 
operations expected through 2011. 
 Repair Actions to Date 
 
Still active operations. 
Graphics 
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline Developed 
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 Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction  
(i.e., Construction QA/QC) 
Construction QA/QC Plan was in place 
during construction. 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan Yes 
 Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
Yes 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
Yes 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, biorem., etc.) 
Yes 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
Yes 
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
Yes 
 Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
Yes 
 Perform Active Monitoring 
 
Yes 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
Yes 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Yes 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
 
Yes   
 Detect Security Violations 
 
Yes 
 Deter Security Violations 
 
Yes 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
Yes 
 Establish Property-based Controls 
(i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
Yes 
 Maintain Reporting Requirements 
 
Yes 
Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  Yes 
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
Yes, appropriations. 
 Maintain Funding 
(i.e., long-term financial security) 
Annual appropriations. 
 
Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders 
 
High profile site.  Active local 
involvement. 
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  Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
Yes, visitor center and active visitor 
program.  
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
Yes 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
Yes, visitor center and active visitor 
program. Local public reading rooms 
house AR. 
 
Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users 
 
Yes 
 Define Information Requirements 
 
Administrative record is very complete.  
First 5-year review was obtained. 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
Yes 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
Yes 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
Yes 
 Maintain data current with 
information technology platforms 
Yes 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
Yes 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
Yes, but still have on-going remedial 
operations. 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
O&M staff located at the site. 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
O&M staff located at the site. 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
USDOI will have this responsibility after 
final remediation.  
 Define Best Available Technology 
 
Based on results of 1996 ROD. 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of 
Repair versus Replace versus Re-
remediate 
Still active remediation. 
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 Spring Valley Checklist 
Case Study 
Name: 
Spring Valley 
Site Location: 
 
Washington, D.C. 
Site Point of 
Contact(s): 
George Arnold 
 
American University,  
University Archivist 
202-885-3255 
Location of 
Information: 
American University 
Bender Library 
Date of Site Visit: April 17, 2002 
Participants in 
Visit: 
Kevin Kostelnik 
Dr. Jerry Harbour 
Site Characteristics 
 Annual Precipitation 
 
The average annual precipitation for the area is 39 
inches.   
 Surface Waters 
 
The site is located in a residential/university suburb 
of Washington, D.C. Much of the area has been 
modified to control surface runoff. Drainage is to 
storm drains although a number of small 
intermittent streams still cross the area.   
 Aquifer/Groundwater Residents in the area are on public water supplies.  
 Biological Indicators 
 
The site is located in a residential/university suburb 
of Washington, D.C. Wildlife is limited to various 
species of birds and small mammals. 
 Annual Freeze/Thaw 
Cycles 
Temperatures range from approximately 87oF to 
27oF. 
 Ecosystem “Value” 
 
The site is located in a residential/university suburb 
of Washington, D.C. Wildlife is limited to various 
species of birds and small mammals. 
 Size  The Spring Valley area encompasses a 660-acre 
area.  American University encompasses 
approximately 90 acres. 
 Site Geology The Spring Valley site involves four geologic 
formations, the Sykeville Formation, the Dalecarlia 
Intrusive Suite, the Anctinolite Schist and the 
Coastal Plain Terrace Formation. 
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary 
Contaminants of 
Concern 
 
The primary health risks are associated with the 
presence of unexploded, leaking ordnance and 
containers of chemical warfare agents. Additional 
risk is associated with soils contaminated from 
chemical warfare agents. Arsenic is the predominant 
contaminant, although health risk studies are 
ongoing. 
 Primary Exposure 
Routes 
 
Health risk studies are ongoing. Plausible routes of 
human exposure could be consumption, dermal 
contact and inhalation. The highest risks should be 
associated with areas of ordnance/chemical 
disposal. 
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  Primary Risk 
 
Health risk studies are ongoing. 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population Density 
within 1 mi. 
Approximately 13,000 people live within the Spring 
Valley neighborhood. 
 Demographic Pattern 
 
The surrounding population is increasing. Spring 
Valley is within the District of Columbia.  
 Current Regional 
Land Use 
 
The current regional land use is residential, 
commercial and urban. Small pockets of woodlots 
remain within the neighborhood. 
 Historic Regional 
Land Use 
 
At the time American University was established 
(i.e., 1890) the area was predominantly rural 
farmland. This area later began to develop into 
residential land use. 
 Current Site Land 
Use 
 
The current regional land use is residential, 
commercial and urban. Small pockets of woodlots 
remain within the neighborhood. 
 Potential Alternative 
Land Use(s) 
None foreseen.   
Regulatory Characteristics 
 Principle Regulation 
 
Response actions at Spring Valley are being 
performed by the Army Corps of Engineers under 
their Defense Environmental Restoration Program 
(DERP). DERP was established under the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA) of 1986 to identify, investigate and clean-
up environmental contamination at formerly used 
defense sites (FUDS). The Corps coordinates its 
efforts with the USEPA, which has authority to act 
at the site via Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) of 1980.  The District of Columbia, 
where Spring Valley is located, also plays a key role 
in making recommendations. 
 Current Land Owner American University, individual homeowners. 
 
 Land Transfers 
 
The Methodist Episcopal Church acquired 90 acres 
in 1889 to establish American University. The 
University properties, and surrounding lands, were 
leased to the U.S. government from 1917-1921. 
Portions of the properties were again leased to the 
U.S. government from 1937-1941. Areas 
surrounding the university were developed over the 
past century and approximately 1200 homes now 
occupy the property around American University.  
 Former Land 
Owner(s) 
Davis Farms 
American University 
 Potentially 
Responsible Parties 
US Army 
System Characteristics 
 Engineered Barriers 
Description 
Shallow land disposal. 
  
 Institutional Controls 
Description 
None 
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  Date of Site Closure 
   
The properties were returned to the University in 
1921.  
Active remedial operations are still occurring today. 
 State of Practice at 
that time 
Disposal in 1920 consisted of shallow land disposal. 
Active remedial operations are still occurring today. 
 Repair Actions to 
Date 
Still active remediation, investigations and 
operations. 
Graphics 
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline Completed 
Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction (i.e., QA/QC) 
No 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan 
  
No, broad area survey of 1483 properties 
initiated in 2002. 
 Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
No 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
No 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, biorem., etc.) 
No 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
Yes, active remediations. 
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
No 
 Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
Yes 
 Perform Active Monitoring 
 
Yes 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
Yes 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Yes, at active remediation sites. 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
Yes, at active remediation sites. 
 Detect Security Violations 
 
Yes, at active remediation sites. 
 Deter Security Violations 
 
Yes, at active remediation sites. 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
On-going through legal actions. 
 
 
 Establish Property-based Controls 
(i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
No 
 Maintain Reporting Requirements 
 
No 
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 Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
On-going through legal actions. 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
On-going through legal actions. 
 Maintain Funding 
(i.e., long-term financial security) 
Remediation appears to be funded 
through annual appropriations of Corps. 
Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders 
 
High profile site.  Active local 
involvement. 
 Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
Yes, local reading rooms, newsletters 
and public meetings. 
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
None obvious. 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
Yes, local reading rooms, newsletters 
and public meetings. 
Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users 
 
No 
 Define Information Requirements 
 
Historically no; a lot of information 
surfaced through families of men serving 
at AUES. 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
None obvious, although assume Corps 
has ongoing Administrative Record. 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
None obvious, although assume Corps 
has ongoing Administrative Record. 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
None obvious, although assume Corps 
has ongoing Administrative Record. 
 Maintain data current with 
information technology platforms 
None obvious, although assume Corps 
has ongoing Administrative Record. 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
Site is being remediated under non-time 
critical removal actions. 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
None obvious 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
None obvious 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
None obvious 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
None obvious 
 
 Define Best Available Technology 
 
Still active remediation. 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of 
Repair versus Replace versus Re-
remediate 
Still active remediation. 
 
  
250  
 Canonsburg Checklist 
Case Study 
Name: 
 
Canonsburg Uranium Mill Tailing Disposal Site 
Site Location: 
 
Canonsburg, PA 
Site Point of 
Contact(s): Department for Energy, 
S.M. Stoller,   
Carl Jacobson, Grand Junction Project Office,  
Grand Junction, CO, 81503 
970-248-6040 
Location of 
Information: 
Grand Junction Project Office 
Date of Site 
Visit: 
June 13, 2003 
Participants in 
Visit: 
Kevin Kostelnik 
 
Background The Canonsburg disposal cell was used for disposal of residual radioactive 
material (RRM) resulting from the processing of uranium ore. The cell 
contains 376,100 cubic yards (i.e., 226,000 tons) of RRM. The average 
radioactivity of the tailings is 2315 pCi/g 226Ra.  The total cell radioactivity is 
100 Ci 226Ra.   
Site Characteristics 
 Annual Precipitation 
 
Average annual precipitation for the Canonsburg, 
PA area is 37 inches.  
 
 
Surface Waters 
 
The Canonsburg Disposal cell is directly 
bordered by Chartiers Creek (i.e., perennial 
stream) on the north, east and west. The water 
quality of the stream is considered poor in the 
vicinity of the site. 
Residents in the area are on public supplies. 
These public supplies rely on surface water 
upstream from the site. 
 Aquifer/Ground Water  
 
Groundwater occurs in the unconsolidated fill at 
a depth of 3 to 14 feet at the site. Groundwater 
resources in the area are minimal.  
 
Residents in the area are on public supplies. 
These public supplies rely on surface water 
upstream from the site. 
 Biological Indicators 
 
 
Vegetation is generally deciduous mixed forest 
consisting of primarily mixed oak, ash and 
maple. 
 
Wildlife include deer, squirrel, waterfowl, etc.  
There are no known threatened or endangered 
species in the area. 
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  Annual Freeze/Thaw 
Cycles 
The region is classified as a humid continental 
climate. Temperatures generally range from 
100oF to 0oF. 
 Ecosystem “Value” 
 
No threatened or endangered species are known 
to exist near this site. 
 Size  The original site involved approximately 18.6 
acres.  Contaminated material from this site, as 
well as 163 vicinity properties (i.e., 30 acres), 
was consolidated and stabilized into a 6-acre on-
site disposal cell.  
 Site Geology The geology of the site consists of approximately 
30 feet of unconsolidated alluvium that overlies 
claystone and shales of the Pennsylvanian 
Casselman Formation. 
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary Contaminants of 
Concern 
 
Uranium tailings contain small concentrations of 
naturally occurring materials that radioactively 
decays to radium and produces radon, a 
radioactive gas. In addition, trace metals 
associated with the ore and chemicals used 
during the milling process are present. 
 Primary Exposure Routes 
 
Groundwater contamination of surface water. 
 Primary Risk 
 
A copy of the Baseline Risk Assessment has 
been requested from Grand Junction. 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population Density within 
1 mi. 
As of 1990 the population of the Borough of 
Canonsburg was approximately 9200.   
 Demographic Pattern 
 
The immediate population appears stable.   
The site lies is the Borough of Canonsburg, 20 
miles southwest from Pittsburgh, PA. The 
regional population is also stable.   
 Current Regional Land 
Use 
 
The immediate area is primarily residential. 
 Historic Regional Land 
Use 
 
The immediate area was industrial and 
residential.  
 Current Site Land Use 
 
Waste disposal, surrounded by residential. 
 
 Potential Alternative Land 
Use(s) 
None 
Regulatory Characteristics 
 Principle Regulation 
 
The principle regulation is the Uranium Mill 
Tailings Radiation Control Act. The Uranium 
Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) 
of 1978 was designed to clean up 24 abandoned 
mill tailing sites that had processed uranium and 
related ores for the federal government. Under 
the UMTRCA, the USEPA was directed to set 
general standards for the cleanup at these sites 
and vicinity properties. These are contained in 
the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40, Part 
192.   
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 UMTRCA authorized the USDOE to clean up the 
sites to meet USEPA standards. UMTRCA also 
authorized the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (USNRC) to oversee and certify the 
cleanup and license the completed disposal cell. 
Remedial actions at UMTRCA sites must also 
comply with the USEPA ground water protection 
standards published in the Federal Register in 
January 1995. 
 Current Land Owner 
 
U.S. federal government (USDOE) is the current 
landowner. The site is currently managed within 
the US DOE Long-term Surveillance and 
Monitoring Program by the DOE Grand Junction 
Project Office (DOE-GJO) under license (1996) 
to the USNRC. 
 
Site C was donated to the Borough of 
Canonsburg by the State of Pennsylvania. 
 Land Transfers 
 
The Canonsburg site was owned and operated as 
a radium extraction plant by Standard Chemical 
from 1911 to 1922. During the period of 1930-
1942 operations continued at this location for the 
extraction of uranium and radium salts. Vitro 
Corporation of America acquired the property 
and processed ore from 1942 until 1957 under 
contract to the federal government. In 1956 and 
1957, approximately 54,000 cubic yards of 
material was moved from the Canonsburg site to 
the Burrell site. In 1957 the Vitro plant closed.  
From 1957 through 1966 the site was used for 
storage under an Atomic Energy Commission 
contract. In 1967, the property was purchased by 
the Canon Development Company and was 
leased to tenant companies for light industrial 
use. 
 
Remedial action began in 1983. In accordance 
with UMTRCA, the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania was responsible for acquiring the 
designated properties. The site consisted of three 
parcels. The Commonwealth acquired these 
parcels through its Department of Environmental 
Resources. In addition to these parcels, 
approximately 163 vicinity properties were 
identified as potentially contaminated. The US 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) acquired 
these adjacent properties on behalf of the 
USDOE to complete the remedial action.   
 
Upon completion of the remedial action and 
following the USNRC’s concurrence, the 
Commonwealth transferred the ownership of 
these properties to the United States of America. 
Site C was transferred to the Borough of 
Canonsburg for public use. These transfers were 
completed in 1995. 
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  Former Land Owner(s) 
 
See Land Transfers section. 
 
 Potentially Responsible 
Parties 
US DOE 
 
System Characteristics 
 Engineered Barriers 
Description 
 
The size of the Canonsburg Disposal Cell is 
approximately 6 acres. The cell involves a 
compacted clay bottom liner. The radioactive 
tailings were then emplaced on the liner and the 
material was covered with a 3-foot radon barrier 
consisting of a clay-and-soil mixture. The radon 
barrier was covered with layers of rock and soil, 
which was seeded with grass.  
 Institutional Controls 
Description 
 
The DOE-GJO manages the site through its 
Long-Term Surveillance and Maintenance 
Program (LTSM) and in accordance with a long-
term surveillance plan prepared specifically for 
the Canonsburg site. Under provisions of the 
LTSP, the LTSM Program: conducts annual 
inspections of this site to evaluate the condition 
of surface features, cuts the grass at least once 
each year and controls other vegetation, performs 
other maintenance as necessary, and continues to 
monitor groundwater.   
 
Specific Institutional Controls present at this site 
include: access controls/fencing, warning signs, 
site markers and monuments, erosion control 
markers along Chartiers Creek, annual 
inspections, routine maintenance and 
groundwater monitoring wells. 
 
The LTSM Program monitors groundwater and 
surface water at the site as a best management 
practice to evaluate potential contaminant trends 
within the unconsolidated materials underlying 
the disposal site and to ensure that the creek is 
not contaminated. 
 Date of Site Closure 
   
The date of the cell closure is December 1985. 
 
 State of Practice at that 
time 
Current 
 Repair Actions to Date 
 
In 2001, the southern bank of Chartier Creek was 
stabilized to prevent further erosion. Stream 
erosion had been a concern for several years 
prior to this corrective action. Erosion markers 
and groundwater wells were impacted. The 
corrective action has been successful to date. 
Graphics 
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline See Land Transfer Section. 
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 Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction (i.e., Construction 
Quality Assurance/Quality Control. 
Construction QA/QC Plan was in place 
during construction. 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan 
  
Yes, LTSM Plan from DOE-GJO. 
 Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
GW monitoring and site inspections. 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
Annual inspection reports summarize 
findings.  Only data available is for GW 
monitoring. 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, bioremediate, etc.) 
None 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
Yes 
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
NA 
 Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
NA 
 Perform Active Monitoring 
 
NA 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
NA 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Yes 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
 
Physical access is limited by locked 
fence.   
 Detect Security Violations 
 
NA 
 Deter Security Violations 
 
NA 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
Yes 
 Establish Property-based Controls 
(i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
Yes, but have not yet obtained copies of 
deeds.  
 Maintain Reporting Requirements 
 
Yes 
Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
Annual LTSM maintenance budget, but 
does not include emergency 
contingency. 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
Annual USDOE appropriations.  
 Maintain Funding 
(i.e., long-term financial security) 
Annual USDOE appropriations.  
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 Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders 
 
No local interest groups identified. 
 Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
No information available concerning 
local community involvement. 
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
No 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
Annual inspection reports available from 
DOE-GJO.  No information on local 
involvement.   
Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users 
 
Only know users appear to be DOE-
GJO. 
 Define Information Requirements 
 
Information IS included in annual 
inspection reports (i.e., groundwater 
data). 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
DOE-GJO has responsibility for 
maintaining information. DOE-GJO 
conducts trending analysis. Information 
is available via internet. 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
Yes, but appears limited to groundwater 
data. 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified 
although trending data is presented in 
annual reports. 
 Maintain data current with 
information technology platforms 
DOE-GJO maintains paper copies of 
records. 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
Emergency procedures and verification 
procedures appear to be in place between 
DOE-GJO and local and state 
authorities. 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
No emergency equipment is located at 
the site.  Places will rely on local and 
state support. 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
NA 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
NA 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
The DOE-GJO has the responsibility for 
all management functions.   
 NA Define Best Available Technology 
 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of 
Repair versus Replace versus Re-
remediate 
NA 
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 Burrell Checklist 
Case Study 
Name: 
Burrell Uranium Mill Tailing Disposal Site 
Site Location: 
 
Blairsville, PA; Indiana County, PA 
Site Point of 
Contact(s): 
Grand Junction, CO, 81503 
 
Carl Jacobson, Grand Junction Project Office,  
Department for Energy, 
S.M. Stoller,  
970-248-6040 
Location of 
Information: 
Grand Junction Project Office 
Date of Site Visit: June 12, 2003 
Participants in 
Visit: 
Kevin Kostelnik 
 
Background The Burrell site is considered a vicinity property of the Canonsburg UMTRA 
site.  As a result of the amount of residual radioactive material (RRM) as well 
as the distance to the Canonsburg site, the Burrell disposal cell was 
constructed on-site rather than relocating all RRM back to Canonsburg. The 
cell contains 86,000 tons of RRM. The total cell radioactivity is 4 Ci 226Ra.   
Site Characteristics 
 Annual Precipitation 
 
Average annual precipitation for the Blairsville, PA 
area is 44 inches, which is fairly evenly distributed 
throughout the year. 
 Surface Waters 
 
The Burrell Disposal cell is located approximately 1 
mile from the Borough of Blairsville. The 
Conemaugh River directly borders the site on the 
south. The railroad tracks of the Norfolk Southern 
Rail Corporation directly border the site on the north. 
This river is recharged by groundwater flowing 
south-west through unconsolidated material.  
 Aquifer/Groundwater Groundwater occurs in the unconsolidated material at 
a depth of 30 feet at the site.  Groundwater flows 
south-west through unconsolidated material below 
the site and discharges into the Conemaugh River. 
Residents in the area are on public supplies.    
 Biological Indicators Vegetation is generally deciduous mixed forest 
consisting of primarily mixed oak, ash and maple. 
Wildlife include deer, squirrel, waterfowl, etc. here 
are no known threatened or endangered species in the 
area.
 
 T
 
 Annual Freeze/Thaw 
Cycles 
The region is classified as a humid continental 
climate.  
Temperatures generally range from 100oF to 0oF. 
 Ecosystem “Value” 
 
No threatened or endangered species are known to 
exist near this site. 
 Size  The Burrell site involves approximately 72 acres. 
Contaminated material was consolidated and 
stabilized into a 5-acre on-site disposal cell.  
 Site Geology The Burrell site is located upon a man-made plateau.  
Fill material, measuring 50 to 60 feet in depth, were 
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 landfilled to level the area for the rail service.  The 
fill material consists of gravelly loam, cinders, gravel, 
sandstone, construction debris, etc. The site is 
underlain by claystone and shales of the 
Pennsylvanian Casselman Formation. 
Waste Characteristics 
 Primary 
Contaminants of 
Concern 
 
Uranium tailings contain small concentrations of 
naturally occurring materials that radioactively 
decays to radium and produces radon, a radioactive 
gas. In addition, trace metals associated with the ore 
and chemicals used during the milling process are 
present. 
 Primary Exposure 
Routes 
Groundwater contamination. 
 Primary Risk 
 
Groundwater water contamination.  Initially 10 
monitoring wells and 2 seeps were monitored for 
standard water quality indicators and 20 analytes 
including: gross alpha, lead, molybdenum, radium-
226, radium-228, nitrate, selenium and uranium. 
Societal Characteristics 
 Population Density 
within 1 mi. 
 
The population within 1 mile of the site is very low 
(~<100). Residential sites are expanding into the area 
and the population within 2 miles of the site has been 
increasing. As of 1990 the population of the Borough 
of Blairsville was approximately 3595.   
 Demographic Pattern 
 
The immediate population appears to be increasing.  
Residential sites are expanding into the area and the 
population within 2 miles of the site has been 
increasing.  
 
The site lies within the Borough of Blairsville, 40 
miles west from Pittsburgh, PA. The regional 
population is stable.   
 Current Regional 
Land Use 
The immediate area is wooded. A railroad is directly 
adjacent to the disposal site. 
 Historic Regional 
Land Use 
The immediate area is wooded. A railroad is directly 
adjacent to the disposal site. 
 Current Site Land 
Use 
 
Waste disposal, surrounded by wooded areas. Area 
residents access the railroad area for recreation and 
unofficial waste disposal. 
 Potential Alternative 
Land Use(s) 
None 
Regulatory Characteristics 
 
 The principle regulation is the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act. The Uranium Mill Tailings 
Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) of 1978 was 
designed to clean up 24 abandoned mill tailing sites 
that had processed uranium and related ores for the 
federal government. Under the UMTRCA, the 
USEPA was directed to set general standards for the 
cleanup at these sites and vicinity properties. These 
are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, 
Title 40, Part 192.   
Principle Regulation 
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 UMTRCA authorized the USDOE to clean up the 
sites to meet USEPA standards.  UMTRCA also 
authorized the USNRC to oversee and certify the 
cleanup and license the completed disposal cell. 
Remedial actions at UMTRCA sites must also 
comply with the USEPA ground water protection 
standards published in the Federal Register in 
January 1995. 
 Current Land Owner 
 
U.S. federal government (USDOE) is the current 
landowner.  The site is currently managed within the 
US DOE Long-term Surveillance and Monitoring 
Program under license (1996) to the USNRC. 
 Land Transfers 
 
The Burrell site was previously owned by the 
Western Pennsylvania Railroad Company for the 
purposes of supporting rail operations as far back as 
1882. The property changed ownerships several times 
but always to subsequent railroads. The Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company acquired portions of the property 
in 1937. Later the Consolidated Rail Corporation 
acquired the property in 1976. Resolution of the 
federal government’s acquisition of the property 
occurred December 27, 1988. 
 Former Land 
Owner(s) 
See Land Transfers section. 
 
 Potentially 
Responsible Parties 
US DOE. 
  
System Characteristics 
 Engineered Barriers 
Description 
The size of the Burrell Disposal Cell is 
approximately 5 acres. The cell involves a multi-layer 
cap above the RRM found at the site. This RRM was 
originally transported to the Burrell site to serve as 
fill material at the site to level it for the railroad. This 
RRM, measuring approximately 74,400 tons, was left 
in place. In addition to this RRM, approximately 
11,600 tons of additional RRM was relocated from 
the Canonsburg UMTRA site from 1956 through 
1957. As part of the Burrell remedial action, this 
RRM was placed on top of the other RRM. The cap 
was then placed on top of this total 86,000 tons of 
RRM.   
 
 
The cap consists of three layers. Directly above the 
RRM a 3-foot-thick radon barrier was installed which 
consisting of a compacted clay. The purpose of this 
clay layer is to prevent the escape of radon gas and 
prevent the infiltration of precipitation. Above the 
radon barrier a 1-foot-thick soil-bedding layer was 
installed. The purpose of this layer was to promote 
precipitation runoff. The third layer consists of 1-
foot-thick riprap. This layer was designed to prevent 
surface erosion.   
 Institutional Controls 
Description 
 
The DOE Grand Junction Office (DOE-GJO) 
manages the site through its Long-Term Surveillance 
and Maintenance Program (LTSM) and in accordance 
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 with a long-term surveillance plan prepared 
specifically for the Burrell site. Under provisions of 
the LTSP, the LTSM Program: conducts annual 
inspections of this site to evaluate the condition of 
site features, performs other maintenance as 
necessary, continues to monitor groundwater and 
maintains emergency response capabilities in the 
event of a catastrophe.   
 
Specific Institutional Controls present at this site 
include: access controls/fencing, warning signs, site 
markers and monuments, erosion control markers, 
annual inspections, routine maintenance and 
groundwater monitoring wells. 
 
The LTSM Program initially monitored both 
groundwater and surface water at the site as a best 
management practice to evaluate potential 
contaminant trends. Changes to this monitoring plan 
have been noted in the 2002 Annual Compliance 
Report. These modifications include: discontinuing 
vegetation control on the cell cover, reducing 
groundwater monitoring frequency to once every 5 
years, elimination of 2 wells for groundwater 
monitoring, eliminating surface water monitoring on 
the Conemough River, discontinuing analyses for 
ammonia, cyanide, gross alpha, radium-226, radium-
228 and vanadium, and removing reference to a site 
marker that was never installed. 
 Date of Site Closure 
   
The date of the cell closure is December 1987. 
 
 State of Practice at 
that time 
Current 
 Repair Actions to 
Date 
 
Vegetation removal from the cap riprap has been an 
ongoing problem. A July 1999 GJO report documents 
this issue and recommends the elimination of 
maintenance/vegetation removal. 
Graphics 
 Photographs Obtained 
 Maps Obtained 
 Timeline Developed 
 
Functions Activities Comments 
Maintain the Engineered Contaminant Control System 
 Verify Engineered System 
Construction (i.e., Construction 
Quality Assurance/Quality Control) 
Construction QA/QC Plan was in place 
during construction. 
 Establish System Monitoring Plan 
  
Yes, LTSM Plan from DOE-GJO. 
 Perform System Monitoring  
(i.e., after release or integrated 
system) 
GW monitoring and site inspections. 
 Analyze and Report Data 
(i.e., monthly, quarterly, annually) 
Annual inspection reports summarize 
findings.  In addition, a Plant 
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 Encroachment analysis report documents 
the projected effects of vegetation 
growing on the cap. Report includes 
additional data. 
 Maintain Active Processes  
(pump & treat, biorem., etc.) 
None 
 Conduct Active Repairs 
 
Yes, vegetation on cap sprayed until the 
requirement was eliminated. 
Monitor the Environment & Ecosystem 
 Define Environmental, Ecological & 
Bioindicators 
NA 
 Establish Monitoring Plan 
 
NA 
 Perform Active Monitoring 
 
NA 
 Analyze and Report Data 
 
NA 
Maintain Site Security 
 Establish Security Plan 
 
Yes 
 Maintain Security Mechanisms  Physical access is limited by locked fence.  
(i.e., Access Controls) 
 Detect Security Violations 
 
NA 
 Deter Security Violations 
 
NA 
Enforce Legal Controls 
 Define Legal Responsibility 
(i.e., local, state, fed, multiple) 
Yes 
 Establish Property-based Controls 
(i.e., Real Estate Provisions, 
easements, covenants, restrictions) 
Yes  
 Maintain Reporting Requirements 
 
Yes 
Maintain Financial Security 
 Establish Financial Requirements  
(for monitoring, repair, replace, 
emergency actions, etc.) 
Annual LTSM maintenance budget, but 
does not include emergency contingency. 
 Establish Funding Mechanisms  Yes, annual USDOE appropriations.  
(i.e., insurance, tax, trust, 
appropriations) 
 Maintain Funding Requires annual appropriations. 
(i.e., long-term financial security)  
Maintain Community Awareness 
 Identify Site Stakeholders 
 
No local interest groups identified. 
 Establish Community Awareness 
Program  
 
DOE-GJO LTSM website established and 
maintained. No information available 
concerning local community involvement. 
 Define Community Awareness 
procedures and schedule 
No 
 Maintain Community Awareness 
Program 
Annual inspection reports available from 
DOE-GJO. No information on local 
involvement.   
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 Perform Information Management 
 Define Information Users 
 
Only known users appear to be DOE-GJO 
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(USNRC). 
 Define Information Requirements 
 
Information appears to be limited to that 
included in annual inspection reports (i.e., 
groundwater data). 
 Establish Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified 
although trending data is presented in 
annual reports. Some information is 
available via DOE-GJO webpage. 
 Integrate all monitoring and other 
relevant data 
Yes, but appears limited to groundwater 
data. 
 Maintain Information Management 
System 
No defined system was identified 
although trending data is presented in 
annual reports. 
 Maintain data current with 
information technology platforms 
DOE-GJO maintains paper copies of 
records. 
Perform Emergency Actions 
 Establish Emergency Preparedness 
Plans 
Emergency procedures and verification 
procedures appear to be in place between 
DOE-GJO and local and state authorities. 
 Obtain Emergency Response 
equipment 
No emergency equipment is located at the 
site.  Response will rely on local and state 
support. 
 Train Emergency Response Teams 
 
NA 
 Maintain Emergency Response 
Equipment & Team 
NA 
Continuous Improvement of System Operations  
 Integrate all Residual Hazards 
Management System Functions 
The DOE-GJO has the responsibility for 
all management functions.   
 Define Best Available Technology 
 
NA 
 Analyze Cost-Effectiveness of Repair 
versus Replace versus Re-remediate 
NA 
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